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Abstract 
Title of Dissertation : Contemporary issues on the domestic Ro-ro passenger 
ferry operation in developing country:  Identification of 
safety issues in domestic ferry operation based on the ferry 
involved accident investigation report in Indonesian water 
year 2003 - 2013 
Degree : MSc 
The dissertation is a study to present recent overview to the safety issues in the 
domestic ferry operation in developing country. This was done by taking example 
Indonesian domestic ferry operation. 
The ferry operation considered as the most successful maritime operation in sense of 
its transporting people, vehicle and goods. In developing countries, ferry is not just a 
transportation tools but it also use to maintain national integrity by providing access 
to remote islands or isolated by water location. However, accident to ferry in typical 
developing country more likely resulted in a catastrophic consequence of losing life 
and damaged to the property. Investigation into the accident had been done to reveal 
the causal root and present the outcome to the related stakeholders. The main idea of 
the dissertation is to review 16 ferry involved investigation report issued in 2003-
2013 with appropriate accident causation model and determine which factors were 
missing and contribute to the development of accident from cultivation of risk to the 
greater consequences. The review mainly focused on the three different type of 
accident namely fire, collision and capsize.  
The utilisation of state of the art, SEMOMAP model to the selected cases has 
presented detail outcome and useful information on the issues in the domestic ferry 
operation. Each of type of accident has shown various and interdependent factor that 
describe how the accident developed from contributory factor to the evacuation 
process. The model also made possible to review how human and equipment interact 
during the critical stage and later the model also identify the miss, lack and gaps 
within the process of accident.  
Further analysis and extensive discussion to the outcome of the model conducted to 
properly presents the outcome of the models. Relatively not surprisingly that the 
outcome of the SEMOMAP model showing the human failure contribution to the 
overall mishaps and significantly contribute to the overall accident process. Certainly 
that the accident causation models utilised and developed under the dissertation are 
immature system, some areas also requires further development in order to achieve 
better utilisation and handier outcome. 
Within the concluding chapter, the trend of safety issues in domestic ferry operation 
revealed and relevant recommendation are developed so it could be a reference for 
safety improvement in Domestic ferry operation. 
KEYWORDS: Domestic RoPax Ferry, Safety issues, accident causation model,  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Ro-ro ferries are considered the most successful maritime operation in the world 
from the perspective of service reliability, capacity carried and flexibility in 
operation (IMO, 2014). Ferry transport has been considered by stakeholders as a 
more affordable, timely service and reliable transport mode to transport passengers 
and goods between islands. Its capability to provide cost effectiveness and support 
other transport modes‘ operational efficiency has also led to the use of ferry transport 
to connect islands and create shortcuts to reduce distance and operation time. 
Ferry operation has been utilised worldwide. For developed countries, ferries are 
considered as the safest form of transportation. Their safety record shows significant 
achievement. For developing countries, domestic ferries have been a major backbone 
for national economic activities. The common ferry type used in the developing 
world is the RoPax ferry. That is the typical ferry that provides space to carry 
passengers, vehicles and cargo at the same time. 
In further detail, for archipelagic countries, domestic ferries play a significant role in 
the timely transhipment of large numbers of passengers. They also connect islands to 
provide access to commercial activity which, in the wider perspective, maintains 
national integrity. 
The development of technology utilised in RoPax ferry operation allows the ships to 
operate as connecting bridges. RoPax Ferries are still considered as the most 
affordable transport means compared to actual bridges themselves. Therefore, their 
service needs to be fast, reliable, structurally robust and intact, and punctual in 
operation, while at the same time, providing a sufficient level of safety. 
Despite its success story, ferry operation also contains a significant degree of 
operational risk. Due to the nature of operation, ferry disaster cases have the potential 
to result in catastrophic consequences. The cases of the Herald of Free Enterprise 
(UK, 1989), Estonia (Baltic Sea, 1992), Dona Paz (Philippine 1985), Al Salam 
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Boccaccio (Red sea, 2001), and Princess Ashika (Tonga, 2009) have raised public 
concern about the safety level of domestic ferry operation in developing countries. 
The international maritime community has also expressed its concern following 
continuous accidents involving domestic ferries despite the fact that improvements 
have been introduced to every aspect of their operation. In 2006, the International 
Maritime Organisation (IMO) along with the international ferry operators‘ 
community known as Interferry established a pilot project program to provide 
technical assistance to improve safety in developing countries‘ domestic ferry 
operations. The project took place in Bangladesh, which has been known for its 
disastrous ferry accidents. 
Significant findings following investigations into ferry-involved cases have been 
provided to all ferry operation stakeholders. This was done to raise awareness of 
safety issues and as a reference to develop and improve the level of safety in 
shipboard operation. However, disastrous accidents continued to occur, as evidenced 
by the Sewol case in South Korea in early 2014. Obviously, despite improvements to 
safety following easy access to technological development, public interest and 
human involvement, there is always room for error that could lead a ferry operation 
to a catastrophic accident. In other words, there are factors that latently contribute but 
are ignored and later accumulate into a single catastrophic accident.  
As an archipelagic country, Indonesia understands well the importance of maritime 
transport to support every aspect of the Nation‘s development. For Indonesia, 
domestic RoPax ferries play a significant role in maintaining the nations‘ integrity. 
The current system has been developed to connect its major islands and works as a 
transport hub for other transport modes. In the general perspective, domestic ferries 
connect islands and provide opportunities for regional development, hence 
supporting the national equality development program. In a more specific view, the 
transport system supports logistic distribution, and access to equalise economic 
development by providing low cost transport across the nation. 
Since the ferry transport system was introduced, there have been fluctuations in its 
safety level as indicated by a number of incidents and mishaps. Accidents related to 
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domestic ferry operation continue to occur. DGST data from 2003 to2013 indicates 
that nearly every year one or more ferry accidents occur with the consequence of a 
high number of fatalities, missing persons and serious injuries.  
Systemic investigations into the related accidents have been conducted to determine 
contributing factors and reports have also been published to increase public and 
stakeholder awareness of the safety of domestic RoPax ferry operation. Investigation 
reports were made public with the objective of presenting the main factors causing 
the accidents. However, some of the reports did not sufficiently provide details on 
the factors that contributed directly and indirectly to the accidents. Some missing 
important information could be useful to present the facts pertaining to the current 
issues of ferry operation. To some extent, investigation reports themselves are 
considered insufficient to analyse and properly identify the factors contributing to 
accident/incidents. Therefore, additional analysis by adopting a sufficient accident 
causation model could enhance the outcome of the investigation and provide 
feedback to the investigation process itself  (Wiegmann & Shappel, 2001). 
It is necessary to identify and understand how the accidents developed starting from 
small operational and management issues that occurred in the past and contributed to 
the development of risk that resulted in the accident itself. The aspect of emergency 
response from both shipboard and shore based activities also plays an important role 
in determining whether the consequences of the incident could have been mitigated 
or whether the response resulted in greater loss. 
To sum up, concerning the significant role of the domestic ferry in every aspect of 
the country‘s development, there should be greater awareness to improve the level of 
safety of its operation. However, there are still issues that might not be properly 
identified and result in the continuation of tragic accidents involving Indonesian 
domestic ferries. A thorough analysis of the previous mishaps in RoPax ferry 
operation by utilising proper assessment tools is deemed necessary. Following this 
reason, the writer has been motivated to conduct this study 
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1.2 Objectives 
Following the background information mentioned above, the dissertation attempts to 
identify the current safety issues involved in the operation of domestic ro-ro 
passenger ferries in the Indonesian domestic ferry operation system. As a more 
specific goal, the dissertation provides related information with regard to safety 
issues involved in domestic ferry operation including, but not limited to, the 
following topics. 
 To identify critical safety factors existing in domestic ferry accidents by 
developing and utilising an accident analysis model. 
 To analyse the main safety issues that contribute to domestic ferry accidents 
 To identify the adequacy and comprehensiveness of accident investigation 
reports to provide a reference for related parties to improve the investigation 
system in the future. 
 To propose recommendations for related stakeholders to improve the safety of 
domestic ferry operation in Indonesia, and possibly internationally. 
1.3 Scope of works and methodology 
The dissertation does not attempt to present all related information on Indonesian 
domestic ferry operation issues. In order to sufficiently achieve the objectives stated 
above, the dissertation only focuses on analysing accidents involving domestic 
ferries operating in Indonesian waters, based on 16 RoPax ferry related accident 
investigation reports issued by the National Transportation Safety Committee 
(NTSC) during the period 2003 – 2013. 
In addition, the dissertation covers the following: 
 A literature review on domestic ropax ferry operation systems from a 
regulatory perspective to support domestic ferry operation, which will be cross 
referenced with relevant international resolutions, regional agreements, 
accident development processes, and concepts of safety analysis 
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 An exploration and review of accident causation models by utilising them in 
different cases 
 An Identification and analysis of safety issues by utilising the SEMOMAP 
model on the selected investigation reports. 
1.4 Structure and organisation 
In order to accomplish the main goals of the dissertation, the structure has been 
arranged in the following order 
Chapter I presents the background and main objective of the dissertation by briefly 
describing its general concept and methodology. 
Chapter II is mainly focused on the literature review to present the general aspects of 
the domestic ferry operation system. It covers the rules and regulations for domestic 
ferry operation, the technology involved, and the operational pattern utilised.  
Chapter III provides brief information on the current domestic Ro-ro ferry operation 
in Indonesia focusing on the development of policy, fleet status, transport 
productivity, operation pattern and recognised operational issues. 
Chapter IV presents general concepts to identify safety issues in maritime transport. 
This covers the concept of accident development, discussion of the tools used to 
analyse accidents and introduction to the SEMOMAP as the main model used to 
analyse the safety issues in domestic ferry operation. The chapter discusses briefly 
the idea of accident analysis from the perspective of both a formal investigation 
method and an accident causation model. In addition, the chapter introduces the 
features of the SEMOMAP model by explaining its general concept and 
development, its operational workflow and terminology used in the model. 
Chapter V provides an overview of the accident cases that are used in the model. The 
chapter also discusses and summarises the outcome of the SEMOMAP model to the 
cases used and analyses the outcome to determine the factors related to the operation 
of Indonesian Domestic RoPax ferries.  
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Chapter VI discuss and analyse the SEMOMAP outcome and provide comparison 
with other similar analysis results published by other institutions. Lastly, comments 
on the issues and improvements regarding utilisation of the model are presented. 
Chapter VII presents a conclusion to the information and, based on the analysis of 
the issues involved in domestic RoPax ferry operation, recommendations are 
proposed. 
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2 Domestic Ferry Operation System 
The chapter presents general information on the nature of ferry transport from the 
perspective of technology, operation, regulation development and common issues 
that take place in the operation of domestic RoPax ferries.  
2.1 Past and present domestic ferry operation development 
Recently, speed, reliability, safety, efficiency and environmental sustainability have 
been the major factors demanded by transport users. Considering the aforementioned 
requirements, ferry transport is the best solution since Ferry transport is able to 
provide shortcuts in terms of time and distance, as well as being flexible in operation 
and affordable.  
Globally, there were about 1,162 units ferry ships with size more than 1000 GT, with 
a total capacity of 1.15 million passengers and car capacity of 226,210 or equal to 
769,210 lane metres of commercial vehicles. Combined gross tonnage was 12.8 
million and the average age of the fleet was 21 years. According to ShipPax data, in 
2009, more than 2 billion passengers, 251 million cars, 32 million trailers were 
carried by ferries globally. Interferry database records show there were 1300 ferry 
ships above 1000 GRT operating globally (Interferry, 2014).  
Ferry operation can be traced back historically by observing its service in ancient 
times. The first modernised ferry was built in 1849 when the Leviathan provided a 
connection for the railway line from Dundee to Aberdeen, UK (Marshall, 1989). The 
main reason for the development of the new transport system was that existing bridge 
technology was incapable of supporting rail traffic in the region. In addition, during 
its early application, the ferry system was renowned for providing short distance 
transport from port to port. It also opened access to movement and ease of commerce 
activity where centres were divided by waters. Later, following increased demand for 
higher capacity transport, the ferry system was also considered as support for other 
modes of transportation such as railways and land transport. 
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During World War II, typical ferry operations of landing ship tank (LST) were used 
to support the transhipment of troops, military vehicles and trains across European 
countries, the Mediterranean region, Greek islands and English Channel. During that 
time, ferry transport played a significant role as it was flexible and required no 
additional infrastructure such as port facilities or complex berthing operations. After 
the World War, the ferry transport system developed to continuously support and 
even accelerate the overall transport process, commercial activity and logistics 
supply. 
In Europe, Ro-ros have also proved extremely popular in association with pleasure 
activities and for private car owners and have significantly contributed to the growth 
of tourism. Until the early 1950s someone wishing to take a car from one country to 
another by sea had to get it loaded into a ship's hold by crane, a time-consuming and 
expensive process. The development of the ro-ro car ferry changed all of that and 
many ports boomed as a result.  
Today the world ro-ro fleet can be subdivided into a number of different types. They 
include ships designed to carry freight vehicles only, and those designed to carry a 
combination of containers and freight vehicles and to transport cars without 
passengers. There are various other types and freight-only Ro-ro ships form about 
two thirds of the world ro-ro fleet at present. 
The term ―domestic ferry‖ is strongly related to the type of operation and legal 
jurisdiction that applies to the ship. More specifically, for instance, under the 
Canadian system, the term ―domestic ferry‖ defines a vessel that is entitled to fly the 
Canadian flag, carries passengers on a regular schedule and operates on a route set 
out in a schedule. Since the ship is operated within the State‘s jurisdiction, local legal 
regulations apply to all aspects of its operation such as structure, registration, 
manning, operating route and other relevant regulations. 
9 
 
2.2 Technology, safety and operational patterns involved in Domestic Ferry 
operation 
There are various types of ferries. According to the guidelines for ferry transportation 
service issued by the Transport Research Board of the USA, there are three ferry 
types, namely: 
 Water Taxis: small watercraft that typically serve short cross-waterways or 
waterway circulation routes; 
 Passenger Ferries: larger vessels that have higher passenger capacity and 
speeds than water taxis and typically serve short- to moderate-length routes; 
and 
 Auto Ferries: also known as roll-on, roll-off ferries, these ferries transport 
vehicles as well as passengers. They are typically used on longer routes across 
major bodies of water and on low-volume rural roads crossing rivers. 
The RoPax ferry is one type of ferry. The acronym ROPAX (roll-on/roll-off 
passenger) describes a RO-RO vessel built for freight vehicle transport along with 
passenger accommodation. Passenger ferries are larger vessels that have more 
passenger capacities and speeds than water taxis and that typically serve short to 
moderate-length routes. The RoPax ferry also has distinctive technology, safety 
system and operation pattern. 
2.2.1 Ship structure 
From the ship-structure perspective, a ferry ship has its own technical characteristics 
to support its operation pattern. For the purpose of carrying vehicles in an affordable 
number, the ship is designed to have a continuous deck over its entire length 
(Dokkum, 2012). A RoPax ferry can also be easily identified by its ramps, which are 
located either at its forward/after end and/or on its side. The ramps work as 
connecting means for vehicles from the port to the ship, unlike early ferries, which 
required massive and complex crane operation. However, from hull type and vessel 
dimensions point of view, ferry ships have adopted similar types of hull shape such 
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as monohull, catamaran, hydrofoils, and any other hull form (Transit Cooperative 
Research Program, 2003).  
In terms of propulsion installation, ship designers consider the functionality of the 
ferry. Therefore, most RoPax ferries have double ended structures to ease their 
operations when berthing. Each end is equipped with one or more propulsion 
systems. To ease its operation, propulsion types such as azimuth thrusters, and void 
Schneider, are also installed so the ship is easier to handle and manoeuvre (Dokkum, 
2012). 
According to its main function, a RoPax Ferry is required to have space to carry 
vehicles and or trains on board its deck. Roll-on/Roll-off shipping is usually reserved 
for larger cargo ships since it takes considerable space to deliver vehicles with this 
method and also requires enough vehicles to be moved at once for it to be financially 
feasible. The cardeck space can be an open space type or fully enclosed type. The 
selection of cardeck construction type depends on the route and type of operation. 
For example, a fully enclosed cardeck is designed for the ferry to protect its cars 
when it is transiting in open seas that have higher waves. Relevant to the function of 
the ramp door, all openings in the enclosed space deck should be watertight. The 
open space cardeck is normally for short distance ferries that are transiting coastal 
areas or engaging in short distance voyages. 
The ferry cardeck, as its main cargo compartment, is measured by its carrying 
capacity in Line per Meter (LiM) (Dokkum, 2012). The cardeck is also specifically 
designed to support the weight of the vehicles and its cargo. Therefore, information 
on the details of the cargo and the vehicles is considered of importance for ferry 
operation. 
Since it also carries passengers, the Ropax ferry ship provides accommodation space. 
The accommodation structure highly depends on the type, length, time and area of 
operation. For instance, short distance ferries only provide passenger space similar to 
waiting rooms; meanwhile, cruise-like ferries can provide comfortable cabins for 
passengers to stay in during lengthy operations. 
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2.2.2 Safety onboard ropax ferry 
Since the ropax ferry ship is mixture like cargo (auto-carrier) vessel and passenger 
type ship, there are some parameters to indicate safety of its operation. 
Stability 
Stability is known as the main issue for ferry operation. The spacious and full length 
cardeck can create enormous effects when there are shifting cargoes or additional 
weight comes into effect such as from flooding. Flooding can create a stability 
phenomenon called free surface effect (FSE). The free surface effect worsens ship 
stability due to the large quantity of fluid moving to the direction in which the ship is 
heeling. The condition creates large heeling moment and resulted in a quick negative 
stability (reference). 
There are a number of capsize cases indicating ferry vulnerability to FSE. Therefore, 
special regulations in SOLAS chapter II-1 on subdivision and damage stability were 
adopted to mitigate the issue. As general idea, the subdivision standard requires the 
ships to be able to survive if one watertight compartment is flooded.  
In addition, the modern ro-ro ferry is installed with an anti-heeling system to allow 
water to automatically distribute between two opposing ballast tanks to keep the ship 
upright (Dokkum, 2012). 
To prevent the flooding and reduce the risk of capsize, SOLAS requires all openings 
door/ramp door should be watertight. In addition, additional measures should be 
provided such as an inner door behind the bow door or visor to prevent water 
entering car deck - for example, through doors leading to other parts of the ship.  
Following the higher possibility of the flooding, most of the Ro-ro ferries are 
installed with special drainage systems. For enclosed cardecks, SOLAS requires a 
system that allows drainage to be controlled by the crew from the bridge instead of 
operated directly in the engine room. On the other hand, an open space cardeck 
should be fitted with a sufficient number of scuppers to allow the water to freely 
discharge overboard. 
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Cargo securing system 
Due to ship movement, unsecured or improperly secured vehicles onboard a ferry, 
could compromise ship stability and possibly damage other cargo.  To secure the 
vehicle deck, there are securing points known as lashings that should comply with 
guidelines for Securing Arrangements for the Transport of Road Vehicles on Ro-Ro 
Ships under IMO resolution A.581 (14). The guidelines apply to Ro-Ro ships which 
carry road vehicles on either long or short international voyages in unsheltered 
waters and are applicable to: Road vehicles with an authorized total mass of vehicle 
and cargo between 3.5 and 40 t, Articulated road trains with an authorized total mass 
not more than 45 t. 
Local rules such as Indonesian standard for minimum ferry service require certain 
space arrangements for cars to provide easy access for the crew during ship 
operations and emergency situations.  
Fire protection 
Ferry also considered vulnerable to fire accident. The level of complexity in fire was 
rising due to the cargo and passenger carried onboard. 
In more specific, IMO adopted resolution A.327 (IX), concerning fire safety 
requirements for cargo ships. The resolution recommends the implementation of 
improved fire safety requirements in addition to those incorporated in SOLAS 60 and 
SOLAS 74 (which at that time had not entered into force).  
In addition, SOLAS regulations specify the minimum protection for typical 
passenger ship to have levels of fire protection equivalent to machinery spaces 
(Transit Cooperative Research Program, 2003), that is: 
– Must be limited by class A boundaries (in steel or equivalent material) 
– Closed spaces to be protected by a fixed fire extinguishing system, typically 
CO2 in cargo ships and sprinklers (DeLuge system) in car ferries 
– Smoke detection system 
– Open cargo decks do not require a fixed fire extinguishing system 
– Portable systems and hoses 
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Life saving appliance 
RoPax ferries are also required to comply with standards for life saving appliances 
such as ensuring an adequate number of liferafts and lifejackets for crew and 
passengers that are ready to access during emergency situations. There are different 
applications of the requirement since some countries also developed non-SOLAS 
safety standard.  
2.2.3 Berthing operation  
The main idea of ferry terminal design is to provide access for passengers and 
vehicles to proceed from the ferry to access a mode of continued travel. The internal 
layout of international facilities should reflect this concern for the convenience of 
passengers and their vehicles by providing simple and direct passenger/vehicle flow 
routes through well designed facilities (Transit Cooperative Research Program, 
2003). 
The Transit Cooperative Research Program (2003) provides the general concept of 
the berthing operation for ferries. The vessel capacity of the berth, or loading area, is 
dependent upon two key components: the arrival service time and the departure 
service time. Arrival service time, given in seconds per vessel, is the sum of the 
vessel clearance time, plus the passenger disembarking time. Similarly, departure 
service time is the embarking time plus clearance time of the vessel to allow for other 
vessels to use the dock area. Disembarking and embarking time is a function of a 
number of factors, including passenger or auto demand, fare collection methods, and 
the design of the embarking and disembarking facilities, such as the dimensions of 
the gangways and walkways. 
The vessel and loading design may also enable the embarking and disembarking 
times to be overlapped. 
A. Passenger boarding operation 
Passengers‘ travel time is the duration from leaving the origin to arrival at the 
destination. Design elements include docks, shelter, queuing areas, and fare 
collection. All of these elements should be arranged to provide safety and reliability 
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and to reduce time as much as possible. For international ferry connections, some 
additional facilities such as custom clearance and immigration service might also be 
provided. 
Above all, the main idea for a passenger manifest system in Ro-ro ferry operation is 
to identify the exact number of total passengers boarded. There should be sufficient 
identification since the ship is limited to a certain number passengers due to safety 
and comfort.  
B. Vehicle loading operation 
The process of vehicle loading and unloading is time consuming and hence demands 
proper loading facilities and circulation provisions at the terminal (Transit 
Cooperative Research Program, 2003). 
To support its operation, some RoPax ferry ports are also equipped with specially 
built transport facilities known as movable bridges (MB). The MB can be adjusted to 
accommodate the tide of the water with the ship draught and allow vehicles easy 
access to and from its cargo deck. Docking configurations largely depend upon the 
vessel and the design parameters for capacity and overall travel time. Since there are 
no standard designs for ferry terminals (as there are standard highway designs), great 
care must be taken to configure terminals to work for the ferry system and the ferry 
vessels. 
Bruzzone (2012) state that concerning safe and secure handling for the vehicle and 
its cargo loaded while they are transported onboard ferry, there should proper 
identification of the cargo and its weight. Therefore, the ferry terminal is ideally 
equipped with vehicle-cargo weighing facilities and cargo inspection facilities. The 
shipper is also required to provide detailed document declaration of its type and size. 
Hence, the ferry crew can set up proper handling for the concerned vehicles. For 
instance, reefer cargo is mostly not allowed to use its independent cooling system. 
Therefore, vehicles with reefer cargo should be located near an electrical power port 
provided onboard the ferry ship. 
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2.2.4 Operational pattern 
In order to maintain its effective operation, some ferry operations are maintained on 
a daily basis. Most RoPax ferries are operated regularly under an assigned schedule. 
In some ferry ports, there is a strict time of port operation due to high berthing 
occupancy of the berth facilities.  
Referring to operational patterns, ferry operation can be divided into the following 
types (Bruzzone, 2012): 
 Direct connection to connect two ports and working similarly to a floating 
bridge. 
 Multiple connections system:  developed to connect more than two points of 
call within a group of islands.  
 Coastal and shortcut ferry: coastal ferry established to provide access and short 
cut of two points within the coastal region that its access is blocked by different 
condition. 
In addition, in terms of its service, a ferry can be also categorized into the following 
(Transit Cooperative Research Program, 2003): 
• Transit (no vehicle access): 
- Ferry Urban consisting of scheduled service between points within a city or 
metropolitan area. 
- Ferry Intercity consisting of scheduled service between metropolitan areas. 
• Highway 
- Ferry Essential consisting of scheduled service between points outside a 
metropolitan area or between metropolitan areas and providing vehicle access 
almost always in areas without direct roadway access. 
2.3 Development of rules and regulations for domestic RoPax ferry operation 
RoPax ferries are not subject to exemption from any regulations. In fact there are 
stricter regulations since they carry passengers and possibly dangerous cargo in 
addition to vehicles. Similarly, almost all regulations to improve the safety and 
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effectiveness of Ro-ro transport are derived from near misses, incidents, and 
accidents in the past. For instance, the development of the international safety 
management (ISM) code was strongly attributed to the Herald of Free Enterprise 
accident. 
In general, shipping regulations should includes technical design, construction 
parametric, repair, operations standard and system, standard for manning, training, 
environmental impact, security and regular inspections throughout a vessel‘s life. 
Adequate and thorough inspections should examine deeply the stability information, 
hulls condition, propulsion system and performance, states of other machinery, 
electrical systems, lifesaving appliances and arrangements, fire prevention and fire 
fighting systems, navigation systems and communications systems (Interferry, 2014) 
The IMO conference in 1995 adopted numbers of amendments to SOLAS, based on 
proposition by member states and highlighted by the Panel of Experts on the safety 
of roll on – roll off passenger ships. 
The most significant changes relate to the stability of ro-ro passenger ships stipulated 
in Chapter II-1 of the convention. The SOLAS 90 related to damage stability 
standard was extended to existing ships in accordance with an agreed phase-in 
programme. 
A new regulation 8-2 was adopted under the convention during the conference. It 
contained special standard for ro-ro passenger ships carrying 400 passengers or 
more. This main objective of the additional regulation is to scrap ships built to a 
single compartment standard and ensure the concept of two main compartments so 
the ship can survive without capsizing when flooded following damage occurred. 
Amendments also included changes to Chapter III, which related with life saving 
appliances and arrangements, including the addition regulation that requiring ro-ro 
passenger ships to be equipped with public address (PA) mechanism.  
Other amendments were also made to Chapter IV on the radio communications; 
Chapter V on the safety of navigation that also including a special requirement that 
all ro-ro passenger ships should have an established working language - and Chapter 
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VI on carriage of cargoes. The IMO conference 1995 also adopted a resolution which 
permits regional arrangements to be made on special safety requirements for ro-ro 
passenger ships. 
It is obvious that SOLAS, MARPOL, STCW and other international convention 
requirements should be fully satisfied and complied with by typical passenger ships 
as well as RoPax ferries that engage in international voyages. However, since most 
domestic ferries operate within inland waterways and/or coastal service, international 
regulation implementation is limited but does not prevent the shipowner or the ship 
operator from applying it.  
For most domestic ferry operations in developing countries, financial constraints are 
the main issue for RoPax ferry operators to comply fully with SOLAS requirements. 
Therefore, to provide legal protection and ensure safety is maintained at a 
satisfactory level, most State maritime administrations have developed a standard 
operating procedure that is equal to international conventions or depends on the 
policy of the country itself. The typical regulation is commonly referred to as non-
convention vessel standard or regulation. Therefore, following the conditions, 
stipulated standards for ferry operation can be different from country to country.  
For instance, following the tragic accident of Estonia in 1994, the EU developed a 
comprehensive policy for regional ferry transport by issuing the Council Directive 
98/18/EC dated 17 March 1998 on safety rules and standards for passenger ships as 
amended by Directive 2003/24/EC dated 14 April 2003. The rules apply to domestic 
and inland water way transport that also includes passenger ferry transport in the 
European region. 
In the United States, U.S. Coast Guard approval is always required for the operation 
of for-hire passenger vessels. The Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Title 46 
contains regulatory requirements applicable to the design, construction, and 
operation of ferries operating in U.S. waters.  
Other regions, under IMO technical assistance support, are encouraged to develop 
local rules on domestic ferry operation. Indonesia Government issued standard for 
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Non-Convention vessels in 2009. The standard was developed under joint 
cooperation between Directorate General of Sea Transportation and Australian 
Maritime Safety Authority. The standard is considered sufficient to provide 
alternative for Non-Convention vessel flying Indonesia Flag in complying the level 
of safety based on the capability of local operators.  
2.4 Typical domestic RoPax ferry operation issues 
2.4.1 Policy and operational issues 
Lawson and Weisbrod (2005) stated that ferry transport is a key element of economic 
development for many nations due to their main reliance on ferries for the transport 
of people and goods—hence the critical importance of ferries also goes for jobs 
opportunity and as a catalyst of national economic growth (Lawson & Weisbrod, 
2005). Lawson and Weisbrod also mentioned that the nations where high rates of 
fatality incident occur, ferry transport is indispensable to the lives of the local social 
community. Ferry transport main developed based on the geographic features, such 
as nations with island archipelagos, unbridgeable straits, riverine deltas, poor road 
transport, or a combination of these geographic features. Concerning the importance 
of ferry transportation as the basis of economic development, the lack of safety is 
economically devastating. 
The fire onboard Egyptian flag passenger ferry El Salam Boccaccio 98 in the Red 
Sea in February 2006 indicated insufficient maintenance, out dated technology for 
onboard emergency response and insufficient crew capability during emergency 
situation strongly contributed to the large number of casualties. On the other side, 
unavailability of shore based emergency response also proved to allow the severer 
consequence of a large number of fatalities. 
The investigation into the Capsize of Princess Ashika off Tonga in 2009 also 
indicated a lack of shore-based influence to overall safety contributed significantly to 
the accident. In addition, improper maintenance and lack of safety regulations were 
also found to contribute to the accident (TAIC, 2010). 
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There are numerous studies on accidents involving domestic RoPax ferries in 
developing countries. Following the studies, it is possible to find commonalities 
among the cases. In their research, Dalziel et.al (2012) identified the repeated causes 
of ferry incidents: (Dalziel & Weisbrod, 2013): 
 Overloading 
 Inadequate Vessel Design and Maintenance 
 Sudden Hazardous Weather 
 Human Error 
 Lack of communication (alerting/location) 
 Inadequate rescue response 
Due to the distinct operation of RoPax ferries, from a shore based operation 
perspective, OSHA of the United States identified several factors that contribute to  
injuries and damage to  property, including (OSHA, 2010): 
 Lack of training 
 Lack of awareness 
 Fatigue 
 Inattention 
 Inadequate traffic controls 
 Lack of training 
 Lack of awareness 
 Fatigue 
 Inattention 
 Inadequate traffic controls 
In addition, following a thorough examination of a number of ferry accidents in 
different regions, Lawson et.al (2009) discussed a common approach to identify 
safety issues in ferry operations for developing countries. This was done in two main 
aspects of prevention and response, and post-event responsibilities for ferry safety in 
developing countries. The prevention and response focused on the regulatory 
approach, vessel design related to its fitness, and sufficiency in standard operating 
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and emergency response procedures that cover both shipboard operation and shore 
based response (Table 2-1). 
Table 2-1: prevention and response for ferry safety in developing countries. Source: Lawson & 
Weisbrod, 2005.  
 
Under post event responsibilities, the issues mainly relate to the reactive actions of 
related parties, including the investigation of the accident, documentation and 
records of the event, imposed penalties for any violation that resulted in the accident, 
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and post incident victim support such as insurance support and compensation (Table 
2-2). 
Table 2-2: Post event responsibilities for States operating domestic ferry Source: Lawson & 
Weisbrod, 2005. 
 
Obviously the issues of ferry safety in the developing world will remain if there are 
no proper actions taken by all parties. The international maritime and ferry 
communities are required to stand ready to offer their assistance and capacity-
building know-how. 
During a regional forum on domestic ferry safety held in Bali Indonesia on 6-7 
December 2011, issues that take place in ferry operation were discussed. This was 
mainly focused on lack of enforcement, insufficient regulation, administration 
monitoring of fleet operation, lack of safety management and non-existence of a 
safety culture in every aspect of ferry operation (IMO, 2011). 
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2.4.2 RoPax safety issues from a technological perspective 
From a technological perspective, IMO has identified significant issues based on an 
analysis of ferry mishap data (IMO, 2014). 
1. The lack of internal bulkheads 
The hull was divided into some watertight compartments so when one of the 
compartment breached, the ship will remain afloat. The watertight bulkheads 
structure will stop or delay the flooding, providing sufficient time for evacuation of 
the passengers and crew. Where the structure considered intact, it will stop ship to 
capsize at all. The main problem with Ro-ros is the length and spacious cardeck that 
nearly impossible to install internal bulkhead mainly due to operational reason. The 
huge vehicle decks make it possible for water to enter very rapidly and fire can also 
spread very quickly for the same reason. 
2. Cargo access doors 
Rampdoor considered as the weak point due to number of capsize accident the 
seawater inrushes from non watertight door. During the cargo operation, such doors 
can also be damaged or twisted. 
3. Stability 
Ro-ro stability has been studied since it is found too vulnerable with such condition 
such as movement of cargo on the vehicle deck. The sudden and rapid inrush of 
water following damage to the hull or failure of watertight doors can be even more 
serious. Lack of condition of freeing port can also be a significant factor to ship 
stability as it allows water accumulated in the spacious cardeck. In addition, larger 
upper water superstructure means that the ship can also be more influenced by wind 
and bad weather. 
4. Low freeboards 
To ease the vehicle loading operation, cargo access doors fitted on cargo-only ro-ros 
are normally designed close to the waterline. The issues appear when the ship was 
loaded in maximum or having excessive trim by stern or even waves which could 
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result in a sudden inrush of water (if the door is open or the structure was not 
watertight). Subsequently, the condition could result in the list increasing and a 
possible capsizing of the ship. 
5. Cargo stowage and securing 
When the ship experience excessive heel angle, the cargo inside can easily shifted 
and break loose if it is not correctly stowed and secured. The tight operation schedule 
urge the ship crew to commenced the securing in timely manner. Proper securing 
equipments are required to support this condition. Tight arrangement of the vehicle 
should be highly considered to provide sufficient access to the ship crew when 
emergency situation developed such as fire or spillage dangerous cargo from the 
tipped over vehicle. 
6. Life-saving appliances 
The high structure of the ro-ros, including passenger ships, could create serious 
issues regarding LSA: as the life boat stowed higher, it can be difficult to launch, 
especially if the ship is heeling badly. 
7. The crew 
The tight schedule, monotonous and typical operation can affect the crew. The 
typical ship regular and scheduled operation in certain conditions allows the ship not 
to be manned with sufficient number of crew. However, the factors referred to above 
indicate that ro-ros are highly sophisticated ships which require very careful 
handling. The situation makes the ship exceptionally vulnerable to human error. 
2.5 Conclusion 
To summarise, ferry transport is considered as the most successful maritime transport 
due to its flexibility, punctuality, and ease to connect with other transport modes. 
Due to its nature of operation, domestic ferry regulation has been developed in a 
stricter way.  
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For developed countries, ferry transport has achieved a sufficient level of safety 
following its operational, technological and regulatory improvements. However, 
studies have identified that there are safety areas in need of consideration for ferry 
operation in developing countries.  
The international community has expressed its concern by providing assistance and 
technical support to the concerned ferry transport stakeholders in developing 
countries.  
  
25 
 
3 Indonesian domestic RoPax ferry operation 
The following chapter provides an overview of Indonesian domestic RoPax ferry 
operation including its historical development, statistical activity data, current fleet 
condition, current policy and general overview of challenges that currently exist. 
3.1 Indonesian policy and regulation on Domestic RoPax ferry transport 
For archipelagic countries, maritime transport plays a significant role in all aspects of 
the Nation‘s development. It provides connection and open access to all parts of the 
country. Since Indonesia‘s policy and concept of the oceans is not to divide the 
nation but to connect all islands, maritime transport is considered as the keeper of 
National integrity and the main support for the economic equality development 
program. In addition, maritime transport in Indonesia provides the opportunity to 
reach 5000 inhabited remote islands spread across the country. 
The Ro-ro is considered the most appropriate transport mode for Indonesia since it 
provides flexibility, low fare, and affordable technology. The Ro-ro can also access 
inland waters that require low draft ships. On the other hand, coastal ferries in some 
areas in Indonesia also play a significant role in saving time and increasing regional 
interconnectivity.  
3.1.1 Indonesia domestic ferry policy 
The history records that during the end of the Dutch colonising era in the early 
1900s, the first modernised ferry port in Indonesia was established to connect the 
railway line from Merak Port of Java Island to Bakauheni port of the southern part of 
Sumatera island (Rizal, 2011). Later, following increased traffic and vast 
development across the country, the ferry service shifted from only being a 
connection to rail transport to focusing on the transport of passengers and connecting 
other land transport modes. 
The Indonesian government considers Ro-ro transport as an integral part of the road 
transport network. It provides opportunities to enhance the overall reliability of 
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transport services since it is capable of connecting all islands. Thus, it supports 
national social and economic activity (DGLT, 2005). 
According to the long term development plan issued by the ministry of 
Transportation of Indonesia, the nation‘s ferry transport policy mainly focuses on to 
the following agenda (MoT, 2008): 
 Development for mass transport 
 Connection between islands, working similarly to a bridge 
 Even growth and distribution of  regional development and reduction of cost 
disparity 
 Support for national logistic distribution 
 Maintenance of national political and social stability; even further, avoidance 
of national social gap and disintegration. 
In addition, the Indonesian Shipping Act no. 17/2008 and Government Decree no. 
22/2010 on water transportation stipulated clearly the main function of ferry 
transport: 
 Ferry transport is a floating bridge that connects road transport and railway 
transport systems that have been divided by water to transport passengers and 
vehicles and their cargo. 
 Ferry transport development is also directed to open and provide access to 
remote and under developed inhabited islands. Future plans also attempt to 
provide alternatives to saturated road transport. 
To interpret the policy stated in the act, the Ministry of Transportation developed a 
national blueprint for ferry transportation in 2009. The blueprint comprises the stages 
of a plan for improving ferry transport services. This focused on three main 
strategies: 
 Revitalisation of the existing ferry service focused on the port facility and fleet 
retrofits.  
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 Optimisation and capacity improvement of existing commercial ferry lanes 
including improvement to the capacity of ferry service based on the growth of 
transport demand for passengers, vehicle and cargo transport 
 Development of new ferry service to connect remote islands 
3.1.2 Indonesia domestic ferry route network 
According to the national blueprint for ferry transport in Indonesia, ferry lanes are 
considered to integrate with other land transport systems and attempt to provide 
connections to every island in Indonesia. Therefore, the Indonesian government 
decided to focus the operation of the ferry lane into three main lanes known as North, 
Middle and South Belt (Figure 3-1).  
 
Figure 3-1: Indonesian domestic ferry transport lane system. Map obtained from DGST. Copyright 
2009. Reprinted with permission 
The north belt connects the road transport system of the northern part of Sumatera 
Island to the road transport system in the northern part of Kalimantan, North of 
Sulawesi and links the road transport network to the northern part of Papua Island. 
The middle belt provides connections for the road transport network from and to the 
middle part of Sumatera Island, Bangka Belitung, south to east coast road transport 
network of Kalimantan island, centre of Sulawesi, Seram Island and the west part of 
Papua. The South belt provides connections from and to Sumatera interstate highway 
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network, Java island road network, Nusa Tenggara (lesser Sunda) islands, and the 
southern part of Papua province. 
To integrate the three main belts and enhance transport network connectivity, the 
government also set up inter-connections through the long voyage ferry service.  
In accordance with the Indonesian maritime transport policy stated above, the 
government continuously maintains ferry services throughout the country. According 
to the land transportation statistical data, there are a total of 217 ferry lanes across the 
country that are comprised of 48 commercial lanes and 169 lanes under the 
subsidiary of local municipalities or under the management of the central 
government as part of a pioneer service program. In terms of distance, the shortest 
ferry lane covers 530 Nm (DGLT, 2014). 
The ferry routes are serviced by 258 units RoPax ferry and 15 pioneer ships with 
total loading capacity of 50,460 passengers and 6,885 vehicles. Among the RoPax 
ferry numbers only 11% are owned and managed by the ferry authority and 88% of 
the total fleet is owned and operated by the private sector (DGLT, 2014). 
To support ferry operation, in 2013, the Indonesian Government built 210 ferry ports 
across the nation. In detail, there were 34 ferry ports operated under the management 
of the state owned company, Indonesian Ferry, through a public-private partnership 
system, and 4 ports established under direct management of the directorate general of 
land transportation, via public service. In addition, the central government also 
supports local municipalities to operate 106 ports under a subsidiary support system, 
and in the meantime, there were another 66 ports in the process of construction 
(DGLT, 2014). 
3.2 Indonesian RoPax ferry operation information 
3.2.1 Productivity 
With regard to transport productivity, Indonesia domestic ferry transport has 
achieved a significant outcome. In 2013, the domestic RoPax ferry transported a total 
of 62,036,587 passengers. The total transported passengers indicate a significant 
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increment of 20% compared to the previous year of 2012, during which 58,673,855 
passengers were transported (DGLT, 2014). 
For 2013, the transport productivity data also indicates a significant increment. There 
were 7,713,925 motor cycle units transported by national ferry services. Compared to 
2012, the number represents an increase of about 15%. The total number of vehicles 
transported also increased. In 2013, there were 7,443,459 units of different types of 
vehicle transported by ferry service. Vehicle transport activity increased by 30% in 
2013 compared to data from 2012, 
Table 3-1 presents the five busiest ferry services in Indonesia. In terms of passengers 
and cargo transported, the Merak-Bakauheni ferry lane is the most productive ferry 
service with 15 million passengers and 3 million vehicles transported. In terms of the 
number of trips, Ketapang – Gilimanuk ferry service is the busiest ferry service with 
119,670 trips in 2013. 
Table 3-1: Top 5 ferry lane productivity data in Indonesia year 2013. Data obtained from DGLT 
copyright 2014 
Ferry lane Trip Pax Motor Vehicle 
Merak - Bakauheni 63,680 18,597,804 587,873 3,317,524 
Ketapang – Gilimanuk 167,230 14,204,920 1,431,310 2,204,577 
Ujung - Kamal 34,245 6,620,924 1,561,671 199,179 
Padangbai - Lembar 19,978 2,065,308 260,707 306,646 
Kayangan - Pototano 25,301 2,636,174 324,725 295,874 
Total 310,434 44,125,130 4,166,286 6,323,800 
30 
 
 
Figure 3-2: The top 5 busiest ferry service in Indonesia year 2013. Data DGLT copyright @2014. 
Reprinted with permission 
3.2.2 Minimum standard for domestic ferry service 
In order to standardise ferry operation, the government had issued standard operation 
for ferry transport service in Indonesia under Director General of Land 
Transportation decree no 73/AP005/DRJD2003 year 2003. This covers passenger 
service, vehicle loading operation, transit service and standard for schedule 
accomplishment. 
The main features of the above standards are detailed as follows (DGLT, 2003): 
 Ship service speed standard 
 Minimum service speed for economy class should be not less than 10 knots 
 Minimum service speed for non-economy class should be not less than 15 
knots 
 Ship speed for short distance ferry route or less than 6 nautical miles can be 
adjusted accordingly 
 Vehicle loading standards and procedure: 
 Maximum weight for the vehicle and its cargo shall not exceed 17.5 tonnes 
 Thus cardeck spaces shall also be constructed accordingly to withstand the 
above mentioned weight limit. 
1. Merak - Bakauheni
3. Ujung - Kamal
2. Ketapang - Gilimanuk
4. PadangBai - Lembar
5. Kayangan - Pototano
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 The highest stack shall not exceed 2.5 metres for small cars, 3.8 metres for 
small lorries and 4.7 metres for container carrier lorries. 
 The shortest distance between vehicles on the cardeck shall not exceed 60 
cm for side end and 30 cm for both forward and after end. 
 Securing lines for vehicles are required for ferries that transit routes with a 
probability of ship inclination up to 10 deg due to local sea state. 
 The driver and passengers are not allowed to stay inside the car during the 
voyage. Open fire activity as such smoking is prohibited on the car deck. 
Any kind of machinery onboard vehicles shall be kept on while the ship is 
underway. 
Director General of Land Transportation Decree no. 2681AP.005/DRJD/2006 
regulates berth operation for ferry. The standard requires the ferry port operation 
divided into four main parts that is: 
 Approaching time (15 minutes started from approaching area) 
 Cargo operation time that divided into two Unloading time and Loading 
time (30 minutes) 
 Departure preparation (15 minutes) 
All the ship operators require to observed port operation time. This was developed to 
improve the port productivity and maintain the ferry operation schedule.  
3.3 Identified challenges in Indonesian domestic ferry operation 
As a typical developing country, Indonesia faces many challenges in its domestic 
ferry operation 
3.3.1 Fleet condition 
Domestic RoPax ferries in Indonesia are old. Data from DGLT (2014) indicates that 
the age of the ships varies from 1 year to 50 years. More than50% of the national 
ferry fleet is over 25 years old, whereas only 5% is under 5 years. To some extent, 
this condition could affect the efficiency of the overall operation.  An older ship 
requires costly operation and longer time for maintenance. The lengthy time for 
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maintenance also affects the ferry operation schedule. On some occasion, exemptions 
to the ferry conditions were issued by the relevant authority to the ferry ships, with 
the objective of fulfilling the transport demand during high peaks. Obviously this 
condition could increase the risk of operation since the maintenance schedule was 
not followed properly.  
Indonesian ferry operation time is low. The average speed of operation was 8-9 
knots. This condition does not comply with the ferry operation standard as mentioned 
above. Among the registered vessels, the highest speed RoPax ferry was only 15 
knots and the lowest was 4 knots. This great disparity of speed has also influenced 
overall ferry service operation. For instance, the difference in speed could create 
congestion of ferry traffic in the waiting areas since they have to wait for slower 
ferries to be berthed by the port controller (NTSC, Investigation report into collision 
between Singapore registered gas carrier MV. Norgas Cathinka with Indonesia 
registered ropax ferry MV. Bahuga Jaya at Sunda Strait on 26 September 2012, 
2013).  
The Indonesian government has also attempted to revitalise the ferry fleet by 
ordering new ships annually (DGLT, 2005). However, since the newly built ships are 
only operated by the state owned Ferry Company the project will take time to 
sufficiently support the entire ferry fleet, considering the large coverage area and 
number of the ferry routes. In addition, the capacity of the private sector to acquire 
brand new vessels is limited. As a result, the private sector will continuously operate 
old ships as second hand priced ships are cheaper. 
3.3.2 Effect of climate change in ferry operation 
It is commonly known that tropical regions are facing issues of climate change more 
than other regions. One of the significant effects is change to sea state. Indonesian 
waters used to be relatively calm. However, recently storms have frequently 
approached and created significant sea states. The condition has caused rising 
concern for ferry operators and has affected the schedule. For instance, ferry 
authorities occasionally stop all ferry operations due to heavy weather.  
33 
 
Relevant to this issue, Indonesian ferry operation has also been affected by this 
situation. Data from DGLT indicates that most of the ferries servicing the long 
distance ferry routes are built with open space cardecks. Specifically, there is an 
issue when the sea state worsens, and the probability of seawater entering the cargo 
space is higher. This condition requires higher attention from ferry operators to 
conduct thorough inspections of the ships‘ structure, particularly of the stability 
related constructions such as bulkheads, scuppers and cargo securing systems. 
The other issue relevant to the weather change is related to the suitability of the ferry 
design. Indonesian ferry fleet data indicates that most of the ferries operated were 
bought from Japan (DGLT, 2014). In Japan, the ferries serve ferry routes that are 
limited to the inner waterways or coastal ferries. This translates to the ferries being 
designed to operate in calm waters with a wave height not higher than 1.5 m.  
3.3.3 Opening new ferry service 
Until 2013, of the total ferry service lanes proposed in the national blue print for 
ferry transportation, there were still 29 ferry routes that were not yet fully 
operational. This condition occurred due to a lack of private sector interest in 
operating ferry routes. On the other hand, the government is still attempting to 
optimise the existing routes as its main priority. 
The issues affect the sufficiency of the nation‘s fleet to accommodate transport 
demand. Compared to the transport demand across the country, the ferry port 
facilities are considered insufficient. The government has been limited by budget 
constraints to continuously provide proper infrastructure for ferry operation. 
(Alimoeso, 2009) 
On the other hand, low maintenance is the major problem for ferry port facilities in 
Indonesia. Financial support mostly contributes to this condition. Some terminals do 
not have sufficient capacity to provide comfort of service to transport users. 
3.3.4 Low tariff and competition with other transport modes 
Indonesian ferry tariffs are low compared to similar ferry operations in the South 
East Asian region (Haryo, 2013).Haryo implies that from the consumer perspective, 
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the government is concerned with the purchase power of the transport user. 
However, the local ferry operator needs to smartly manage the company to improve 
the quality of service with its current income state. 
Current ferry transportation development implies that there is clear competition 
between ferry operators and road and air transport. For instance, there was a 
significant decrease in ferry productivity due to the establishment of a connecting 
bridge on the Ujung – Kamal ferry route (DGLT, 2014). 
3.4 Conclusion 
To summarise, domestic ferry transport plays a significant role in the nation‘s 
development effort. Taking the example of typical ferry operation in a developing 
country, ferry transport in Indonesia does not just provide safe, fast, comfortable, and 
environmentally friendly transport for the user, but it is also utilised and developed to 
maintain national integrity, thus providing opportunities for national development 
equality. Challenges as indicated above should be overcome to improve overall ferry 
performance such as safety itself. 
Despite the success story of its productivity, statistical data shows that accidents and 
mishaps involving domestic RoPax ferries continue to occur despite some 
improvements and developments in every aspect of operation. NTSC maritime 
accident and incident data 2003 – 2013 indicates that very serious ferry accident 
occurred nearly every year. Most of the accidents have resulted in severe 
consequences, including loss of life and damage to property. Therefore, there should 
be a proper analysis to sufficiently identify the safety issues involved in its operation. 
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4 Assessing safety issues in domestic RoPax ferry operation 
4.1 Overview 
Safety has always been considered the main critical feature in domestic RoPax ferry 
operation. As described above, due to the nature of its operation, gaps and 
deficiencies in operation could lead to severe and catastrophic consequences. Safety 
systems are developed to prevent injury or loss of human life, damage to property 
and adverse consequences to the environment (Qureshi, 2008). 
Maintaining the safety level in domestic ferry operation can be done in many ways 
but the main focus is on two factors:  Preventive action and Reactive action. 
Preventive action is mostly related to any activity to mitigate risk involved in ship 
board operation such as design, procedure, inspection or any other hazard control 
method. On the other side, reactive action is any activity taken to reduce the severity 
of an accident by conducting investigations, search and rescue, or imposed penalties. 
Preventive action is critical to mitigate the risk of an incident developing into a 
greater harmful event. However, accidents themselves have proven that there are 
gaps in the safety system which are known as safety issues. 
ATSB defines safety issues as safety factors that: 
(a) can reasonably be regarded as having the potential to adversely affect the 
safety of future operations, and  
(b) are a characteristic of an organisation or a system, rather than a 
characteristic of a specific individual, or characteristic of an operational 
environment at a specific point in time. 
Safety issues in a maritime operation can be identified by analysing the previous 
mishaps and incidents/accidents. This can be done by analysing the statistical data, 
developing an accident causation model and investigating the mishaps. As a result, 
important information related to the causal factors can be unveiled to the interested 
parties to improve overall shipboard safety performance. On the other hand, it can 
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also provide feedback to the designer (policy, procedure, tools) to stimulate 
validation and refinement of the system (Vassalos, et al., 2003). 
To a further extent, Vassalos et al (2003) explains that the result of an analysis of 
safety issues in an accident also ―pulls‖ together not only developing and updating 
the knowledge of accident model analysis tools but also provides comprehensive 
information on gaps in assessment of structural safety, survivability, passenger 
evacuation, seaworthiness and fire safety. 
This chapter presents the systematic methodology utilised in this dissertation with the 
main objective of identifying safety issues in domestic RoPax ferry operation. Proper 
justification for the use of the SEMOMAP model is briefly explained by presenting 
the main concept, system workflow, methodology, and comparison with other 
models widely used for analysis of safety in the maritime field. 
4.2 Concept of maritime transport accident/incident and need of investigation 
The disaster of the Herald of Free Enterprise and many others Ro-ro passenger ship 
accidents remind maritime stakeholders how these accident bring great loss of life 
and damage to property and the environment.  
Heinrich (1931) defined ―accident‖ as a result of a chain of several undesired events, 
whilst the seriousness of the accident is a compound set of technical failures, 
operating errors, fundamental design errors, and management errors. The removal of 
any contributing links, or causes, may be sufficient to prevent accidents. This idea is 
considered as the basic concept for systemic investigation.  
An accident is mostly a complex system that occurs through the accumulation of 
factors and failures. Reason (1999) in his accident model suggests that adverse 
events occur when multiple contributors, considered weaknesses in the established 
safety defence, align. Hollnagel (1998) emphasises the failure of barriers that are set 
up to prevent risk being carried out or a harmful event from taking place characterise 
the accident itself. 
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It is understood that even a small mishap should not be accepted in maritime 
operation. However, in the safety concern, an accident or incident is a learning 
opportunity to improve safety in maritime transportation. 
4.2.1 Investigation into maritime casualty 
Investigation into maritime casualties serves several purposes depending on the 
institution that conducts the investigation namely civil, criminal, administrative, or 
other.  
Investigation into accidents/incidents is a natural approach to analyse the weaknesses 
or gaps in the overall transportation performance that led to the accidents. 
Traditionally, most accident investigations focused on the question of ―who‖ instead 
of asking ―how‖ and ―why‖. This condition derived from the public desire to simply 
blame and assign liability to a person or institution, thus considering the case 
concluded. 
Investigations adopt a retrospective concept that can identify the gaps that led to the 
event, unlike during the design or development stage. The designer or policy maker 
can only foresee the likelihood of risk in the operation and fails to entirely identify 
weaknesses in their design or policy. Proper and comprehensive investigation looks 
into the development of an event and attempts to analyse its causal factors. 
In terms of safety improvement, an investigation into a maritime casualty could be 
used to enhance safety by determining what happened, how it happened and why it 
happened. In addition, the information gained from the process of investigation can 
be used to improve safety of transport operation in view of (ATSB, 2008): 
• Identifying safety issues that could adversely affect the safety of future 
operations, and encouraging or facilitating safety action by relevant 
organisations to address these issues. 
• Providing information about the circumstances of the occurrence, and the 
factors involved in the development of the occurrence, to the transportation 
industry.  
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• Providing information for an occurrence database, which can then be combined 
with information from other occurrences and used for research and trend 
analysis purposes. 
Under the international maritime regime, investigation is a key process to maintain 
and improve maritime safety performance. Investigation into casualty matters has 
been sufficiently described in the IMO‘s four pillars of SOLAS, MARPOL, STCW 
and MLC. 
The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) under SOLAS has made casualty 
investigations mandatory by adopting IMO Resolution MSC. 255 (84) on the 
adoption of the code of the international standards and recommended practices for a 
safety investigation into a marine casualty or marine incident. The Amendment of 
SOLAS outlines a code for the investigation of marine casualties and incidents in an 
annex to Resolution A.849 (20) (27 November 1997). This document states the 
following: 
―The objective of any marine casualty investigation is to prevent similar 
casualties in the future. Investigations identify the circumstances of the 
casualty under investigation and establish the causes and contributing factors, 
by gathering and analysing information and drawing conclusions. Ideally, it is 
not the purpose of such investigations to determine liability, or apportion 
blame. However, the investigating authority should not refrain from fully 
reporting the causes because fault or liability may be inferred from its 
findings‖. 
The code attempts to provide a common approach for member States to conduct 
safety investigations into marine casualties. The code mainly focuses on standard 
reporting, evidence collection, coordination and cooperation among different 
substantial interested States. 
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However, there are cases when an investigation itself is unable to provide 
comprehensive information; nonetheless, a systemic formal investigation is 
thoroughly conducted. Some examples show that an investigation report itself serves 
only to satisfy the public‘s hasty demand. 
Wiegmann et.al (2002) discussed the cycle of the investigation process and how 
prevention efforts fail to stop accidents from occurring again. The outcome of the 
analysis underlined that each of the factors involved in the cycle is insufficient and 
incomprehensive in terms of providing information for the improvement of safety. 
Thus, any intervention or prevention program as a result of an accident analysis is 
considered insufficient. For instance, most accident investigations tend to focus on 
determining what happened instead of why it happened and are not supported by 
sufficient procedures. Insufficient database systems and lack of analysis of the data 
also take part in the ineffective prevention program (Wiegmann & Shappel, 2001). 
 
Figure 4-1: General process of investigation and preventing accident. The chart reproduced and 
adapted from a human error analysis of commercial aviation accidents using the human factors 
analysis and classification system by Wiegmann and Shappel. Copyright 2001 
ATSB in 2008 conducted close scrutiny of the outcome of its investigation reports. 
The outcome of the analysis indicated that the method of analysis has been a 
neglected area in terms of standards, guidance and training of investigators in most 
organisations that conduct safety investigations, despite its importance, complexity, 
and reliance on investigators‘ judgements. The analysis results also pointed out that 
many investigators primarily used their experience and intuition in conducting 
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analyses, which is not based on, or guided by, a structured process. Other issues 
appeared to be related to the limited time available for producing reports, meaning 
that the analysis process is normally conducted while the investigation report is being 
written. As a result, the writing process can become inefficient; supporting 
arguments for findings may be weak or not clearly presented, and important factors 
can be missed (ATSB, 2008). 
Accordingly, it is necessary to enhance the factors of response cycles by improving 
the methods of the investigation and providing additional supportive analysis 
processes which then could identify the factors that might not be considered during 
the investigation process. 
4.2.2 Accident causation models 
An accident causation model is commonly a complex system that requires a 
sufficient level of knowledge so it can be used to determine the factor or issues that 
took place to increase risk of accident. Accident causation studies promise significant 
opportunity for those who are interested in developing the pertinent theory.  
At present, theories of accident causation are conceptual in nature and, as such, are of 
limited use in preventing and controlling accidents. With such a diversity of theories, 
it will not be difficult to understand that there does not exist one single theory that is 
considered right or correct and is universally accepted.  
In 1931, Heinrich introduced the first systemic approach known as the Domino 
model to analyse accidents in the industrial sector. The model was developed 
according to behaviour based safety which later identified that unsafe acts 
contributed majorly to workplace accidents (Heinrich, 1931). 
Hollnagel (2004) reviewed the historical development of accident modelling based 
on traditional and modern approaches. 
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Traditional approach 
Originally, the traditional accident causation model looked at the accident by its 
direct cause and attempted to view the entire event in a singular/one way order. 
There are two common approaches under the traditional model. 
 Sequential/event based model 
The event based model was developed following the chain reaction concept, 
which explains an event in chronological order. The model highlights that an 
accident is caused by multiple events that occur one after another. It is a simple 
linear model that determines the causes as independent to every event in the 
main process. The model mostly focused on the failure and malfunction of the 
independent causes. The model suggests that prevention of accidents can be 
accomplished by eradicating one or more of the links so the event does not 
develop into an accident. The Domino theory by Heinrich (1931) (Figure 4-2) 
and Fault tree model are examples of event based models. 
 
Figure 4-2: Domino theory model by Heinrich 1931. The figure taken from Heinrich: Industrial 
accident prevention. Copyright McGraw-Hil 1931. 
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 Epidemiological  
The epidemiological accident model was originally based on biological 
research on the disease spread process. It attempts to identify the main cause of 
the disease by tracing back the entire cases or other event occurred randomly in 
the different circumstance. The epidemiological model identified that accidents 
(spread of disease) occur through the contribution of latent factors. Unlike the 
sequential model, the epidemiological model adopts a complex linear model 
that determines the cause as an interdependent factor. The concept sees the 
development of accidents due to errors in the safety defence/barrier that has 
been set up to prevent them. 
 
Figure 4-3: Swiss cheese model by James Reason (1997) 
The generic barriers are commonly categorised into organisational factors, line 
management and precondition. The error of an individual factor (sharp end) is 
seen as an active failure, contributed to by previous misses and gaps in defence 
(blunt end). When all errors in each defence align, an accident occurs. The 
model made it possible to identify which safety defence was not working by 
observing the functionality of the barriers when the accident occurred. Hence, 
the prevention action is focused on strengthening the defence/barrier. The 
Swiss cheese model of James Reason is the prominent model in the 
epidemiological system. 
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Modern approach 
Systemic models 
Systemic models developed due to known insufficiency in the traditional approach. 
The systemic model sees the system as a whole as a contributor to the accident. The 
model adopts a non-linear model concept where all factors involved couple and 
interact coincidentally in a specific time (Hollnagel, 2004). The systemic models 
observe accidents as emergent phenomena that arise due to the complex interactions 
between system components that may lead to the degraded performance of the 
system, resulting in the accident. The tightness of the component coupling is one of 
the indicators to determine the health of the system. 
In the systemic models, the system is seen as an entity of dynamic interaction among 
the components (technical, human, organisational and management) which was set 
up independently to support and maintain the operation of the system in achieving 
the goal. Leveson (2004) stated that accidents are treated as the result of flawed 
processes involving interactions among people, social and organisational structures, 
engineering activities, and physical and software system components. 
Some examples of the accident causation model using the systemic concept are 
TRACEr of Kirwan and Shorrock (2001), STAMP of Leveson (2003), CREAM of 
Hollnagel (1998). 
Qureshi (2008) argued that traditional accident modelling approaches are not 
adequate to analyse accidents that occur in modern sociotechnical systems, where 
accident causation is not the result of an individual component failure or human 
error. 
The Swiss cheese model is also a useful method to provide a comprehensive 
overview of an accident by considering it via a generic group of categories. The 
Eurocontrol Experimental Centre (2006) mentioned that the model can be used for 
heuristic communication models, framework of accident analysis and basis of 
measurement. However, some scholars dispute the effectiveness of the models in 
explaining the interrelation of the factors in every stage of the models. Shappel and 
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Wiegman (2000) stated that Reason‘s ‗Swiss cheese‘ model of accident causation 
had a few details on how to apply it in a real-world setting but never clearly 
mentioned the definition of the ‗holes in the cheese‘. 
To some extent, systemic models are able to provide a comprehensive picture of the 
factor/component correlation in a complex socio-technical system. However, the 
systemic model requires extra effort to properly identify the multi non-linear 
relations.  
Obviously, there is no ―best‖ accident causation model that applies to all kinds of 
accidents. The description above does not attempt to define which accident model is 
the most appropriate; instead, it provides an overview of models applicable to certain 
conditions of events, with the similar main objective of acquiring information that 
can be a useful reference for determining the factors that affect the safety 
performance of a system. 
4.3 The SEMOMAP 
4.3.1 General concept and development 
The sequential model of the maritime process (SEMOMAP) was originally 
developed by Schroeder under his PhD research thesis in 2003. The concept of the 
model adopts the sequential process, which mainly focuses on the overall accident 
process but also on analysing critical events at every stage of accident development 
(Schroeder, 2004). It also focuses on the question as to why some accidents result in 
total loss, whereas others can be mitigated to prevent, up to a certain point, greater 
consequences. This was deemed necessary since the model can be used to a further 
extent to analyse the possibility of an event in shipboard operation before it actually 
occurs and determine which factors are associated with higher risk of operation. 
The approach of SEMOMAP is based on the Model of Human Recovery and Human 
Error Management developed by Van Der Schaaf in 1992.  
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Figure 4-4: SEMOMAP v1 workflow by Schroder (2003) 
In 2014, the model was developed to accommodate broader applicability, resulting in 
SEMOMAP v2 (Schroeder et al, 2014). Adopting the concept in the previous 
version, the SEMOMAP v2 generalises an accident into four main stages: 
Contributory stage, development of risk of accident, called ―beginning of accident‖, 
the accident itself and the evacuation stage (Figure 4-5). 
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Figure 4-5: SEMOMAP concept for accident/incident development 
Each stage is developed into more detailed sub-stages by adopting a number of 
independent taxonomies that are considered appropriate. 
Under phase-0 of the Contributory factor, SEMOMAP attempts to identify the factor 
responsible for affecting the degrading performance of shipborne operation. The 
phase also describes the event where improper systemic factors take place and lead to 
a higher risk of accident/incident. The phase utilises an improved HFACS taxonomy 
to sufficiently assess each possible factor in the perspective of shipboard operation.  
The SEMOMAP considers that the identified factors could influence different 
aspects of ship operation, mainly focused on two main elements, human and 
technical. Under each element, the SEMOMAP defines the list of subjects as 
follows: 
Contributory 
Factor
Phase – 2: 
Accident
Phase – 3:
Evacuation
Phase – 1:
Beginning of Accident
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Figure 4-6: Scope of analysis under CF phase of SEMOMAP 
Under the CF phase, the SEMOMAP categorises the actions taken by the human 
subjects. Under SRK models of Rasmussen (1999), the SEMOMAP categorises the 
action into two types of error and violation. As shown in Figure 4-6, within each 
level there are numerous specific types of contributing safety factors. Details of the 
taxonomy used for SEMOMAP under phase CF can be seen in Appendix-3 
During phase-1 to phase-3, the SEMOMAP sees the process as an action of the 
shipboard element to react with the current state of the operation. SEMOMAP 
utilises the concept of Simple Model of Cognition developed by Hollnagel in 1998 as 
well as the model of information processing by Wickens (1992). Both models 
generate similar concepts on how human as operator reacts/behaves in complex 
situations as well shipboard operation. Both models incorporate the information 
processing stage which later results in decisions and action taken. 
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Figure 4-7: Wickens‘ model of information processing (1994) 
Wickens provides a detailed concept of cognition by adding memory based action 
and information processing events to the cognitive process. 
 
Figure 4-8: Simple Model of Cognition by Hollnagel (1998) 
According to Hollnagel, human performance in critical situations would generally 
complete four main steps of observation, interpretation, planning/selection of action 
and, lastly, executing the action selected. 
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From the cognitive process models above, SEMOMAP extends the process and 
modifies the models of human cognitive process into four steps of accident 
assessment process: indication - detection - analysis – action/preventive measure. 
The cognition models describe all action taken onboard prior to or post event based 
on the perspective of the subject involved during the cognition process. It also 
recognises that the party involved during the cognition process could be from 
anywhere such as onboard or ashore or even offboard (other ships). This can also 
originate from the human aspect or equipment aspect. 
 
Figure 4-9: Cognition model under SEMOMAP 
During the indication stage, SEMOMAP identifies gaps that might take place and 
assesses whether information is recorded and thus transmitted properly. When there 
is a failure during the main cognitive process, the SEMOMAP model also makes it 
possible to identify the source of the failure which can be human failure or 
equipment failure. Additionally, by utilising the Error Mode under the TRACEr 
model, the SEMOMAP model makes it possible to identify the contributing factors 
that affect the cognitive process. 
During the detection stage, the SEMOMAP considers the information transmission 
process as the key point in determining the success of the process. The information 
transmitted from the previous stage is the main reference during the detection 
process. Overall, the assessment process during the detection stage involves 
information reception, evaluation process and information transmission. The activity 
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could involve humans or equipment installed either onboard or ashore. The 
SEMOMAP also assesses the error/failure for each sub-stage by utilising Error Mode 
under the TRACEr model. 
Analysis of the threat is the main activity in the cognitive process. It differs with 
regard to outcome, either successfully anticipating the threat or increasing the risk in 
shipboard operation. The analysis process involves information reception, setting up 
planning and decision making. The analysis of the information is possibly conducted 
by shipboard personnel or other sources. The key ingredient for the success of this 
stage is the information transmitted from the previous stage and also the capability of 
the subjects involved. Similar to the previous stage, SEMOMAP observes error and 
failure during the entire process, using the possible features listed in the human 
reliability assessment under the TRACEr model. 
Selection of action is the final step under the cognitive process. The SEMOMAP 
differentiates the action based on the risk of each type of accident. To analyse the 
success of cognitive process under the selection of action stage, SEMOMAP divides 
the cognitive process into three main sub-stages: communication process, timing and 
sequence, and quality and selection. Each sub-stage is reviewed from the 
perspectives of human and equipment failure. Each failure is also observed by each 
of the contributing factors to determine the root causal factor. 
4.3.2 Taxonomy involved 
As explained in the previous section, two major taxonomies are utilised to support 
the main process of SEMOMAP model. The following section provides brief 
information about both HFACS and TRACEr model. 
HFACS 
Shappel and Wiegmann developed the Human Factors Analysis and Classification 
System (HFACS) in 2000. The model is developed based on the sequential or chain-
of-events theory of accident causation and was derived from Reason‘s (1990) 
accident causation model. It was originally developed for use within the United 
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States military, both to guide investigations when determining why an accident or 
incident occurred, and to analyse accident data.  
 
Figure 4-10: HFACS framework by Shappel and Wiegmann (2000) 
The HFACS classification system focused on four hierarchical levels, (under the 
SEMOMAP so called Level-1):  
1) Organisational influences: 
Under organisational influence, originally HFACS provide three main categories of 
Level-2 including resource management, organisational climate and organisational 
process. For further detail, the taxonomy expanded each factor under level-2 into 
detail factor of Level-3. The SEMOMAP extended the detail of taxonomy into level-
4 for each factor under level-3, with further detail can be found in the Appendix-3 
2) Unsafe supervision  
Under supervision, HFACS expand the category into four sub-categories of Level-2 
namely Failed to Correct Known Problems, Inadequate Supervision, Planned 
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Inappropriate Operations and Supervisory Violations. Under factors level-2, the 
SEMOMAP extend the factors into marine related factors of Level-3. Level- 4 of 
each factor is also developed with further detail can be found in the Appendix-3. 
3) Preconditions for unsafe acts  
Under precondition, HFACS taxonomy divided into three different categories of: 
environmental factors, Crew Conditions and Personal factors. 
4) Unsafe acts of operators. 
HFACS categories the unsafe act into two main factors of Error and Violation. Under 
Errors type, HFSC adopt SRK models of human error developed by James Reason 
and divided the factor into Skill-based, Rule Based and Knowledge based Error. For 
Violation type, there are two sub-categories namely Exceptional and Routine 
Violation 
For every level of HFACS, causal categories were developed that identify the active 
and latent failures that occur. Theoretically, there should be at least one failure occur 
at each level and resulted in adverse condition. 
HFACS was originally developed to assess human performance in the aviation 
industry. Schroeder et al (2011) modified the HFACS taxonomy to be applicable to 
research in the maritime sector, more specifically to analyse explosions and fires in 
the machinery space (Schroeder, Baldauf, & Ghirxi, 2011). The modification mainly 
focused on the fifth level on top of organisational influence. The term ―statutory‖ 
was added in order to observe the influence of safety regulations in shipping. Full 
details of the taxonomy used, including its definition for SEMOMAP models, can be 
found in Appendix-3. 
TRACEr 
The technique for the retrospective and predictive analysis of cognitive error 
(TRACEr) was developed by Kirwan and Shorrock in 2000. The model is based on 
the Human Factor Information Processing paradigm, but draws extensively from a 
range of Human Factors and error causation models. It was based on a task analysis 
of the controller activities via Hierarchical Task Analysis. TRACEr contains a 
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number of flowcharts to help the analyst determine what errors could occur, what 
their causes might be, and their relative recovery likelihood.  
The original TRACEr has a modular structure, comprising eight taxonomies or 
classification schemes. There are three main types of taxonomy: those describing the 
context within which the error occurred (Shorrock & Kirwan, 2002). Table 4-1 
below indicates classified human error by TRACEr. 
Table 4-1: Generation of TRACEr Internal Error Model. The tables reproduced from Development 
and application of a human error identification tool for air traffic control by Steven T. Shorrock and 
Barry Kirwan. Copyright (2002). 
 
The SEMOMAP adopted the TRACEr taxonomy to identify operator-machine 
interaction and suggests that incidents are often triggered by cognitive and 
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psychological error by the operator. The operator is furthermore influenced in his 
performance by external and internal factors.  
From the human failure taxonomy above, SEMOMAP adopted every phase of 
cognition. Details of the taxonomy can be found in Appendix-3 
4.3.3 SEMOMAP System methodology 
Along with the objectives in this dissertation, the following section provides a 
general overview of how to utilise the SEMOMAP model.  
Phase-0: Contributory factors (CF) 
As explained above, the SEMOMAP begins with CF as its initial step. In compliance 
with the concept of HFACS, the first step under the phase is to focus on and identify 
which human and/or technical element plays a significant role and is mostly affected 
by the deficiencies and gaps in the contributory factor(s) in the four main groups. 
Each factor in detail in the Level-4 taxonomy is reviewed and selected in accordance 
with the information provided in the investigation reports. 
The model‘s workflow can be seen in the Appendix-1. 
Phase-1: beginning of accident 
The beginning of accident phase under SEMOMAP attempts to explain in detail how 
the shipboard or shore side reacted to the presence of risk in the ship operation. The 
SEMOMAP uses the term ―Threat‖ to indicate the important factors that affect the 
risk of ship operation. 
As some issues were not resolved during the initial stage, the shipboard operation is 
subsequently led to the possible risk of accident/incident. SEMOMAP categorises 
risk of accident/incident into four main sections: Navigational risk, Onboard Incident 
and Entire Vessel risk. Under each main category, the details are as follow: 
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Figure 4-11: shipboard operational risk category under SEMOMAP v2 
By adopting the cognitive process, the SEMOMAP amends the process under phase-
1 into following order.  
 
Figure 4-12: Cognitive process under phase-1 beginning of accident of SEMOMAP v2 model.  
Indication of the threat could come from a variety of sources, either onboard ship, 
including ship equipment, different types of sensors; or ashore, including warning 
information from a shore-based agency. Each of the involved indicators is reviewed 
and analysed to find out whether the process was successful or failed.  The process 
continues following the cognitive process as one type of iteration. 
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In most of accidents, there could be a series of events that occur concurrently, 
leading to failure, which results in the escalation of risk. The SEMOMAP model 
makes it possible to analyse each of the events by looping the event until all the 
processes are either resolved or continue to develop into the event of an accident. 
 Phase-2: Accident Phase 
Phase-2 is as a result of improper or insufficient preventive action taken by the 
shipboard parties to mitigate the risk. Similar to Phase-1, SEMOMAP defines the 
event‘s progress based on the cognitive process workflow.  
Since the threat was not properly mitigated and has become an accident, the 
SEMOMAP changes the term ―threat term‖ to ―health system‖. This is to define the 
state of the shipboard operation after the main event of the accident/incident occurs. 
The concept is that the crew would initiate efforts to reduce the consequences after 
the accident by reviewing and assessing overall or partially affected ship 
components. 
 Phase-2: Accident Phase 
The phase-2 is as a result of improper or insufficient preventive action taken by the 
shipboard party to mitigate the risk. Similarly like Phase-1, SEMOMAP define the 
event progress based on the cognitive process workflow.  
Since the threat was not properly mitigated and has considerably been change into 
accident, the SEMOMAP change the threat term in to ―health system‖. This to define 
the state of the shipboard operation after the main event of accident/incident 
occurred. The concept is the crew would start initiate their effort to reduce the 
consequence after the accident by reviewing and assessing overall or partial ship 
affected component. 
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Figure 4-13: Cognitive process under phase-2 of SEMOMAP v2 model 
Similar to the cognitive process during phase-1, the SEMOMAP provides tools to 
assess failure during each stage. Under phase-2, the action considerably related to 
mitigating the consequences after the accident happens. When the event is not 
properly assessed and evaluated, the event later could develop into initiation of the 
evacuation process. 
Phase-3: Evacuation Phase 
SEMOMAP considers phase-3 as a consequence of unsuccessful mitigation effort 
during phase-2. The events occurring are seen as a continuation of the previous 
action taken under the emergency stage. During this stage, the shipborne operation is 
focused on the operation to reduce the consequences caused by the event in phase-2. 
Most of the resources are used to either evacuate the personnel and/or continue the 
action to reduce the consequences, while the evacuation process is underway. 
Therefore, the SEMOMAP model is slightly modified from the two previous stages. 
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Figure 4-14: Cognitive process under phase-3 of SEMOMAP v2 model 
Like two previous phases, the model attempts to identify and analyse the failure/error 
source that takes place during the process of evacuation.  
In detail, the complete workflow SEMOMAP analysis process can be found in 
Appendix-2. 
4.4 Methodology to utilise the model 
After determining the proper accident causation models of SEMOMAP, the 
dissertation used selected investigation reports issued by a formal investigative body 
in Indonesia. Following the objective of the dissertation, the selection will only 
review cases related to the operation of domestic RoPax ferries. The selected reports 
comprise the factual information, accident chronology, findings and 
recommendations. 
The coding is conducted based on the available information in the report by the 
writer. Graphical breakdown and results are only shown for levels 1 to 4a of the 
taxonomy. Level 4b and 5 have not been analysed graphically, as they are reliant and 
dependant on coder reliability –i.e. – different people might disagree with the 
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taxonomy options selected for level 4b and 5; instead, however, levels 4b and 5 are 
described and discussed very broadly and subjectively.   
It is acknowledged that in comparison with the model, some information in the 
investigation reports could have been unavailable for various reasons. Additional 
supporting information is subject to obtained in order to support the analysis in the 
accident causation model of SEMOMAP.  
Obviously, the correct interpretation of the writer is of importance to sufficiently 
select factors under each phase. In addition, ideally it requires the work of groups 
comprised of experts in every aspect of shipborne operation to sufficiently interpret 
the information listed in the investigation reports. Therefore, in order to have proper 
results, the SEMOMAP system requires comprehensive knowledge of the users in 
the sense of the investigation process, concept of accident process, human factor 
analysis, and maritime operation. In this thesis, however, the report was single-
handedly coded by the writer. Therefore, to ensure the validity and accuracy of the 
SEMOMAP result, background of the writer is necessary to mention.  
The writer has background and knowledge in naval architecture and ship 
engineering. He also has extensive experience in marine casualty investigation and 
has attended formal one year comprehensive training in ATSB. In addition, the 
writer was also involved in most of the investigations of the cases used in this thesis 
and contributed in producing the investigation reports. 
Following the outcome of the SEMOMAP analysis, the dissertation attempts to 
identify which safety factors are considered dominant in every stage of the accident. 
This is done by observing the cases based on the nature of the accidents: fire, 
sinking/capsize and collision. 
In particular for collision cases, the coding mainly focused on crew behaviour and 
performance on the Ropax ferry instead of covering all the involved ship behaviours.  
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4.5 Conclusion 
Obviously, accident causation model analyses and formal investigations are two 
separate methods but they have the same paramount objective of identifying gaps 
and weaknesses in maritime operation that lead to accidents and propose 
improvements to the system to prevent recurrence in the future. For this reason, 
applying both methods could create a more comprehensive outcome. Therefore, the 
need to analyse investigation reports by adopting a proper accident causation model 
is of utmost importance. 
The SEMOMAP is considered an appropriate model to analyse the safety issues in 
typical ship board accident/incidents such as events involving domestic ferries. The 
SEMOMAP has been successfully developed to provide a clear picture of how an 
accident develops from a small event into a greater consequence/s. The model is 
thoroughly integrated with adequate prescriptive established taxonomies to 
understand complex situations in a temporal event.  
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5 Model Results 
5.1 Domestic RoPax ferry accident investigation reports 2003 – 2013 
The dissertation reviews and utilises sixteen investigation reports related to domestic 
ferry accidents/incidents in Indonesia issued by the NTSC during the period of 2003 
– 2013 as the main references. The selected cases were considered to provide 
sufficient information to view the issues in domestic ferry operation. The variety of 
consequences among the selected accidents also made it possible to conduct 
benchmarking between two different cases with two different outcomes. Most of the 
selected cases are high profile due to their contributing factors and the consequences 
resulting from the accidents. 
In terms of the nature of the accidents, the selected cases comprise 8 fire accidents, 5 
sinking/capsize cases and 3 collision cases.  
Under IMO category for occurrence categorisation (IMO, 2008), there are 11 cases 
of very serious marine casualty, 3 cases of serious marine casualty and 2 cases of less 
serious marine casualty. In the case of fire accidents, the selected cases can be 
categorized by the location where the fire started. There are 3 cases in the engine 
room and 5 cases in the cardeck/accommodation space. 
Following the ferry service types of short and long distance ferry routes, the selected 
cases were categorised into 5 cases occurring on short distance ferry services and 11 
cases occurring on long distance ferry services. Figure 5-1 below indicates the 
location where the accidents occurred.  
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Figure 5-1: Selected accident case by its location and nature of the accident 
Overall ship data can also be distinguished by age and ship size at the time of the 
accident. With regard to the ships‘ age at the time of the accident, the average age for 
involved ships is 23 years old, where the youngest ship in the population is 10 years 
old and the oldest ship is 40 years old. In terms of the ship size, the involved ships 
were comprised of 4 ships with size less than 1000 GT, 8 ships between 1000 GT to 
5000 GT and 4 ships above 5000 GT. 
Information related to all selected investigation reports used in this dissertation can 
be seen in Appendix 4. 
The selected cases were thoroughly reviewed in accordance with the workflow in the 
SEMOMAP v2 models. Under Phase-0: Contributory Factor, the model identified 
the issues that occurred and contributed significantly to the development of the 
increased risk of accident. Under phases 1, 2 and 3, the model focused on personnel 
performance and their interaction with the system and surroundings. In Phase-1, the 
SEMOMAP models identified how the crew reacted to the existing risk and analysed 
the gaps and misses in their performance which later increased the risk of accident. 
Phase-2 and phase-3 examine the related parties‘ performance to reduce or prevent 
further consequences after the accident occurred. 
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In order to provide sufficient overview of the outcome of the model to the selected 
cases, analysis results are divided by the nature of the accident: fire, sinking/capsize 
and collision. 
5.2 SEMOMAP result for Fire category accident 
Under the SEMOMAP model, the analysis result focused on the affected human and 
technical factors as described in the previous chapter. The SEMOMAP identified 
parties based on the interaction of the factors according to the HFACS. Since each of 
the contributory factors interacts differently in each element, the outcome of the 
result is divided into two main components of contribution: Human element 
interaction and technical element interaction 
5.2.1 Identified contributory factors for Fire category accidents 
Factors affecting human element under fire category accidents 
From a review of 8 fire accident cases, SEMOMAP records 592 interactions between 
9 major human element subjects and 24 factors under level 3 of the HFACS system. 
The human element includes the captain and navigational officers, ordinary seaman 
and engine department officers. 
Under the category of Organisational Influence, the results indicate that the factor of 
poor equipment/facility resources (25%) had the highest effect on human 
performance during the fire accidents, whereas the factor of lack of oversight under 
organisational process (27%) contributed to the behaviour of the human element and 
increased risk of fire in ferry operation.  
With regard to the Supervision issue, there were 183 interactions of the factors, in 
which Planned Inappropriate Operation (36%) is considered as the most significant 
factor. Poor Shipborne Operation is the second factor that influences human 
performance in relation to risk of fire accident.  
Under the Preconditions category, poor crew interaction (30%) under personnel 
factors is found to influence human performance in relation to risk of fire. On the 
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other hand, poor technological environment (29%) also contributed highly to the 
presence of risk of fire onboard the ferry ship. 
All the factors above were later found to contribute to the presence of unsafe acts 
where skill based error (38%) was mostly identified and increased  the risk of fire 
accident, whereas exceptional violation was also be found to contribute significantly 
to the presence of fire risk in ferry operation. Further details of the recorded 
interaction among each factor are shown in Table 5-1 below. 
Table 5-1: Identified factors under HFACS level 2 that influence the Human Element performance for 
fire type accidents 
 
L1 L2 L3
Lack of Human Resources 30
Poor Equipment/Facility 
Resources
44
Disorganised Structure 1
Poor Work Culture 21
Poorly Designed Operations 9
Inappropriate Procedures 9
Lack of Oversight 29
Poor International/ National 
Standards
10
Inadequate Flag State 
Implementation
22
Inadequate Supervision
Poor Shipborne and Shore 
Supervision
48
Planned Inappropriate 
Operations
Poor Shipborne Operations 60
Failed to Correct Known 
Problems
Shipborne Related 
Shortcomings
52
Supervisory Violations Shipborne Violations 9
Poor Physical Environment 14
Poor Technological 
Environment
53
Negative Cognitive Factors 20
Poor Physiological State 2
Poor Crew Interaction 55
Poor Personal Readiness 41
Skill-based errors 24
Decision and judgement 
errors
14
Perceptual errors 4
Routine 4
Exceptional 17
Total 592
Total Identified 
Factors
Organisational 
Influences (i)
Resource Management
Statutory Factors
Factors
Organisational Climate
Organisational Process
Errors
Violations
Personnel Factors
Crew Condition
Environmental Factors
Supervision (ii)
Preconditions (iii)
Unsafe Acts (iv)
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Figure 5-2: identified HFACS level-2 factors that influenced each involved Human performance in 
the fire category accident 
The Figure 5-2 above indicates that among 8 human elements identified as the most 
affected and playing a major role in the presence of risk of fire accident, the Captain 
is the most affected human element due to misses and gaps in the systemic process. 
1
st
/chief officer and Chief Engineer are in the second position and play a significant 
role under the same circumstance. 
Under organisational influence, the SEMOMAP identified lack of human resources 
such as training and selection as the factor that most influences the insufficient 
performance of the Captain. Similarly, the chief officer and chief engineer are 
identified as being affected by such conditions (Figure 5-2 A). 
Under the supervision category, the factor of Planned Inappropriate Operations is 
the key factor that contributed to the deficient performance of the captain, chief 
officer, chief engineer and ordinary seaman, whereas the factor of Failed to Correct 
Known Problem was another significant issue in supervision affecting the same 
human element (Figure 5-2B). 
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Factors affecting technical elements under fire category accidents 
The SEMOMAP records five main elements that played significant roles during the 
fire accidents. These include alarm panels and systems, main engine, ballast water 
pumps, separators and other technical elements (covers fire fighting equipment for 
both fixed system and portable extinguishers). Deficiency in the technical element 
performance is contributed to by 23 factors under HFACS level-3 with a total of 171 
interactions. 
Under the organisational influence category, the factor of poor equipment/facility 
resources (35%) such as engineer support and failure to correct known design flaws  
contributes most significantly to the performance of the technical element. The 
factor of lack of oversight such as failure to monitor and check resources to ensure 
safe work environment is also known to influence the performance of the technical 
element and contributed to the increased risk of fire in the Roro ferry operation. The 
factor of inadequate flag state implementation (17%) is the next factor that 
significantly influenced the condition of the technical element. This was mostly from 
lack of class and statutory surveys. 
Under the Supervision category, the factor of shipborne related short comings (39%) 
is known to be the most influential factor to the technical element and includes the 
factor of failed to correct safety hazard. Another factor that also contributes 
significantly to the issues in the technical element is poor shipborne operations 
(36%). This includes the factor of lack of risk assessment and limited recent 
experience shown by the crew. 
Poor technological environment (71%) under the Precondition category is another 
factor that is influential to the weakness of the technical element condition. This 
covers mainly the factors of faulty equipment, incorrect modification to the 
manufacturer’s procedures and issues on control and switches. 
It is interesting to note that human behaviour also contributed to the degrading 
performance of the technical element. Judgement errors under unsafe act/behaviour 
were found to affect the technical element performance. 
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Table 5-2: Identified factors under HFACS level 2 that influence the Technical Element performance 
for fire category accident 
 
The SEMOMAP also records that other elements such as fire fighting equipment 
were the most affected technical elements due to gaps and misses in the systemic 
process, whereas the main engine is the 2
nd
 most affected technical element. The 
main issues in the fire fighting system stemmed mostly from factors of resource 
management, planned inappropriate operations and environmental factors. 
Inadequacy in the main engine performance was found to be affected by issues in 
L1 L2 L3
Lack of Human Resources 7
Poor Technological Resources 3
Poor Equipment/Facility 
Resources
30
Inadequate Policies 1
Poor Work Culture 5
Poorly Designed Operations 4
Inappropriate Procedures 5
Lack of Oversight 14
Poor International/ National 
Standards
4
Inadequate Flag State 
Implementation
12
Inadequate Supervision
Poor Shipborne and Shore 
Supervision
6
Planned Inappropriate 
Operations
Poor Shipborne Operations 12
Failed to Correct Known 
Problems
Shipborne Related 
Shortcomings
13
Supervisory Violations Shipborne Violations 2
Poor Physical Environment 5
Poor Technological 
Environment
32
Crew Condition Negative Cognitive Factors 1
Poor Crew Interaction 2
Poor Personal Readiness 5
Skill-based errors 2
Decision and judgement 
errors
3
Routine 1
Exceptional 2
Total 171
Supervision (ii)
Preconditions (iii)
Factors Total Identified 
Factors
Organisational 
Influences (i)
Resource Management
Organisational Process
Statutory Factors
Organisational Climate
Environmental Factors
Personnel Factors
Unsafe Acts (iv)
Errors
Violations
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resource management, planned inappropriate operations and environmental factors. 
On the other hand, some errors in handling the main engine were also found to 
contribute to degrading performance of the main engine (Figure 5-3). 
 
Figure 5-3: Influence of Contributory factors to the involved technical element for fire type accident 
5.2.2 Phase-1 result for fire category accidents 
Since the SEMOMAP adopts cognitive processes to overview the element of 
behaviour while assessing the risk of accident, the outcome of the model is 
categorized by the nature of accident and based on each phase and each stage of: 
Indication-detection-analysis-action. The outcome focuses on the particular stage that 
had the most issues and influences to mitigate the risk of fire accident. 
From 8 fire cases reviewed, the SEMOMAP recorded 78 events of accident 
assessment process during phase-1 (Figure 5-4). The risk of fire was identified to 
escalate since there were failures in every step of the cognitive process. During the 
indication stage, failure was identified mostly during the transmission process, which 
involved human as the indicator.  During the detection stage, the failure mostly took 
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place in the evaluation stage, where it comes from human failure such as ignoring the 
threat or omitted action. 
 
Figure 5-4: frequency of fail (red block) /safe (blue block) accident assessment process under phase-1 
of fire type accident 
During the threat analysis stage, failure mostly occurred when setting up a plan to 
handle the presence of risk of fire. The issues mostly resulted from human failure as 
a result of insufficient planning due to confusion, distractions, forgetting long term 
training and lack of vigilance to the situation. 
For the fire category, the data indicates the most of the failures occurred during the 
threat prevention action with most of the failures caused by lack of human 
performance such as action taken too late due to lack of vigilance and situational 
awareness. There are 5 actions most frequently taken to prevent fire such as cutting 
off oxygen supply, reducing heat, and shutting down the engine, but there is also 
evidence to mention that there was no action taken to prevent fire from developing. 
Failure in human performance was also found in the inappropriate action taken 
during the selection and quality stage. During this crucial stage, most of the evidence 
shows that the crew provided too little action to prevent the fire from spreading. 
Detailed particulars for phase-1 can be found in Table 0-74, Appendix-5. 
Threat Indication Threat Detection Threat Analysis Threat Prevention Action
Not Applicable 17 19 24 26
Applicable but Not Successful 8 12 8 21
Applicable 27 47 46 31
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Figure 5-5: Threat prevention action data for fire category accident 
5.2.3 Phase-2 result for fire category accidents 
Under phase 2, SEMOMAP recorded 84 events of accident assessment processfrom 
the total reviewed fire cases. The data shows that since the accidents occurred most 
of the indications have become obvious. However, the issues later took place at the 
next stage of cognition. 
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Figure 5-6: frequency of fail (red block) /safe (blue block) accident assessment process under phase-2 
of fire type accident 
During the system health detection, the issues are found to totally come from human 
failure as a result of factor of confusion, fail to see the information and forget long-
term training. Time pressure also found influencing the analysis process. 
Similarly to the system health indication, the human failure is also identified as the 
most factors resulting in the fall of the analysis process. The condition takes place 
during planning and decision making. This was mainly caused by factors of 
confusion, distraction, forget long-term training, lack of vigilance and other factors. 
During the system health detection, the issues are found to result completely from 
human failures as a result of factors of confusion, failure to see the information and 
forgetting long-term training. Time pressure was also found to be an influence in the 
analysis process. 
Similarly to the system health indication, human failure was also identified as the top 
factor resulting in the fall of the analysis process, specifically during planning and 
decision making. This was mainly caused by factors of confusion, distraction, 
forgetting long-term training, lack of vigilance and other factors. 
System Health Indication System Health Detection System Health Analysis Emergency Response Action
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During phase-2 in fire type accidents, there were 7 actions commonly taken: fire 
fighting (57%), other action (25%) and shutting down the engine (4%). However, 
failures also occurred during the action taken to handle the emergency situation. The 
data shows that from the total 84 events during the cognition process under this 
phase, 40% were found to be caused by human failure (76%) and equipment failure 
(24%) (See Figure 5-7). The issues mainly took places in timing and sequences, and 
also during selection and quality. Under timing and sequence, the evidence shows 
that most of action taken was too late, mostly as a result of confusion, distraction, 
forgetting long-term training and time pressure. On the other hand, too little action 
taken was found to be the major factor under human failure that caused the fire 
accident to continue to develop.  
 
Figure 5-7: Detailed particulars for emergency response under phase-2 in fire type accident 
From the 8 fire cases reviewed, 2 cases indicating proper situation handling during 
phase-2 that was able to mitigate the event, preventing is from developing into 
further consequences..   
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5.2.4 Phase-3 results for fire category accidents 
In phase-3 for fire type accidents, the SEMOMAP recorded 66 events of cognition 
(see appendix-5, Table 0-74). The data shows that failure occurred continuously 
during the emergency situation and evacuation process.  
 
Figure 5-8: frequency of fail (red block) /safe (blue block) accident assessment process under phase-3 
of fire type accident 
From 23 failures identified in phase-3, 74% were caused by human failure which 
mostly occurred under selection and quality factors and timing and sequence factors 
(Figure 5-9).  
The factors of action too little and action too late  were the main human factors that 
took place in the failure, and were contributed to by the conditions of confusion, 
distraction, forgetting long-term training and procedure, and tunnel vision.. 
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Figure 5-9: Detailed information for emergency response and evacuation action under phase-3 for fire 
type accident. 
From the 8 cases reviewed, there are 2 cases that showed the event was mitigated up 
to phase-2, whereas the other 6 cases developed up to phase-3. For the cases 
developed up to phase-3, the final consequences of the cases were also varied. 
SEMOMAP records 4 cases of severe loss with casualty/s, 1 case with severe loss 
without casualty and 1 case of total loss without casualty. 
5.3 SEMOMAP results for Capsize/Listing category accidents 
5.3.1 Identified contributory factors for Capsize/Listing type accidents 
Factors affecting human element under Capsize/Listing category accidents 
From the 5 capsize cases reviewed, SEMOMAP recorded 26 factors of HFACS level 
3, affecting 5 main human element performances (Table 5-3).  
Under the Organisational Influence category, factors of lack of human resources and 
poor equipment/facility resources were the two main factors that contributed to the 
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failure of the human element performance, increasing the risk of operation 
particularly for risk of capsize accident. The SEMOMAP also recorded the factors of 
lack of training and lack of safety value as the two most influential issues for crew 
performance in responding to the risk of capsize. 
Table 5-3: Identified factors under HFACS level 2 that influence the Human Element performance for 
Capsize/Listing type accident 
 
Under the Supervision category, the selected cases indicated issues of poor 
Shipborne operations as the most affecting factor to crew performance, whereas the 
factor of Shipborne related shortcomings was the second most influencing factor. 
L1 L2 L3
Lack of Human Resources 18
Poor Technological Resources 1
Poor Equipment/ Facility Resources
17
Disorganised Structure 3
Inadequate Policies 9
Poor Work Culture 8
Poorly Designed Operations 13
Inappropriate Procedures 3
Lack of Oversight 13
Poor International/ National 
Standards 5
Inadequate Flag State 
Implementation 5
Inadequate Supervision
Poor Shipborne and Shore 
Supervision 17
Planned Inappropriate 
Operations
Poor Shipborne Operations
23
Failed to Correct Known 
Problems
Shipborne Related Shortcomings
19
Supervisory Violations Shipborne Violations 5
Poor Physical Environment 12
Poor Technological Environment
10
Negative Cognitive Factors 18
Poor Physiological State 2
Poor Crew Interaction 22
Poor Personal Readiness 15
Skill-based errors 17
Decision and judgement errors 14
Perceptual errors 3
Routine 3
Exceptional 7
Total 282
Factors Total Identified 
Factor
Organisational 
Influences (i)
Resource Management
Organisational Climate
Organisational Process
Statutory Factors
Supervision (ii)
Preconditions (iii)
Unsafe Acts (iv)
Violations
Personnel Factors
Crew Condition
Environmental Factors
Errors
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More specifically, the factors of lack of formal risk assessment and loss of 
supervisory situational awareness are common issues that affect human element 
performance in terms of risk of capsize/listing accidents. 
Poor ship movements and manoeuvres under environmental factors are the most 
common issues under the Preconditions category.  From the perspective of the 
human factor issue, pattern of poor risk judgment is considered the second most 
influential factor related to human performance onboard ferry ships. 
Under the unsafe act category, the data identifies skill based error factors such as 
poor technique/seamanship and inadvertent use of equipment as two common errors 
shown by the human element 
The chart below indicates the human elements most affected by the gaps and misses 
in the system. Based on the reviewed cases, SEMOMAP recorded the captain, chief 
officer, helmsman, AB and bosun as the most affected human elements during 
capsize/listing type accidents. The data shows that under organisational influence, 
the master‘s performance was mostly affected by the factors of resource 
management and organisational process, whereas the chief officer, responsible for 
cargo preparation and management, was affected mostly by personnel factors under 
the supervision category (Figure 5-10). 
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Figure 5-10: identified HFACS level-2 factors that influenced each involved Human performance in 
the capsize/listing type accident 
Factors affecting technical element under Capsize/Listing category accidents 
From the review of the 5 cases of Ropax ferry capsize/listing, SEMOMAP identified 
the 7 technical elements most involved and affected by the issues at the systemic 
level. The SEMOMAP also recorded 133 interactions of the 17 HFACS level-3 
factors with the involved technical elements. 
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Table 5-4: Contributory factor influencing technical element for capsize/listing type accident 
 
As regards organisational influence, the factor of poor equipment/facility resources 
under resource management was the most influential aspect to the degrading 
performance of the technical element. This factor mostly affects hull condition and 
other technical elements such as scupper/freeing port in the car deck, and watertight 
openings (ramps, doors). Factors of inadequate flag state implementation such as 
class and statutory survey were considered as the second most influential factor to 
the performance of involved technical element. 
Under the supervision category, the factor of poor Shipborne operations was 
identified as affecting the technical element, whereas the factor of Shipborne related 
shortcomings was the second influential factor (Figure 5-11 A). The factors mostly 
influence the technical elements of hull, steering equipment and other types as 
mentioned in the previous paragraph. 
L1 L2 L3
Lack of Human Resources 3
Poor Technological Resources 7
Poor Equipment/Facility Resources 28
Organisational Climate Poor Work Culture 9
Poorly Designed Operations 6
Inappropriate Procedures 1
Lack of Oversight 10
Poor International/ National 
Standards
5
Inadequate Flag State 
Implementation
12
Inadequate Supervision
Poor Shipborne and Shore 
Supervision
5
Planned Inappropriate 
Operations
Poor Shipborne Operations 9
Failed to Correct Known 
Problems
Shipborne Related Shortcomings 7
Supervisory Violations Shipborne Violations 1
Poor Physical Environment 5
Poor Technological Environment 22
Personnel Factors Poor Personal Readiness 1
Unsafe Acts (iv) Violations Exceptional 2
Total 133
Environmental Factors
Supervision (ii)
Preconditions (iii)
Total Identified 
Factor
Factors
Organisational 
Influences (i)
Resource Management
Organisational Process
Statutory Factors
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The factor of poor technological environment was identified as the most influencing 
factor to the degrading performance of the involved technical element. More 
specifically, faulty equipment was the factor that mostly took place in the hull, 
steering equipment, and freeing port in the car deck, thus increasing the risk of 
capsize/listing in Ropax ferry operation. 
Unsafe acts were also found to influence the degrading performance of the technical 
element. The data indicates that factors of exceeding limits of system and 
unauthorised to operate beyond design criteria under exceptional violation type were 
the two factors that took place in the capsize/listing type accidents. 
 
Figure 5-11: Identified HFACS level-2 factors that influenced each involved technical performance in 
the capsize/listing type accident 
5.3.2 Phase-1 result for the Capsize/Listing type accidents 
From the review of 5 Ropax ferry capsize accidents, SEMOMAP recorded 90 
cognitive processes. During phase-1 for capsize/listing type accident, failure was 
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found in every stage of the cognitive process, but mostly took place during the last 
step of threat prevention action (Figure 5-12).  
 
Figure 5-12: frequency of fail (red-block) and safe (blue-block) of accident assessment process under 
phase-1 for capsize/listing type accident 
During phase-1 of capsize/listing type accident, human failure is identified as the 
main factor compared to equipment failure. From 54 failures that increased the risk 
of capsize in ferry operation during phase-1, 93% came from human failure, whereas 
7 % came from equipment failure. 
Under phase-1, human failure took place more during threat analysis and threat 
prevention action. There are 4 main subjects involved in the stage including: master 
(83%), officer on watch (7%) and other crew (Figure 5-13 A). During threat analysis, 
failures occurred during the setting up planning and decision making process, such as 
failure in planning and decision making or partial/unclear planning. The factors that 
influenced failure in decision were mostly those of expectation bias, desire for 
harmony, lack of vigilance and time pressure.  
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Figure 5-13: detailed information on the threat analysis action under phase-1 for capsize/listing type 
accident 
The SEMOMAP records four main actions taken to prevent capsize from occurring: 
altering speed, stabilising and securing cargo and other actions such as reduce stop 
ship movement, and pumping out flooding (Figure 5-14 A). However, failures 
occurred during this stage. Most of the failures identified took place due to timing 
and sequence (action too late), and selection and quality (action too little). For human 
failure, causal factors were confusion, forgetting long-term training, time pressure, 
and lack of vigilance. 
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Figure 5-14: Detailed information on the threat prevention action under phase-1 for capsize/listing 
type accident 
5.3.3 Phase-2 result for the Capsize/Listing type accidents 
During phase-2 for the 5 cases of capsize/listing Ropax ferry, SEMOMAP recorded 
12 events of cognitive process.  
From the observed cases, the first two steps of cognition (system health indication 
and system health detection) successfully responded to the situation by providing 
proper detection of the potential system health issue after the accident took place. 
However, the data shows that failures during the accident assessment process under 
system health analysis occurred. The failures were observed mostly from humans, 
whereas equipment contributed less during that stage. The Master is known to take 
all responsibility during the analysis process; however, the data indicates that failures 
mostly occurred during the decision making stages. This was caused by factors of 
confusion, distraction, and lack of vigilance and, since the accident had started, time 
pressure existed as well. 
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Figure 5-15: frequency of fail (red-block) and safe (blue-block) of accident assessment process under 
phase-2 for capsize/listing type accident 
Failure in taking emergency response action was also observed. Altering speed is the 
most common action taken by the crew after becoming aware of compromised 
stability. However, the issues existed not just in the timing and sequence (such as 
action too late), but also in its selection and quality (action too little). Human failure 
is identified to contribute to the failure during the stage of action taking (Figure 5-16 
C). The common human factors that influence failure are mostly confusion, lack of 
vigilance, and distraction.  
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Figure 5-16: Detailed information on the emergency response action under phase-2 for capsize/listing 
type accident 
Up to phase-2, the accident data shows no proper mitigation action taken by the 
related parties. Hence, most of the cases reviewed continued to the next phase of the 
accident. 
5.3.4 Phase-3 result for the Capsize/Listing type accidents 
From the 5 cases of Ropax ferry capsize/listing accidents, SEMOMAP recorded 33 
event of accident assessment process to deal with the emergency situation. The data 
compiled shows that emergency response was taken mostly by the muster personnel, 
lowering MES (marine emergency system)/liferafts and call for SAR services. From 
the data compiled, failure during the phase continued to occur. Failures observed 
mostly during stage of emergency response and evacuation action (Figure 5-17). This 
condition is considered to influence the process of evacuation, whether successful or 
causing more loss of life. 
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Figure 5-17: frequency of fail (red-block) and safe (blue-block) of accident assessment process under 
phase-3 for capsize/listing type accident  
Failures were identified mainly during the process of evacuation itself. SEMOMAP 
records factors of timing and sequence, and selection and quality as still the most 
common issues. Failure was also observed to take place during the stage of analysis, 
specifically during the planning and decision making process. Human failure was 
also the source of failure that resulted in the overall problem in the evacuation stage 
(Figure 5-18). The human factors that commonly existed and affected the failure 
were delay in planning and taking decisions, due to factors of confusion, expectation 
bias, time pressure and distraction. 
From the reviewed cases, due to insufficient effort and mitigation of the issues, all 
cases resulted in total loss with casualty/s. 
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Figure 5-18: Detailed information on the emergency response and evacuation action under phase-3 for 
capsize/listing type accident 
5.4 SEMOMAP results for Collision type accidents 
5.4.1 Identified contributory factors for collision type accidents 
Factors affecting human element under Collision category accidents 
For the 3 cases of ropax ferry involved collision accidents, SEMOMAP recorded 188 
interactions between 5 human elements involved in the collision accident with 26 
factors of HFACS level-3. In particular, for collision type accidents, Pilot is another 
human element present as a support during the navigational process.  
Under the organisational influence category, factors under resource management are 
the most influential for crew performance in handling the risk of collision. Lack of 
human resources (in terms of training and manning), and presence of poor 
equipment/facility resources are found to be the most common issues affecting crew 
behaviour when dealing with risk of collision (Figure 5-19A). The captain, the 
officer on watch and helmsman are the common human elements affected.  
9%
27%
18%
46%
A. Emergency response & evacuation action taken 
under Phase-3 of Capsize type accident
Call SAR Services
Lower MES/Liferafts
Muster Personnel
Other Evacuation Measure
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Communication Applicable? Timing & Sequence 
Applicable?
Selection & Quality 
Applicable?
B. Emergency Response & Evacuation Action cognitive 
substage, Capsize-Phase3
Applicable Applicable but not Successful Not Applicable
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Communication Applicable? Timing & Sequence 
Applicable?
Selection & Quality 
Applicable?
C. Emergency Response & Evacuation Action failure 
source, Capsize-Phase3
Equipment Failure - Specify Human Failure - Specify
87 
 
Under the supervision category, the factor of Shipborne related shortcomings is 
known to develop risk of collision and affect crew performance when handling this 
kind of situation. The most identified factor that took place was failure to identify 
corrective action and failure to correct inappropriate/risky behaviour. The issues 
affected the captain, chief officer, OOW, helmsman and pilot (Figure 5-19 B).  
Table 5-5: Identified factors under HFACS level 2 that influence the Human Element performance for 
Capsize/Listing type accident 
 
 
 
L1 L2 L3
Lack of Human Resources 5
Poor Technological Resources 3
Poor Equipment/Facility 
Resources
6
Disorganised Structure 2
Inadequate Policies 1
Poor Work Culture 6
Poorly Designed Operations 3
Lack of Oversight 11
Poor International/ National 
Standards
4
Inadequate Flag State 
Implementation
6
Inadequate Supervision
Poor Shipborne and Shore 
Supervision
12
Planned Inappropriate 
Operations
Poor Shipborne Operations 13
Failed to Correct Known 
Problems
Shipborne Related Shortcomings 23
Supervisory Violations Shipborne Violations 2
Poor Physical Environment 10
Poor Technological Environment 5
Negative Cognitive Factors 7
Poor Physiological State 1
Poor Crew Interaction 23
Poor Personal Readiness 10
Skill-based errors 14
Decision and judgement errors 10
Perceptual errors 6
Routine 1
Exceptional 4
Total 188
Errors
Violations
Unsafe Acts (iv)
Factors Total Identified 
Factors
Supervision (ii)
Preconditions (iii)
Environmental Factors
Crew Condition
Personnel Factors
Organisational 
Influences (i)
Resource Management
Organisational Climate
Organisational Process
Statutory Factors
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Figure 5-19: identified HFACS level-2 factors that influenced each involved human performance in 
the collision type accident 
Under the precondition category, personal factors are identified as common issues in 
the escalation of risk of collision. Most of the factors are poor crew interaction and 
poor personal readiness to handle the risk of collision. Another significant factor is 
lack of cross-monitoring performance mainly indicated during the critical stage of 
operation and the risk of collision becoming prominent. The factors were identified 
to affect all involved human elements as mentioned in the previous paragraph. The 
environment factor as well as ship movement and manoeuvres are other significant 
factors that influence crew performance in handling risk of collision. 
Under the unsafe act category, the errors are the prominent factors observed, whereas 
some violations were also identified during the handling of risk of collision. Poor 
techniques/seamanship is the obvious factor under skill based error shown by the 
crew when handling risk of collision. The data also identified perceptual errors as 
another symptom of error by the crew.  
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Factors affecting technical element under Collision type accidents 
From the 3 cases of Ropax ferry collision, SEMOMAP recorded 15 interactions 
between two technical elements with 10 factors of HFACS level-3. The hull and 
main engine are the technical elements that were most involved during the risk of 
collision. 
Under organisational influence, poor equipment/facility resources as well as 
organisational climates are the two common issues in Ropax ferry operation that 
increase risk of collision (Table 5-6). More specifically, Lack of engineer support, 
issues in acquisition policies/ design process, Failure to correct known design flaws 
under resource management is identified to influence the technical element such as 
ship hull and main engine.  
Under the supervision category, two factors of poor shipborne operations and 
shipborne related shortcomings are found to affect the condition of the hull and main 
engine which later increased the risk of collision. 
Table 5-6: Identified factors under HFACS level 2 that influence the Human Element performance for 
Capsize/Listing type accident 
 
L1 L2 L3
Poor Technological Resources 1
Poor Equipment/Facility 
Resources
3
Poor Work Culture 1
Lack of Oversight 2
Poor International/National 
Standards
1
Inadequate Flag State 
Implementation
1
Planned Inappropriate 
Operations
Poor Shipborne Operations 1
Failed to Correct Known 
Problems
Shipborne Related Shortcomings 1
Poor Physical Environment 2
Poor Technological Environment 2
Total 15
Factors Total Identified 
Factors
Preconditions (iii) Environmental Factors
Resource Management
Organisational Climate
Statutory Factors
Organisational 
Influences (i)
Supervision (ii)
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Factors of poor physical environment and poor technological environment, such as 
ship movement and faulty equipment, were also identified to contribute significantly 
to the degrading performance of hull and main engine. 
 
Figure 5-20: identified HFACS level-2 factors that influenced each involved technical performance in 
the collision type accident 
5.4.2 Phase-1 result for the collision type accidents 
Following the review of the sequence of events for 3 cases of Ropax ferry collision, 
SEMOMAP recorded 51 cognition processes (Figure 5-21). 
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Figure 5-21: frequency of fail (red-block) and safe (blue-block) of accident assessment process under 
phase-1 for collision type accident 
There are five common components identified to indicate risk of collision, which are 
AIS, Lookout, and other equipment such as radar and Sea chart. The SEMOMAP 
result shows that there was no failure of indication of risk of collision by all relevant 
and available means.  
However, failure in handling risk of collision was mostly identified during the stage 
of analysis of the threat of collision. Under this stage, most of the failures were 
observed to take place during the planning and decision making process.  These were 
identified as human failures, including mistakes and delays in planning and making 
decisions. More specifically, human factors such as confusion, distractions, 
forgetting long term training and procedures, and lack of vigilance are identified as 
the common issues involved in the failure of the cognitive process. 
Threat Indication Threat Detection Threat Analysis
Threat Prevention 
Action
Not Applicable 9 15 16 2
Applicable but Not Successful 0 5 23 14
Applicable 25 31 12 35
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Fr
ew
q
u
en
cy
 o
f E
ve
n
t
Frequency of fail/safe during cognitive process under Phase-1 of Collision type accident
92 
 
 
Figure 5-22: detailed information on the threat analysis under phase-1 for collision type accident 
Failures during this stage of analysis contributed to the failure to take preventive 
action. The SEMOMAP recorded 6 common actions taken to prevent the risk of 
collision from developing. On the shipboard side, reverse thrust, steering and 
manoeuvring, and altering speed were the common actions taken; meanwhile, on the 
offboard side, other vessels took actions such as altering course and altering speed. 
However, failures were indicated mostly under timing and sequence and also under 
selection and quality. Under timing and sequence, action too late is the common 
problem indicated by crew performance to deal with the risk of collision. This was 
mainly caused by human factors of distraction, expectation bias and forgetting long-
term training. The human factors were mainly the result of desire for harmony, 
discrimination failure, distraction and forgetting long-term training and procedure. 
The data indicates that due to improper handling at every stage of cognition to the 
risk of collision, the events later developed into accidents  
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5.4.3 Phase-2 result for the collision type accidents 
During phase-2, SEMOMAP recorded a total of 27 cognition processes from 3 
collision cases observed (Figure 5-23).  
 
Figure 5-23: frequency of fail (red-block) and safe (blue-block) of accident assessment process under 
phase-2 for collision type accident 
Since the collision become obvious, all indicative measures showed sufficient 
information to determine the status of the ship after the accident. All related 
indicators such as hull damage sensor, stability indicator, the crew and even 
passengers themselves were involved in the stage. However, the failures came to 
exist during the next step of cognition.  
During the system health detection stage, failures were observed mainly during the 
evaluation stage where the human was the main source of the issues. Typical causes 
of human failures were factors of confusion, distraction, forgetting long-term 
training, tunnel vision and expectation bias. Other crew as a common source of 
system health detection shows the factor of confusion as the common human factor 
in place.  
Improper handling of events after the collision worsened the situation by other 
failures that happened during system health analysis. The master was identified as 
the major human element during this stage. The data shows that most of the failures 
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occurred during the planning and decision making process. Key factors were delay in 
planning and decision, commonly due to human factors of distraction, discrimination 
failure, and expectation bias. 
 
Figure 5-24: detailed information on the system health analysis under phase-2 for collision type 
accident 
Even though errors and failures took place at every stage of the cognitive process, 
not all collisions ended up with severe consequences. The SEMOMAP recorded 1 
case that concluded with mitigated loss but, unfortunately, with casualty as a result. 
From the cases of Ropax ferry collision, it was also observed that the event of 
collision is a trigger for development of other events. For instance, 1 case of collision 
resulted in the over heeling of the ferry that allowed seawater ingress to the cardeck 
and later the event of capsize developed.  Another case shows that fire broke out 
after the event of collision. Hence the subsequent evacuation effort was related to the 
fire accident. 
During the emergency response under phase-2 for collision cases, SEMOMAP 
identified 6 common actions taken namely: contained hull damaged, stability and 
secure cargo, sprinkler system, and fire fighting. Failures were observed during the 
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process which mostly occurred under timing and sequence factor (action too late), 
and quality and selection (action too little). The failure data shows that the failures 
came from common human factors such as confusion, distraction, forgetting long-
term training and procedure. 
5.4.4 Phase-3 result to the collision type accident 
Since the outcome of phase-2 varies due to different development of accidents, the 
data also provides different information of response. For instance, as one collision 
did not result in severe consequences, no further phase was developed. However, in 
the other cases, failures were observed to occur in different stages of cognition 
during phase-3  
 
Figure 5-25: frequency of fail (red-block) and safe (blue-block) of accident assessment process under 
phase-3 for collision type accident 
SEMOMAP recorded 6 common emergency actions taken during the evacuation 
process such as call SAR service, muster personnel and lower MES/liferaft. 
However, as fire was also found to develop after collision, of fire fighting was also 
performed during the phase.  
During the emergency response, failure was observed to occur. Failures were 
identified during all cognitive processes of the emergency process: communication, 
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timing and sequence, and selection and quality (Figure 5-26 C). From the cases 
reviewed, the human is identified as the sole source of the failures, which were due 
to factors of confusion, distraction, forgetting long-term training and procedures and 
other factor such as being overwhelmed due to the panic situation of passengers. 
 
Figure 5-26: detailed information on the emergency response and evacuation action under phase-3 for 
collision type accident 
Failures were also observed during the system health analysis stage which mainly 
took place during the planning and decision making stage. Human is observed as the 
main source of failure. The captain takes a major role in analysing the situation 
during the emergency stage as the captain is the person in charge when the situation 
becomes worse. From the cases reviewed, delay in decision making contributed to 
the failure of the evacuation process. In addition, common factors that influenced the 
failure of the master were confusion, expectation bias, and forgetting long term 
training and procedure 
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Of the SEMOMAP records for the two cases that developed into phase-3, one case 
developed into severe loss and the other concluded with an event of total loss. 
Unfortunately, both cases resulted in a number of casualties. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The results of the SEMOMAP are too comprehensive to describe individually. 
However, detailed results of SEMOMAP to all cases are provided in the appendix. 
From the SEMOMAP data above, failure in every phase of accidents influences the 
next process of cognition and results in greater consequences. While the data 
identifies human failure as the main source of failure due to common human factors, 
equipment also contributed significantly. 
Most of the failures were found to occur during the most critical stages of the 
cognition process such as analysis and action taking to prevent or mitigate the issues. 
In more detail, planning and decision is the area where most failures occurred. 
In summary, the table below provides the different outcomes for the reviewed cases. 
Table 5-7: list of reviewed cases based on its nature of the accident and the final outcome 
No Type of 
Accident 
No of 
cases 
End result of the case Location of accident 
1 Fire 8 4 severe loss with casualty/s 
2 mitigated loss without 
casualty 
1 severe loss without casualty 
1 total loss without casualty 
3 Engine room 
5 Cardeck/Acc space 
2 Capsize 5 5 Total loss with casualty  
3 Collision 3 1 mitigated loss 
1 total loss with casualty 
1 severe loss with casualty 
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6 Discussion and analysis of the SEMOMAP result 
The previous chapter provided an overview of the results of the SEMOMAP to the 
selected cases of domestic ropax ferry accidents. However, it would be meaningless 
without any proper interpretation of the information. Thus, the following section 
provides cross relation information and analyses the information to achieve a 
comprehensive outcome. 
Referring to the objectives of the dissertation stated earlier, the interpretation of the 
SEMOMAP outcome focused on the identification of major systemic issues under 
HFACS category, identification to typical sources of failure that contributed to the 
accidents, the shipborne performance in handling and mitigating the consequences, 
and comparison with other analysis results issued by another organisation.. 
6.1 Identified major systemic issues and their influence on the shipboard 
element 
Reason‘s SCM recognises systemic issues as the latent factors that increase the risk 
of accident in the operation system. Therefore, accident prevention or even safety 
improvement programs should consider the contributory factor as the first target 
instead of focusing on the sharp end (operator). 
Following the outcome of the SEMOMAP, the contributory factors for accidents 
involving domestic ropax ferries were identified. However, to avoid lengthy 
discussion due to fine details and too many different categories, this dissertation only 
focuses on explaining the most frequent factors. 
Since the ropax ferry has a typical operation, the discussion generalises the result of 
the contributory factor by combining all recorded events and analyses to identify the 
influence pattern of the factors on human and technical shipborne operation 
elements.  
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6.1.1 Organisational influence 
Organisational influence is considered the first barrier where the risk should be 
mitigated. The SEMOMAP results highlight a stronger relationship between the 
factors under HFACS mostly affecting the Captain, the chief officer and chief 
engineer. 
 
Figure 6-1: illustration to the relationship between human element with identified HFACS factor 
Level-3 under Organisational influence category 
Under organisation influence, poor equipment/facility resources are considered to be 
the most influencing factors, while lack of human resource and lack of oversight are 
the other factors identified as affecting human element performance. For instance, 
poor equipment was observed mostly in the fire type category, where there was a 
lack of sufficient engineer supports and there was no backup from the organisational 
side to correct design flaws. In more detail, during fire Case No. 6 (refer to Table 
0-73), the installation of non-marine use cables had resulted in higher risk of 
electrical malfunction. The company was not able to supply adequate parts for 
engineers to maintain the safe operation of ship electricity (NTSCb, 2007). Another 
pertinent example of poor equipment was found in the case of capsizes. In most of 
the cases of capsize, improper water freeing port was the biggest technical faulty 
identified during the course of the investigation since accumulated water in the car 
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deck is an obvious factor affecting ship stability. The freeing port issues were mostly 
connected to lack of maintenance, and failure to observe the condition regularly.  
In terms of lack of human resources, the issues mostly took place due to lack of 
training. The strongest relations were indicated in the fire accidents. In fire accidents, 
most of the investigation reports indicate that either regular basis training or even 
single training was not sufficiently provided to the crew. Ferry operation is well-
known for its heavy and tight schedule. The investigation also established that even 
when training was found to be regularly held, it was not sufficient to provide crew 
with real time conditions. This was evidenced during fire fighting operations, when 
most of the crew failed to put out the fire in time. Another indication shows that, due 
to lack of training, most of the crew forget how to perform properly in emergency 
situations and allow the passengers to react on their own behalf. Lack of control of 
passengers is another indication of low competency of the crew due to insufficient 
training provided by the ship management. 
Another factor that is considered of importance is the statutory factors. Substantial 
evidence indicated that lack of implementation of the safety regulation has 
contributed indirectly but significant to the risk of accident. For instance, lack of 
inspection of cargo onboard vehicles during the loading process has resulted in 
dangerous cargo entering unnoticed. Investigations into the accidents identified this 
issue took place in most of cases of fire, in which the fire started from a vehicle.  
The factor of lack of oversight is another significant issue influencing the shipborne 
elements. The issues are mainly related to the factors of no proper monitoring, 
checking of resources climate and processes to ensure safe work environment. For 
instance, a common issue in domestic ropax ferry operation is tightness of schedule. 
The ferry operation authority provides limited time for berth operations as stipulated 
in standards for port ferry operation. The standard operation time is considered 
insufficient to accomplish handling of the cargo and departure preparation by the 
ship crew. A number of cases indicate that, due to these issues, factors of omission 
and lack of vigilance took place, increasing risk of operation to some extent. 
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Figure 6-2: illustration of the relationship between technical element with identified HFACS factor 
Level-3 under Organisational Influence category 
With regard to the technical element, the chart above presents the common ship 
equipment that is affected by omissions and misses in the systemic factors. Issues in 
training, poor equipment/facilities resource, and inadequate flag state implementation 
were observed to influence mostly the main engine, hull and other types of technical 
elements such as fixed/portable fire extinguisher system, freeing port structure, and 
fire retardant layer for accommodation deck. For instance, in case no. 14, the lack of 
class survey during maintenance of the ship was identified to create the degrading 
condition of the hull. In another example, in case No. 13, insufficient port inspection 
of the cargo stacking limit was observed to allow tight spaces in the vehicle 
arrangement on the car deck  (NTSCa, 2012).  
Policy on second hand ship placement was also found to be critical since some of 
cases indicate the issue of improper assessment to operate such kinds of ships beyond 
their operating limits. Cases no. 5 and 14 are taken as examples indicating the 
problem in ferry operation policy. Both ships were previously built and operated in 
the coastal area of Japan which is known for its calm water conditions. Back to 
Indonesia, the ferries were improperly modified and operated in waters with high 
probability of high waves (NTSCb, 2012)(NTSCa, 2007). Nonetheless the weather 
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was not considered as a key contributing factor; however, the decision to allocate 
such type and size of ferries to the risky waters was considered inappropriate. 
6.1.2 Supervision 
Supervision is, under SCM, considered as the second barrier set up to prevent safety 
deficiencies from occurring. The SEMOMAP results indicate factors under the 
Supervision category that influence shipborne human element performance. 
 
Figure 6-3: identified Supervision’s factors that influence involved human element in the Indonesian 
domestic ferry operation 
The most identified factors under the supervision category are poor shipborne and 
shore supervision, poor shipborne operation and shipborne related short comings. 
Under level-4 of HFACS under SEMOMAP, lack of risk assessment was the most 
significant factor influencing the performance of the human element, which mostly 
affected the master and chief officer. 
Risk assessment for shipborne operation is of importance to foresee and take proper 
action so the risk of operation can be minimised. Lack of risk assessment was mostly 
identified in the case of fire accidents. In these particular cases, where most of the 
fires started from external factors such as cargo and passengers, there were limited 
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formal risk assessments performed and there was no proper procedure to support the 
shipboard operation in performing such action.  Case no. 3 and case no. 13 are 
examples of how lack of risk performance contributes to the accident. 
In case no. 3, the ship designed and planned to serve inland waterway in Papua 
region. However, later in the field application the ship also require to serve Merauke 
port which was outside the region and to go to the port, the ship must sail in open 
sea. At the time of accident, the ship experience heavy weather that was considered 
beyond limits of its operation. The management later found did not properly assess 
the possibility of higher weather and considered to ignore the actual field operation 
issues. In case no. 13, ship management tend to ignore the risk of higher cargo 
stacking loaded on the lorry. This condition resulted in narrower access to ship crew 
and also public access. When fire started in a lorry on the cardeck, the crew found 
difficulty to access the fire origin and hinder the overall fire fighting process. 
The issues in Supervision also affects technical element. From 16 cases reviewed, 
SEMOMAP identified 7 common technical elements that considerably play more 
significant role during the accident (Figure 6-4).  
 
Figure 6-4: identified Supervision’s factors that influence involved technical element in the Indonesian 
domestic ferry operation 
Factor of shipborne related shortcomings and poor shipborne operations are 
identified to be the most influential issues to the technical element. The SEMOMAP 
identify stronger relations among factors of factor of failed to correct a safety hazard 
and failed to initiate corrective action to the technical elements of main engine, hull 
and element under other category. 
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The issues mainly took place during capsize and fire type accident. Under the 
Capsize type, the hull is the most affected technical subject. In case no 14, condition 
of scupper is being ignored by the crew that lead the seawater could not freely 
discharge. Nor shore based management and shipboard crew perform sufficient 
supervision to this critical issue (NTSCb, 2012). In other capsize case, where the 
condition of overdraft due to overloading process is also observed took place mostly. 
Supervision to this particular condition is formally taken by the chief mate that 
responsible in cargo operation and in addition port inspector before issuing sailing 
permit. The condition of overdraft was acknowledge, however the redundancy 
condition frequently took place and resulted in higher risk of accident. 
Under Fire type where the main engine affected mostly, case no. 4 shows that 
improper supervision to the crew work to the engine led to the degrading 
performance of the main engine. In case no. 4 and case no. 12, improper maintenance 
by the ship crew led to overheat condition which was increasing risk of fire. In 
cardeck fire condition, supervision in the vehicle placement operation also had led 
the condition where there were no sufficient spaces due to tight vehicle arrangement 
for crew during the fire fighting operation. 
Significant issue of supervision also observed in case no. 1, where the port operation 
could not provide sufficient weighing facility to identify the actual weight of the 
vehicle and cargo. Later the condition resulted in the overloaded condition to the ship 
and increased risk of capsize. 
6.1.3 Pre Condition 
Under HFACS system, precondition is adverse condition that could affect shipboard 
element performance, conditions and result in unsafe act or unsafe situation. 
SEMOMAP also consider the degrading performance of technical element affected 
by factors under precondition. 
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Figure 6-5: Illustration to the relationship between factors under supervision with human element  
Since the importance of the factor, the discussion focused to explain each sub 
category under Supervision 
Environmental factors 
Shappel and Wiegman noted that environmental factor is one of the key factors that 
influence shipboard element which is comprises of either physical and/or 
technological factors. Both sub factors can be interrelated to create unsafe condition 
or unsafe error climate for. From reviewed to 16 cases of Indonesian domestic ropax 
ferry accident, SEMOMAP records ship movements and manoeuvre under poor 
physical environment indicates stronger relation with degrading performance of 
human element in capsize type accident.  
During capsize accident, most of the ship part affected by the heeled condition of the 
ship. In some extent, engine and propulsion performance could have been affected 
due to many reasons such as not fully submerged propeller or main engine stopped 
due to problem of fuel supply since the affected fuel level in the tank. On the other 
hand, unusual ship angle for passenger could start the panic situation. Another issue 
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movement gave limited option to the ship crew to handle ship properly. Excessive 
ship movement during berthing operation had damaged the stern construction and 
allow the seawater flooded the ship. Another factor identified is the factor of 
temperature-thermal and stress that contributed significantly in engine room fire 
accident.  
 
Figure 6-6: Identified factors f L3 under Supervision category that affecting Indonesian domestic ferry 
operation 
Poor technological environment also found influential to the shipboard performance 
of domestic ferry. Barriers and faulty equipment is the common precondition issues 
under this category. Faulty equipment not just only identified during fire accident but 
also identified in capsizes type. 
This significant condition under poor technological environment and poor physical 
environment is relevant with identified factor of lack of engineer support and poor 
equipment facility resource that identified mostly in the Organisational Influence 
Category.  
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When it relates with the condition of the fleet itself, most of the involved ferries are 
old. Eventhough regular maintenance performed and annual docking is conducted, 
the ship condition cannot be excluded by the fact that the old structure, machinery 
space and all its peripherals is still giving the difficult condition for the crew. It 
required a lot of effort and resource to retrofit the ship condition which is unlikely for 
the shipowner to do so due to high cost project. Number of evidence showing the 
technical problem found when the crew attempt to mitigate the risk of operation. 
Case no. 5 can be taken as example. Faulty of watertight seal on the ramp door 
resulted in the seawater to enter the car deck. another faulty equipment in different 
case can also be observed in the case no. 4 where CO2 installation not work properly 
when it operated to put out the fire in engine room. 
Along with the challenges mentioned in the chapter 3 above, this condition is 
somewhat difficult to deal with due to some factor such as financial problem for 
shipowner, high demand for transport compare to supply. 
Crew Condition 
Crew condition play significant role in determining the safe onboard operation. 
Under the category, the negative cognitive factors are the most influence factor to the 
human element in the domestic ferry operation. 
Under crew condition category, issue on complacency under negative cognitive 
factors were identified as common factor that influence the crew performance in 
most of the accident reviewed (Figure 6-7).  
This reasonable to believe since ferry typical operation is monotonous and regular. 
Nearly every time the personnel perform similar operation without any additional 
work challenge. From 16 cases review, factor of complacency in domestic ferry 
operation mostly take place in short distance voyage. Complacency takes place in 
any kind of operations and could result in devastated outcome if not taken care 
properly. Proper work roster, competency refreshment by providing regular training, 
adequate crew management can be considered to reduced the excess of the 
complacency. Case no. 1 and case no16 can be taken as example to indicate the 
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severity of the complacency in ferry operation. In Case no. 1 typical berthing 
operation provide ease situation the officer and not warned the damaged resulted 
from excessive operation which later resulting in sea water flooded the cardeck. In 
case no. 16, regular ferry movement taken in avoiding the other ship which was later 
found creates critical situation. Later, the officer on watch corrected the action but 
insufficient to avoid the collision 
Issues in technical/procedure/knowledge mostly identified during fire accident and 
capsize accident. Since no proper training was provided to the crew or proper one, 
crew found trouble when handling critical situation. In capsize accident, some 
findings from investigation identified that the master unable to show proper 
understanding on ship stability. As a result he did not aware with consequence of his 
wring recovery action to stabilise the ship. Later the ship stability worsens and 
capsized the ship.  
Other than those factor mentioned above some indication on the overconfidence, 
channelize attention were the other factor that contributed to degrading performance 
of the crew. 
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Figure 6-7: identified issues on crew condition category 
Inadequate rest is other factor that contributes to the degrading performance of ship 
personnel. Based on the survey conducted by NTSC in 2013, most of the ferries 
operation in Merak Bakauheni ferry lane adopts what so called ―two trip‖ shift or 12 
hours shift. This has been done regularly. In the case no. 8, fire broke out from deck 
equipment when the ship on her final stage of the voyage. The crew was identified 
not to have sufficient rest hour and affecting their performance in fire fighting. 
Personnel Factors 
The table below indicates identified personnel factors issue from 16 domestic ferry 
accident reports. Issues of cross monitoring performance and challenge and reply are 
the common findings among other factors in under category of poor crew interaction, 
whereas pattern of poor risk judgement and inadequate training are two common 
personnel factors identified under category of poor personal readiness. 
Issue in cross monitoring performance took place when no performance monitoring 
conducted by the shipboard management level or shore side. Challenge and reply is 
another shipboard performance issues that increase risk of operation. In most of the 
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case reviewed, despite known fault condition and activity conducted performed, the 
lower rank feel reluctant to remind or warning the adverse condition. 
Case no. 10, 13 and 11 can be taken as example to indicate the problem. During 
loading process, vehicle placement is tighten to provide chance to carry more 
vehicle. The condition has been proved create problem to the crew activity during 
emergency response conducted. 
 
Figure 6-8: factor HFACS Level 4 under personnel factors of Precondition identified in the reviewed 
cases of domestic ferry accident 
Pattern of poor risk judgement were identified also under poor personal readiness 
category whereas inadequate training as the other factor that contributed significantly 
to the degrading performance of the human element.  
The chart below provides a cross reference how the factors above influence the 
human element which later considered contributed to misbehaviour of the crew and 
increasing risk of accident in the ferry operation.  
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affecting entire ship system. During capsize, ideally all crew should have been aware 
with the condition and react based on the each duty under emergency response 
system, so it goes as well during fire accident. When the crew coordination was poor, 
the efforts to mitigate risk become useless.  
During critical situation such as handling the potential risk of fire, crew coordination 
is considered utmost importance. Taking example of case no. 8, 11 and 13, the crew 
unable to perform well due to the emergency response measure was not coordinated 
properly due to confusion, distraction and factor of lack of training. The situation 
was worsen when the fire started in inaccessible place such due to tight arrangement 
of the ship 
 
Figure 6-9: Human element interaction with factor under Personnel factor of Supervision 
6.1.4 Unsafe Act 
The HFACS assume that the unsafe act condition is existed while all previous factors 
were aligned to create subsequent adverse event. Errors represent the mental and 
physical activities of individuals that fail to achieve their intended outcome; that is, 
the result of the person‘s action was not as expected. A violation, on the other hand, 
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committed when the person‘s action reflects a ―willful disregard‖ for manuals, or 
standard operating procedures or regulations  (Wiegmann & Shappel, 2001). 
Under SEMOMAP model, the unsafe act considered as the risky behaviour that been 
repeated in previous time and increase risk in the shipboard operation. 
 
Figure 6-10: Identified human element‘s unsafe act 
The chart above presents the list of human element that mostly involved in the 
domestic ferry accident. The action by the Captain, Chief Officer, Chief engineer and 
OS were the subject that identified showing the   
The most prominent factor under unsafe act category from 16 reviewed cases is the 
skill-based type error and decision-judgement errors. All human element involved 
indicates the symptom in each type of accident. Failure in assessing risk during 
operation is the most common error whereas, poor techniques/seamanship is the 
second most common error identified in the reviewed cases of domestic ferry 
accident. 
On the other hand, factors of accepted unnecessary hazard under exceptional 
violation are the common violation committed by the ship crew whereas factors of 
exceeded limits of system as the second common factor. 
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Figure 6-11: Unsafe act factors identified in all reviewed domestic ropax ferry accident 
In most of the cases reviewed, poor seamanship technique was observed due to many 
reasons such as competencies, experience and training. If it related with previous 
factors start from organisational factors, supervision and precondition, this condition 
is predicted to be exist. The symptom of error in seamanship technique could be seen 
by indication of lack of training in the organisational influence. Issues in supervision 
most likely resulted in the error in risk assessment.  
Typical violation committed by the crew also can presumably originate from issues 
identified in the personnel factor and crew condition. However in some cases, 
inadequate supervision could have also been the factor that contributes to the 
violation. Taking example of accepted unnecessary hazard, in most of the fire type 
accident where it start from the cardeck, the crew experience difficulties during fire 
fighting process. The hazard should have been recognised when the crew arranged 
the vehicle tightly. In some other evidence indicates that the violation to the 
regulation deemed necessary when the ferry frequently encountered other ship that 
did not take proper manoeuvre under the applied regulation. 
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In case no. 16, the ferry ships tend to have irregular movement in the strait based on 
the officers on watch seamanship. While the ferry in a crossing situation, most of the 
ferry tend to avoid collision with the other ship by aiming the stern of the opposed 
ships. In some occasion, the action not complies with COLREGs and creates 
confusion to other ship. In the particular case, the other ship assumed that the ferry 
maintain its course, meanwhile at the same time the ferry already alter the course to 
aim the other ships stern since the officer onboard ferry also assumes that no course 
alteration were made by the other ships. The event later concluded with both ship 
collide. 
It interesting to notes that some unsafe act also influences the condition of technical 
element. Following data of SEMOMAP, violation type exceptional and routine are 
considered influence the main engine, hull type and other technical element. The 
common factors under this violation type accepted unnecessary hazard and failed to 
comply with manual. Investigation to case no. 6 found that the crew installed the 
non-marine use cable for electrical installation which increased risk of fire in 
shipboard operation.  
 
Figure 6-12: identified unsafe act behaviour that influence technical element 
Crew error and violation affecting technical element mostly identified in fire type 
accident. In case no. 4 and 12, the crew was not following the standard manual for 
main engine maintenance, thus, the maintenance conducted was not properly 
performed and resulted in the degrading performance of the main engine indicated by 
event of overheat. 
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6.2 Pattern for failure and its typical source 
During the critical event, humans and machines interact intensively as a whole 
system to maintain safe shipboard operation. Failure during the interaction could lead 
to either increased risk of operation, resulting in a new dangerous event or even 
failure during emergency operation that leads to additional catastrophic 
consequences. 
The SEMOMAP data provides valuable information to demonstrate how human 
performance influences the overall shipboard operation and system. Overall results 
indicate that human failure is the main factor affecting shipborne operation during 
the critical stages such as handling the risk, mitigating the consequence or dealing 
with emergency action/response. 
From 16 cases of Indonesian domestic ferry accidents, SEMOMAP recorded 1683 
events of cognition from each phase and stage in different types of accidents. The 
chart below shows in which phase and stage of phase failures were found to have 
occurred. 
 
Figure 6-13: SEMOMAP result for failure identification under phase-1 in every cognition stage for all 
type of domestic ropax ferry involved accident. 
During phase-1, most of the cases indicated two main cognitive areas where failure 
occurred. During analysis of the threat, failure occurred mostly during decision 
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making, and failure in planning occurred in similar proportion (Figure 6-13). Most of 
the cases reviewed indicated that frequency of failure was observed to be higher 
during executions of action, mainly in terms of selection and quality, and also in 
regard to timing and sequence. 
 
Figure 6-14: SEMOMAP result for failure identification under phase-2 in every cognition stage for all 
type of domestic ropax ferry involved 
During phase-2, the pattern of failure indicates similarities compared to the failure 
pattern during phase-1. The failures mostly occurred during the execution of action, 
which, in this particular phase, is action to emerge from critical situation after the 
accident. Failures in phase-2 were observed to take place most frequently during the 
stage of timing and sequence. A similar failure pattern was also shown in phase-3. 
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Figure 6-15: SEMOMAP result for failure identification in every cognition stage under phase-3 for all 
type of domestic ropax ferry involved 
Following the data acquired from selected reports, frequency of human failure 
compared to equipment failure was found to be higher. The proportion of human 
failure compared to equipment failure was various but within the range of 83% to 93 
%, whereas equipment failures ranged from 7% to 17%. 
Table 6-1: Failure percentage in the accident assessment process for each type of accident 
 
In further detail, compared to the number of the cognitive process, human failure was 
also found to remain high. The proportion of human failure was found to be varied, 
depending on the type of accident and stage of cognitive process. 
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The table below indicates percentage of failures identified from cases of Indonesian 
domestic ferry accidents compared to total cognitive processes in every stage of each 
phase for different types of accidents. The percentages indicated in the table were 
calculated from the number of failures observed in every phase of stage compared to 
the total cognitive events recorded under same phase of stage. 
Table 6-2: Percentage of failure source for different type of ropax ferry involved accident 
 
As stated in the previous chapter, failures mostly occurred during selection and 
execution of action, either action to prevent the threat or emergency action to 
mitigate the consequences after the accident. A similar condition occurred in the last 
stage of phase-2 where most of the failures took place.  
The following sections identify the contribution of failure from human and 
equipment failure perspectives. 
6.2.1 Human performance in critical situation 
The SEMOMAP outcome of the human performance identified some aspects of 
concern while they dealt with critical situations. As explained in the previous 
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chapter, human performance in every step of cognition plays a significant role in 
determining the consequence of the event. 
The SEMOMAP models views contributing factor under systemic process contribute 
and affect the shipboard element. By cross relating the data in contributory factor 
relevant to the human performance behaviour, the significant relation of the factor 
under Phase-0 can also be presented.  
The Figure 5-2, Figure 5-10, Figure 5-19 in chapter 5 indicates how the issues in the 
systemic factors contributed, influencing and affecting human element performance 
in shipboard operation in domestic ferry accident. Looking at the proportion of 
human failures detected in all accident, masters other crews and ERT are identified 
contributed in most of the failure occurred during cognitive process. 
 
Figure 6-16: Distribution of human failures in all reviewed cases for every phase and every step. 
In views of accident step process, the chart below developed based on the total 
human failure identified during all stage of cognition in different type of accident. 
The chart below indicates the 6 most failures took place in the event of accident 
involved domestic ferry in Indonesian water. 
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From the chart below, the master conducted most of failure during Analysis and 
Action stage in fire type accident stage of analysis is the stage where human failure 
mostly occurs. Failure by Other Crew also found higher during analysis process in 
collision category, whereas failures of Other Crew also identified mostly during 
stage of Action in capsize/listing type accident. 
 
Figure 6-17: Distribution of human failure based on each stage of cognition process and type of 
accident. 
Compare to the data provided in the Contributory Factor and accident development 
phases, the data found conformity. There are number of systemic factors that have 
been identified influencing human element which is mostly to the captain. The 
evidence later supported by number of failures in the event of accident development. 
This is not to mention that a single subject should bear all responsibility to any 
failures committed. However, issues in the systemic itself that should have more 
attention and properly managed. 
As mentioned earlier, following the cases reviewed decision making process as well 
as planning are the cognitive stage where failures mostly occurred. In further detail, 
factor of delayed, wrong, unclear or even no analysis is observed.  
Human failures planning also mostly found in similar condition. Failures in planning 
also mostly identified in the collision type accident during stage of threat analysis 
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under phase-1 (Figure 6-18). Factor of wrong planning is the most frequent factor 
observes in the selected 16 cases of domestic ropax ferry accident. This condition 
took place due to factor of lack of vigilance, forget long-term training, incorrect 
detection and time pressure. 
 
Figure 6-18: Human failure frequency in planning based on type of accident, its phase and cognition 
stage 
From all SEMOMAP data on human failures, its indicates that the decision maker 
was not be able to make correct decision in time during in collision type accident 
during threat analysis, whereas the other condition also found during capsize/listing 
type accident (Figure 6-19). The most pertinent human factor under this 
circumstance is the factors of wrong decision that contributed mostly by lack of long-
term training and procedures, condition of confusion, being distracted, tunnel vision 
and other factors. 
In case no. 14, the master unable to assess situation properly due to absent of stability 
data onboard the ships. His planning to reposition the ship was considered 
inappropriate and later identified worsen the ship stability.  
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Figure 6-19: human failure frequency in Decision Making based on type of accident, its phase and 
cognition stage. 
Human failure in executing the action also found too obvious and frequent. Data of 
SEMOMAP identify the area of cognition that the particular failures mostly take 
place. It shows that failure in timing and sequence is observed in every stage, every 
phase of cognition in every type of accident. The SEMOMAP identify that human 
failure during timing and sequence is mostly observed in emergency response action 
under phase-2 of fire type accident. 
 
Figure 6-20: Human failure frequency in Timing and Sequence based on each type of accident, its 
phase and cognition stage 
In more specific, fire in which started in the cardeck is the condition where the fire 
fighting action failed. In case no. 13, the crew action to put out the fire was 
considered too late since the emergency response time required extra effort to access 
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the origin of fire. The issues in timing and sequence commonly on the factor action 
too late and as a result of confusion, forget long-term training and procedures, 
expectation bias, distraction. 
Failure in Quality and Selection also found as the most frequent condition in 
domestic ferry accident. Along with the failure observed in factor timing and 
sequence, the failures in Quality and Selection also found to took place mostly 
during emergency response action under phase-2 of fire type accident that also 
related with more human failure observed during evacuation action under phase-3 for 
same type of accident (Figure 6-21).   
 
Figure 6-21: Human failure frequency in Selection and Quality based on each type of accident, its 
phase and cognition stage 
Most cases of fire shows that the crew unable to identify exactly and reach the source 
of fire. Hence, the action taken was considered too little and some other actions also 
indicate that the action taken was in wrong direction. In most of the fire accidents 
reviewed that resulted in severe loss or total loss, the human failure took place 
mostly due to lack of training, factor of confusion, distraction, and missee. 
From the discussion above, it become obvious that factor of training is crucial to 
prevent the failure. Even the regulation required the ship to perform regular safe drill 
and training onboard more than other type of ship, apparently there are significant 
issues in how the drill was conducted. Some information in the investigation reports 
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mentioned that the drill conducted was based on formality to satisfy the requirement 
and not reflecting actual condition such as difficulties in fire fighting in cardeck. 
6.2.2 Equipment failure 
Failure in equipment is observed to be less compare to the failure of human factor in 
term of domestic ferry accident. However, some failures in equipment also 
considered significant and contributed more in particular cases. 
 
Figure 6-22: Equipment failure frequency based on each type of accident, its phase and cognition 
stage. 
Failure in equipment mostly observed during emergency response action during 
phase-2 of fire type accident. Similar like human failure observed during same 
category, equipment failure also observed mostly during aspect of timing and 
sequence, and also in aspect of selection and quality. The common failed equipment 
during fire accident listed as follow: 
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Figure 6-23: Failed equipment identified in each stage for each type of accident 
The factor of lack of maintenance and not properly installed is the common factor 
that influence the performance of the equipment. In case no. 13, the investigation 
found that the performance of water sprinkler where fire accident started in the 
cardeck was not sufficient to suppress the fire not to spread and developed.  
Under equipment failure, SEMOMAP identify that action provided offboard also 
found insufficient to assist onboard operation handling the critical situation. In most 
of the accident, investigation found that readiness of the SAR to provide assistance is 
found improper. In particular for fire cases, the shore based response was not 
considered too late due to location of the accident (NTSC, 2008). 
Failure during evacuation action also observed in condition that the life jacket was 
not accessible and the life raft could not be released (NTSC, 2009). Both condition 
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was also contribute to the fact that fatalities were not as a result of fire but caused by 
drowning while evacuating from the ship (NTSC, 2008). 
6.3 Risk mitigated or continued to develop? 
One of the key finding is the SEMOMAP also records successful action during 
accident development step. The percentage of successful action compare to the failed 
action is remained high (refer to the Table 0-74). However, the accident continuously 
to develop into further extent. From this condition, despite series of successful 
action, risk in shipboard operation only needs a single failure to develop into greater 
event such as accident.  
A correct action in handling a risky situation can provide an opportunity for the 
shipboard operation to maintain the whole safe operation of the ship. This requires 
total effort from the capable and qualified crew, supported by proper and sufficient 
onboard resources. 
From review of the selected cases, the SEMOMAP outcome can be used to do 
benchmarking/comparison between saved operations with events of total loss. The 
variety of the selected cases also supports the comparison process. To observe this 
matter; fire cases of No. 4 and No. 12 are taken as examples (refer to Table 0-73). 
The chart below was developed by observing every single accident assessment 
process(Loop) to provide a comparison of the cognitive processes in both cases. In 
each loop the SEMOMAP observed each shipboard performance and identified the 
failure in every stage of cognition. Each case shows different onboard behaviour in 
dealing with the fire situation onboard. The loop was generated based on the 
information stated in the accident reports.. 
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Figure 6-24: Comparison of accident process for fire case no. 4 (below the line) and case no. 12 
(above the line) during phase-1 and phase-2 of accident development 
From the charts above, failures were observed during phase-1 which led to the event 
of fire (Figure 6-24). However, significant differences can be seen when the event 
proceeds to phase-2. From the loop chart of case no. 12, failures were observed 
during the initial loop; however, they stopped for next loops. Case no. 4 shows the 
opposite. Failures (indicated by red bars) were identified in every loop of cognition, 
which was mainly during execution of action taken to reduce or mitigate the effect 
after the fire occurred (Figure 6-24). SEMOMAP data indicates that failure in action 
occurred mostly in terms of timing and sequence and also selection and quality. 
In case no. 12, the fire was spotted in the main engine no. 2. Some initial action was 
taken to put out the fire. But the first effort failed. The chief engineer later ordered 
the crew to evacuate from the engine room and to close all engine room connected 
openings (doors, blower etc). When all order been complied with, the chief engineer 
initiated the CO2 system to stop the fire and the action was successful (NTSCa, 
2012). Despite some failures in the main engine no. 2 due to lack of maintenance and 
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support from the company, the crew managed to mitigate the risk of fire and contain 
the damaged into a more controllable area (engine room). 
In contrast, Case No.4 shows the opposite outcome. Similar contributing factors were 
observed compared to Case No. 6. The indicator was obvious to provide sufficient 
information about the fire. However, when the fire broke out in main engine no.2, the 
crew experienced difficulties locating the origin the fire. Lack of vigilance and 
awareness of the condition added to lack of training creates difficulties for the crew 
to put out the fire. On the other hand, the investigation also found malfunctions in the 
fixed fire extinguisher system. As a result, the fire could not be controlled and 
continued to spread. 
From comparison above, there are factor to consider in successful operation to 
mitigate risk or threat not to develop into greater event. Failure is should not be 
existed in every stage of cognition since it affecting the other stage, which might also 
amplify the failure in the next cognitive stage. Obviously it requires effort and high 
degree of crew performance to keep the operation safe. Crew concentration and 
ability to assess the situation also significant to prevent the failure develop. This can 
be done by providing continuous training and familiarisation to the crew, better 
working system and environment. 
6.4 Comparison with the original report of the domestic ferry safety 
For the same investigation reports, NTSC issued a compilation of the results of the 
main causal factors in the domestic ferry accidents. In classifying the final 
contributing factor, the NTSC focused on the two main categories of human and 
technical factors, without further detail of description. 
From a total of 16 ropax ferry accidents, 12 were stated to have been contributed by 
technical factors, whereas 4 were contributed by human factors. The SEMOMAP 
results highlighted the outcome of human factors, which contributed significantly to 
most of the accidents. 
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There are many factors to explain why the result is different. The investigation 
reports mainly exclude the complexity of socio-technical relations and tend to be 
descriptive instead of analytic. The investigations also place too much focus on the 
main causal factor, without extending the analysis deeper into the consequence of the 
accident or action taken during the emergency situation. 
As explain in the chapter 4, the nature of the investigation models is different 
compare to the critical thinking utilised in the accident causation models. While the 
investigation model tends to simplify the information into more general readers 
consumption, the accident causation models provide details for further analysis. 
By this condition mentioned above, the outcome of the SEMOMAP has deviated 
from the original statement of fact issued by the particular organisation. 
6.5 Area of concern 
6.5.1 Data availability 
The SEMOMAP relies mainly on the sufficiency of data provided in accident 
investigation reports. It is nearly impossible to reinvestigate since the occurrence 
happened in past time. Hence, additional data from different sources that are 
considered appropriate and supportive are acquired, for instance, data from the 
Indonesian Marine Tribunal verdicts to the cases used. However, the 
comprehensiveness of the SEMOMAP in providing detailed information also 
requires some logical assumption, which at some point could lead to different 
outcomes and interpretations.  
On the other hand, SEMOMAP model outcome is found so comprehensive so it can 
be used to analysis to the sufficiency of information in the investigation report.  
6.5.2 Comments on utilising the models 
When it tracing back the outcome of the models, the validity of the results is required 
high level of concentration and consistency during coding of the cases. The 
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interpretation of the SEMOMAP model also relies to the punctuality of the user 
when selecting the taxonomy. 
In addition, the data input is mainly relies onto the comprehensiveness of the 
investigation reports. On the other side, the overall knowledge possessed by the user 
is also contributes significantly to the carefulness of the factors selection. The user is 
required to have sufficient background on the ship operation and human factor 
concept. In addition, the user is also required to obtain sufficient knowledge in 
accident causation model and investigation and also not limited to the human factor 
behaviour in the accident process. 
During the dissertation, the analysis conducted to the selected accident where the 
event is obvious. The writer found some critical condition is not covered specifically 
within the model. Therefore the Other type of factor is become more favourable to 
select. To provide better validation to the model, continuous development is 
required. In addition, it strongly recommended utilise near miss data to see which 
area within the accident that not covered.  
6.5.3 Issues in the models 
Outcome of the model 
The SEMOMAP able provide massive and useful data for identification of the issues 
in every phase of accident. There are many of details in the outcome that can lead to 
multiple interpretations. However, the SEMOMAP outcome considered as raw data 
that requires additional works to filter and analyse it. 
In future, it is recommended to develop a better SEMOMAP outcome and summary 
so confusion and extra works in interpreting the results could be avoided. 
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7 Conclusion and recommendation 
The SEMOMAP data and analysis described in previous chapter is proven how 
systemic process is considered of importance to sufficiently reveal the causal factor 
that lies in the domestic ferry operation. Data from investigation report has been 
scrutinised to identified missing information that later combined with other 
references to acquired complete pictures on the safety issues in domestic ferry 
operation. 
The data shows that different type of accident is also contributed by different 
behaviour of the system applied to prevent the accident.  
7.1 Conclusion 
Accident in any nature and condition shows multiple and complex interaction among 
elements of shipboard operation for both shore side and onboard side.  
The domestic ferry in a developing country such as Indonesia recognised as the 
major backbone to support socio-economic activity and more over provide access to 
the remote areas, thus maintain the nation‘s integration. Therefore, safety level of the 
domestic ferry operation should be maintained and improve.  
Review to the 16 different type of accident investigation report has provided 
significant finding in how the safety issues exist in the domestic ferry operation. The 
identified factors as mentioned in the chapter 6 indicate the trend and pattern how 
accident develops from earliest stage of the operation.  
Despite difference type of accident, there are similarities of identified contributory 
factor that contribute to the escalation of risk in domestic ferry accident. Under 
organisational influence, factor of poor equipment/facilities resources should have 
more attention to deal with since it is the common issues identified in the domestic 
ferry accident in Indonesia. Under Supervision category, poor shipborne and shore 
supervision, factor of poor shipborne operations and shipborne related shortcomings 
are the key issues that increased the risk in domestic ferry operation. 
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From the analysis to the outcome of the SEMOMAP to the ferry accident, there are 
some significant points to mention that the human performance play major role in the 
operation of the domestic ferries. Issues in the execution of the selected action found 
to be the most prominent issues. When it related to the contributory factors, lack of 
training is the significant factors while it also contributed by other factors such as 
lack of proper equipment due to non-supportive shore based management. 
The difference of outcome of the cases has shown and provides examples in how the 
accident could have been prevented and at least mitigated to stop further extent.  
The SEMOMAP development managed to provide complex but comprehensive 
pictures how the accident developed and up to which stage where it considered as the 
most significant point. 
7.2 Recommendation 
Following the identified contributing factors under the SEMOMAP models, there is 
no single or individual works can be done itself to mitigate all issues. Join work and 
comprehensive cooperation among the domestic ferry stakeholders required with 
main objective to improve overall ferry safety performance.  
Obviously, following the findings to the failures of human factors, extensive work to 
improve human performance and competencies particularly in assessing the analysis 
and performance in handling the critical situation are required and should have been 
come to highest concern by all related parties. 
Obviously to prevent the recurrence, the preventive measures should not be placed 
based on each nature, since the accident can happen in any different form and nature.  
Database of mishap can be a resourceful reference as benchmark to determine the 
trend and identify better on accident development process. It is not surprisingly that 
most of the administration had only few data for mishap. Therefore the relevant 
authorities and all domestic ferry operators encourage developing a comprehensive 
and thorough database system.  
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Issues Domestic ferry safety will remain blurry due to lack of international attention 
and common approach among interested states. But the problem of lack world level 
analysis is not come as itself. Lack of data submitted by the involved states to the 
relevant organisation also considered as the other factor involved. Further 
enhancement to the database access and update works are required and be developed 
to sufficiently understand the current trend of domestic ferry operation. 
Further work required to compile more accident report to the SEMOMAP system to 
acquire better the outcome of understanding the trend in ferry accident. In will be 
beneficiary to use the model for other domestic ferry accident reports from different 
region and different condition (regulatory, policy, operational pattern) to seek global 
trend in the issues of the operation. By doing so, common approach in reducing the 
risk in domestic ropax ferry operation can be developed for mutual benefit 
Additionally, a more specific research, such as narrow it to each type of accident and 
looking into specific phase, is recommended to observe further trend in the 
operation. 
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Appendices 
Appendix – 1: SEMOMAP Workflow 
Phase-0: Iterative process workflow under SEMOMAP models 
 
Figure 0-1: Phase-0 SEMOMAP workflow 
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Phase-1: Iterative process workflow under SEMOMAP models 
 
Figure 0-2: Phase-1 SEMOMAP workflow 
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Phase-2: iterative process workflow under SEMOMAP Models 
 
Figure 0-3: Phase-2 SEMOMAP workflow 
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Yes
Proceed to 
Phase-3
 No
Yes
Mitigated Loss
(W or w/o Casualties)
Severe Loss
(W or w/o Casualties)
Recording 
applicable?
Recording 
successful 
Select and define 
error type
Transmission 
applicable?
Transmission 
successful?
Select and define 
error type
Receiving 
applicable?
Receiving 
successful?
Select and define 
error type
Evaluation 
applicable?
Evaluation 
successful?
Select and define 
error type
Transmission 
applicable?
Transmission 
successful?
Select and define 
error type
Yes No
YesNo
NoYes
Yes
 Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Receiving 
applicable?
Receiving 
successful?
Select and define 
error type
Planning 
applicable?
Planning 
successful?
Select and define 
error type
Decision 
applicable?
Decision 
successful?
Select and define 
error type
Yes
 Yes
Yes
No Yes
No
No
No
YesNo
Communication 
applicable?
Receiving 
successful?
Select and define 
error type
Time and Sequence 
applicable?
Planning 
successful?
Select and define 
error type
Selection and 
Quality applicable
Decision 
successful?
Select and define 
error type
Yes
 Yes
Yes
No Yes
No
No
No
YesNo
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Phase-3: iterative process workflow under SEMOMAP models 
 
Figure 0-4: Phase-3 SEMOMAP workflow 
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Transmission 
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error type
Yes No
YesNo
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Receiving 
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Receiving 
successful?
Select and define 
error type
Planning 
applicable?
Planning 
successful?
Select and define 
error type
Decision 
applicable?
Decision 
successful?
Select and define 
error type
Yes
 Yes
Yes
No Yes
No
No
No
YesNo
Communication 
applicable?
Receiving 
successful?
Select and define 
error type
Time and Sequence 
applicable?
Planning 
successful?
Select and define 
error type
Selection and 
Quality applicable
Decision 
successful?
Select and define 
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Yes
 Yes
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No Yes
No
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Appendix – 2: SEMOMAP v2 Model 
 
Figure 0-5: SEMOMAP v2. The models developed by Schroeder et al (2014) under unpublished release 
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Appendix – 3: SEMOMAP taxonomy code book (draft) 
The coding developed based on the step by step process following the SEMOMAP 
framework. The coding assist the user to acknowledge and identify the definition of 
each terminology used in the Model. The code developed based on the each phase of 
accident.  
Level-1: the main category that contributed directly to the main phase. The definition 
used for the taxonomy adopted from HFACS 
Level-2: the factors that attributed and support the condition of factor in level-1 
Level-3: specific factors that support the factors in level-2 
Level-4: dropdown list of specific action 
Level-5: more specific selection. Under Contributory Factor L5 covers shipboard 
element. Under accident event assessment process, L5 taxonomy comprise list of error 
mode based on the TRACEr. 
General Information Taxonomy: 
The general information contains involved ship‘s administration data, the occurrence 
general information and consequence of accident to the ship, cargo/passengers and 
environment. 
L1 L2 
IMO Number  State the IMO number of the ship 
Vessel Name State ship name and its previous name 
Vessel type Classify the type of ship by its functionality to carry its cargo: 
GC, Container, Bulk Carrier, Tanker, Passenger, Ro-Ro, 
Others 
Vessel Flag State State ship flag at the time of the accident 
Classification Society State the class society the ship was classified under at the time 
of the accident 
Keel Laid Year State the keel laid year as indicated in ship certificate 
Built at State the location (shipyard, country) the ship built 
Deadweight Ton (DWT) DWT of the ship 
Ship Length Over All (m) Overall length of the ship 
Ship Beam (m) State ship breadth 
Ship Loaded Draft (m) State the ship draft at the time of the occurrence 
Ship Height (m) state the vertical measure of ship bottom to the upmost deck 
Date of Occurrence State date of occurrence 
Time of Occurrence State time of occurrence by Local time and GMT  
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L1 L2 
Geographical Occurrence 
Location 
State the location of the occurrence by its fix gps position and 
other geographical reference 
Type of Occurrence Classify nature of accident with following event: Collision, 
Grounding, Contact, Fire/explosion, Hull failure, Loss of 
control, Ship/equipment damage, Capsize/listing, 
Flooding/foundering, Ship Missing, Occupational accident, 
Others, Unknown 
Number of Fatalities / 
Injuries 
State number of the fatalities as a result of the accident at the 
point and subsequent fatality, 
Consequence to the Ship Provide sufficient information of the end consequences to the 
ship due to accident, 
Narratives Brief overview of the occurrence 
Taxonomy for Phase-0: Contributory Factors 
As mentioned earlier, the taxonomy for Phase 0 was adapted from HFACS. This section 
breaks down the HFACS taxonomy, and provides descriptions of what each option. The 
taxonomy used for SEMOMAP consists of 4 levels; for brevity, however, the taxonomy 
definitions provided in the codebook are only for levels 1, 2 and 3 (1992). 
 
 
 
 
Under the phase-0, SEMOMAP taxonomy provides detail selection of element as 
follow: 
Organisational 
Influence
Resource 
Management
Organisational 
Climate
Organisational 
Process
Statutory factor
Supervision
Inadequate 
Supervision
Planned Inappropriate 
Operations
Failed to Correct 
Known Problems
Supervisory 
Violations
Preconditions
Environmental 
Factors
Crew Condition Personnel Factors
Unsafe Acts
Errors Violations
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Table 0-1: Affected shipboard subject 
Subjects Effected by 
Influencing Factors 
Category Details 
Human Subjects Captain & Officers Captain 
1st/Chief Officer 
2nd Officer 
3rd Officer 
Other Officer 
Navigators Helmsman 
Pilot 
Other Crew AB 
Bosun 
OS 
Engineers 1st/Chief Engineer 
2nd Engineer 
Other Engineer 
Technical Subjects Bridge & Deck Steering Equipment 
Navigation Aids (AIS, ECDIS, Radar, 
GPS, etc…) 
Communication Equipment 
Alarm Panels & System 
Engine Room Main Engine 
Auxiliary Engine 
Engine Control Panel 
Fuel Pumps 
Ballast Water Pumps 
Generators 
Boilers 
Ship Structure & 
Design 
Hull 
Separators 
 
Level-1 Taxonomy: 
Table 0-2: Contributory Factor Level-1 definition  
Terminology Definition 
Organisational 
Influence 
factors in a mishap if the communications, actions, omissions or 
policies of upper-level management directly or indirectly affect 
supervisory practices, conditions or actions of the operator(s) and result 
in system failure, human error or an unsafe situation 
Supervision a mishap event can often be traced back to the supervisory chain of 
command. 
Pre-Condition factors in a mishap if active and/or latent preconditions such as 
conditions of the operators, environmental or personnel factors affect 
practices, conditions or actions of individuals and result in human error 
or an unsafe situation 
Unsafe Acts Acts are those factors that are most closely tied to the mishap, 
and can be described as active failures or actions committed by 
the operator that result in human error or unsafe situation 
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Level-2 Taxonomy  
Taxonomy under Organisational influence 
 
 
Table 0-3: Definition for L2 Factor under organisational influence 
Parent Level Terminology Definition 
Organisational 
Influence 
Resource 
Management 
factor in a mishap if resource management and/or 
acquisition processes or policies, directly or 
indirectly, influence system safety and results in poor 
error management or creates an unsafe situation 
Organisational 
Climate 
Factor in a mishap if organizational variables 
including environment, structure, policies, and 
culture influence individual actions and results in 
human error or an unsafe situation. 
Organisational 
Process 
Factor in a mishap if organizational processes such as 
operations, procedures, operational risk management 
and oversight negatively influence individual, 
supervisory, and/or organizational performance and 
results in unrecognized hazards and/or uncontrolled 
risk and leads to human error or an unsafe situation 
Statutory factors Considered as external factor that mostly on the 
policy and regulatory side 
Taxonomy under supervision 
 
 
Table 0-4: Definition for L2 Factor under Supervision 
Parent Level L-2: 
Terminology 
Definition 
Supervision Inadequate 
supervision 
factor in a mishap when supervision proves 
inappropriate or improper and fails to identify a 
hazard, recognize and control risk, provide guidance, 
training and/or oversight and results in human error 
or an unsafe situation 
Planned 
inappropriate 
operation 
factor in a mishap when supervision fails to 
adequately assess the hazards associated with an 
operation and allows for unnecessary risk. It is also a 
Organisational 
Influence
Resource 
Management
Organisational 
Climate
Organisational 
Process
Statutory factor
Supervision
Inadequate 
Supervision
Planned Inappropriate 
Operations
Failed to Correct 
Known Problems
Supervisory 
Violations
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Parent Level L-2: 
Terminology 
Definition 
factor when supervision allows non-proficient or 
inexperienced personnel to attempt missions beyond 
their capability or when crew or flight makeup is 
inappropriate for the task or mission. 
Failure in 
correct known 
problem 
factor in a mishap when supervision fails to correct 
known deficiencies in documents, processes or 
procedures, or fails to correct inappropriate or unsafe 
actions of individuals, and this lack of supervisory 
action creates an unsafe situation. 
Supervisory 
violation 
factor in a mishap when supervision, while managing 
organizational assets, wilfully disregards instructions, 
guidance, rules, or operating instructions and this 
lack of supervisory responsibility creates an unsafe 
situation. 
Taxonomy under Precondition 
 
Table 0-5: Definition for L2 Factor under Precondition 
Parent Level L-2: 
Terminology 
Definition 
Pre Condition  Condition of 
Individual 
Factors in a mishap if cognitive, psycho-behavioural, 
adverse physical state, or physical/mental limitations 
affect practices, conditions or actions of individuals 
and result in human error or an unsafe situation. 
Environmental 
Factor 
factors in a mishap if physical or technological 
factors affect practices, conditions and actions of 
individual and result in human error or an unsafe 
situation 
Personal Factor factors in a mishap if self-imposed stressors or crew 
resource management affects practices, conditions or 
actions of individuals, and result in human error or an 
unsafe situation 
 
Taxonomy under Unsafe Acts 
 
Preconditions
Environmental 
Factors
Crew Condition Personnel Factors
Unsafe Acts
Errors Violations
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Table 0-6: Definition for L2 Factor unsafe Act 
Parent Level L-2: 
Terminology 
Definition 
Unsafe Acts Errors Factors in a mishap when mental or physical 
activities of the operator fail to achieve their intended 
outcome as a result of skill-based, perceptual, or 
judgment and decision making errors, leading to an 
unsafe situation 
Violations Factors in a mishap when the actions of the operator 
represent wilful disregard for rules and instructions 
and lead to an unsafe situation. Unlike errors, 
violations are deliberate. 
 
Level-3 Taxonomy 
Taxonomy under resource management 
 
Table 0-7: Definition for L3 Factor under Resource Management 
Parent Level L-3: Terminology Definition 
Resource 
Management 
Lack of human 
resource 
Issues that directly influence safety include 
selection (including background checks), 
training, and staffing/manning 
Poor technological 
resources 
Are factors in a mishap when ship design 
factors or automation affect the actions of 
individuals and result in human error or an 
unsafe situation 
Poor 
equipment/facility 
issues related to equipment design, including 
the purchasing of unsuitable equipment, 
inadequate design of workspaces, and failures 
to correct known design flaws 
 
Resource 
Management
Poor Equipment/
Facility Resources
Poor Technological 
Resources
Poor Equipment/
Facility Resources
 Inadequate safe  
manning
 Selection
 Training
 Excessive cost cutting
 Financial resources/ 
support
 Engineer support
 Acquisition policies/ 
design process
 Attrition policies
 Accession/ selection 
policies
 Poor engine-room 
design
 Poor engine-room 
machinery design
 Purchasing of 
unsuitable equipment
 Failure to correct 
known design flaws
 Shortage of tools
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Taxonomy under organisational climate 
 
Table 0-8: Definition for L3 Factor under Organisational Climate 
Parent Level L-3: Terminology Definition 
organizational 
climate 
Disorganised 
Structure 
a factor when the chain of command of an 
individual or structure of an organization is 
confusing, non-standard or inadequate and this 
creates an unsafe situation 
Inadequate 
Policies 
A course or method of action that guides present 
and future decisions. Policies may refer to hiring 
and firing, promotion, retention, raises, sick leave, 
drugs and alcohol, overtime, accident 
investigations, use of safety, equipment, etc. When 
these policies are ill-defined, adversarial, or 
conflicting, safety may be reduced 
Poor Work 
Culture 
a factor when explicit/implicit actions, statements  
or attitudes of unit leadership set unit/organizational 
values (culture) that allow an  
environment where unsafe mission demands or 
pressures exist 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Organisational 
Climate
Disorganised Structure Policies Poor Work Culture
 Chain-of-command
 Communication
 Accessibil ity/ visibility 
of supervisor
 Delegation of 
authority/ rigidity
 Formal  accountabil ity 
for actions
 Promot ion
 Hiring, firing and 
retention
 Drugs and alcohol
 Accident and incident 
investigation
 Norms and rules
 Organisat ional 
customs, beliefs and 
attitudes
 Safety  as a value
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Taxonomy under Organisational Process 
 
Table 0-9: Definition for L3 Factor under Organisational Process 
Parent Level L-3: Terminology Definition 
Organisational 
Process 
Poorly designed 
operation 
a factor when the potential risks of a large program, 
operation, acquisition or process are not adequately 
assessed and this inadequacy leads to an unsafe 
situation. 
Inappropriate 
procedures 
a factor when written direction, checklists, graphic 
depictions, tables, charts or other published 
guidance is inadequate, misleading or inappropriate 
and this creates an unsafe situation 
Lack of oversight a factor when programs are implemented without 
sufficient support, oversight or planning and this 
leads to an unsafe situation 
 
Taxonomy under statutory factor 
 
Table 0-10: Definition for L3 Factor under Statutory Factor 
Parent Level L-3: Terminology Definition 
Statutory Poor Factor that inadequate standards and regulations 
Organisational 
Process
Poorly Designed 
Operat ion
Inappropriate 
Procedures
Lack of Oversight
 Operat ional tempo/
workload
 Incentives
 Time pressure
 Schedules
 Performance 
standards
 Clearly defined 
objectives
 Procedural guidance/ 
publicat ions
 Informational 
resources/ support
 Doctrine
 Established safety 
programmes/ risk 
management 
programmes
 Monitoring and 
checking of 
resources, climate 
and processes to 
ensure safe work 
environment
Statutory factor
Poor International/
National Standards
Inadequate Flag State 
Implementation
 Rule-making process
 Regulations
 Link with vessel/ 
company
 Delegation of 
authority to RO
 Class and statutory 
surveys
 Communication
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factor international/ 
national standards 
cause an unsafe condition or situation 
Inadequate flag 
state 
implementation 
Factor in a mishap if the implementation of the 
flag state such as audit/survey/enforcement 
considered insufficient so it create unsafe 
condition 
 
Taxonomy under Inadequate Supervision 
 
Table 0-11: Definition for L3 Factor under Inadequate Supervision 
Parent Level L-3: Terminology Definition 
Inadequate 
supervision 
Poor shipborne 
and shore 
supervision 
a factor when the availability, competency, quality or 
timeliness of leadership, supervision or oversight does 
not meet task demands and creates an unsafe situation 
 
  
Inadequate Supervision
Poor Shipborne and Shore 
Supervision
 Leadership/ supervision/ oversight inadequate
 Supervision - modelling
 Local training issues/ programmes
 Supervision - policy
 Supervision - personality conflict
 Supervision - lack of feedback
 Failed to provide current public/ adequate technical data or procedures
 Failed to provide adequate rest period
 Lack of accountability
 Perceived lack of authority
 Failed to track qualifications
 Failed to track performance
 Over-tasked/ untrained officer at management level
 Loss of supervisory situational awareness
 Lack of communication with company representatives
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Taxonomy under planned inappropriate operations 
 
Table 0-12: Definition for L3 Factor under planned inappropriate operations 
Parent Level L-3: Terminology Definition  
Planned 
inappropriate 
operations 
Poor shipborne 
operations 
a factor in a mishap when supervision fails to 
adequately assess the hazards associated with an 
operation and allows for unnecessary risk 
 
Taxonomy under failed to correct problems 
 
Table 0-13: Definition for L3 Factor under Failed to correct known problems 
Parent Level L-3: Terminology Definition 
Failed to 
correct known 
problems 
Shipborne related 
shortcomings 
a factor when the supervisor selects an individual 
who‘s experience for either a specific manoeuvre, 
event or scenario is not sufficiently current to permit 
safe mission execution. 
 
 
Planned Inappropriate Operations
Poor Shipborne Operations
 Ordered/led maintenance beyond capability
 Poor crew interaction
 Limited recent experience
 Limited total experience
 Proficiency
 Lack of risk assessment - formal
 Authorised unnecessary hazard
 Failed to provide adequate brief time / supervision
 Failed to provide adequate opportunity for crew rest
 Excessive tasking/ loading
Failed to Correct 
Known Problems
Shipborne Related 
Shortcomings
 Failed to correct inappropriate/risky behaviour
 Failed to correct a safety hazard
 Failed to initiate corrective action
 Failed to report unsafe tendencies
 Failed to update manual
 Parts / tools incorrectly labeled
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Taxonomy under supervisory violations 
 
Table 0-14: Definition for L3 Factor under Supervisory violations 
Parent Level L-3: Terminology Definition 
Supervisory 
violations 
Shipborne 
violations 
Is a factor in a mishap when supervision while 
managing organizational assets wilfully disregards 
instructions, guidance, rules, or operating 
instructions and this lack of supervisory 
responsibility creates an unsafe situation 
 
Taxonomy under supervisory violations 
 
Table 0-15: Definition for L3 Factor under Environmental Factors 
Parent Level L-3: Terminology Definition 
Environmental 
factors 
Poor physical 
environmental 
Physical environment are factors in a mishap if 
environmental phenomena such as weather, climate, 
white-out or dust-out conditions affect the actions of 
Supervisory 
Violations
 Shipborne Violations
 Engaged unqualified crew
 Failed to enforce rules/regs
 Violated procedures
 Willful disregard of authority
 Inadequate documentation
Environmenta l Factors
Poor Physical Environment Poor Technological Environment
 Temperature - thermal stress
 Artificial  light
 Vibration
 Ship movements and manoeuvres
 Tox ins and cleanliness in machinery 
space
 Noise interference
 Controls and switches
 Automation
 Machinery space layout
 Communication equipment
 Barriers
 Faulty equipment
 Constrained tool use
 Complex fault
 Inaccessible maintenance area
 Machinery space configuration variabi lity
 Parts unavai lable
 Parts incorrect ly labeled
 Easy to instal l incorrectly
 Machinery space system knowledge
 Procedure not understandable
 Procedure unavailable/ inaccessible
 Incorrect procedure
 Too much/ conflicting information
 Process/ procedure update not carried out
 Incorrectly  modified manufacturer's 
procedures
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Parent Level L-3: Terminology Definition 
individuals and result in human error or an unsafe 
situation 
Poor 
technological 
environment 
Technological environment are factors in a mishap 
when cockpit/vehicle/workspace design factors or 
automation affect the actions of individuals and result 
in human error or an unsafe situation 
 
Taxonomy under crew condition 
 
Table 0-16: Definition for L3 Factor under Crew Condition 
Parent Level L-3: Terminology Definition 
Crew 
condition 
Negative 
cognitive factors 
Are factors in a mishap if cognitive or attention 
management conditions affect the perception or 
performance of individuals and result inhuman error or 
an unsafe situation 
Poor 
physiological 
state 
Are factors when an individual‘s personality traits, 
psychosocial problems, psychological disorders or 
inappropriate motivation creates an unsafe situation 
 
  
Crew Condition
Negative Cognitive Factors Poor Physiological State
 Inattention, repet itive and monotonous
 Channelised at tention
 Confusion
 Distraction
 Checklist interference
 Emotional  state
 Personality style
 Overconfidence
 Pressing
 Complacency
 Overagressive
 Excessive motivation to succeed
 Get-there-itis
 Response set
 Burnout
 Fatigue - mental
 Circadian rhythm desynchrony
 Misperception of operational condition
 Misinterpreted/ misread instrument
 Expectancy
 Auditory cues
 Other cues
 Alertness (drowsiness)
 Peer pressure
 Technical/procedural knowledge
 Negative transfer
 Effects of PoM and OTC (Medicinal 
Drugs)
 Operat ional injury/ illness
 Sudden incapacitation/ 
unconsciousness
 Physical fatigue
 Seasickness
 Hypoxia
 Hyperventilat ion
 Dehydration
 Physical task oversaturation
 Intoxication
 Nutrit ion
 Inadequate rest
 Unreported disqualified medical  
condition
 Overexcertion while off duty
 Misplaced motivation
 Inadequate mot ivation
 Pre-exist ing physical  illness/ injury/ 
deficient
 Motor skill/ coordinat ion or timing 
deficient
 Insufficient reaction time
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Taxonomy under personnel factors 
 
Table 0-17: Definition for L3 Factor under Personnel Factors 
Parent Level L-3: Terminology Definition 
Personnel 
factors 
Poor crew 
interaction 
Refer to interactions among individuals, crews, and 
teams involved with the preparation and  
execution of a mission that resulted in human error or 
an unsafe situation 
Poor personal 
readiness 
factors in a mishap if the operator demonstrates 
disregard for rules and instructions that govern the 
individuals readiness to perform, or exhibits poor 
judgment when it comes to readiness and results in 
human error or an unsafe situation 
 
  
Personnel Factors
Poor Crew Interaction Poor Personal Readiness
 Machinery space leadership
 Cross-monitoring performance
 Team work delegation
 Rank gradient/power distance
 Assertiveness
 Communicating critical 
information
 Challenge and reply
 Maintenance plan
 Maintenance plan briefing
 Task-in-progress re- planning
 Miscommunication
 Inadequate training
 Maintenance task knowledge
 Time constraints
 Pattern of poor risk judgment
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Taxonomy under errors 
 
Table 0-18: Definition for L3 Factor under Errors 
Parent Level L-3: Terminology Definition 
Errors Skilled based 
errors 
Are factors in a mishap when errors occur in the 
operator‘s execution of a routine, highly  
practiced task relating to procedure, training or 
proficiency and result in an unsafe a situation 
Decision and 
judgement errors 
Are factors in a mishap when behaviour or actions of 
the individual proceed as intended yet the  
chosen plan proves inadequate to achieve the desired 
end-state and results in an unsafe situation 
Perceptual errors Are factors in a mishap when misperception of an 
object, threat or situation, (such as visual,  
auditory, pro prioceptive, or vestibular illusions, 
cognitive or attention failures, etc), results in  
human error 
 
  
Errors
Skill-based errors
Decision and judgement 
errors
Perceptual errors
 Inadvertent use of 
equipment, control and 
switches
 Task overloadFailure to 
see and avoid
 Distraction
 Poor techniques/
seamanshipOver/
under-control of the 
system
 Over-reliance on 
automation
 Negative habit
 Checklist error
 Omitted step in 
procedure
 Procedures not used
 Failed to prioritise 
attention
 Risk assessment during 
operation
 Task misprioritisation
 Necessary action – 
rushed
 Necessary action – 
delayed
 Warning ignored
 Wrong decision making 
during operation
 Error due to 
misperception
 Error due to misjudged 
parameters
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Taxonomy under violations 
 
Table 0-19: Definition for L3 Factor under Violations 
Parent Level L-3: Terminology Definition 
Violations Routine a factor when a procedure or policy violation is 
systemic in a unit/setting and not based on a risk 
assessment for a specific situation. It needlessly 
commits the individual, team, or crew to an unsafe 
course-of-action. These violations may have leadership 
sanction and may not routinely result in 
disciplinary/administrative action. Habitual violations 
of a single individual or small group of individuals 
within a unit can constitute a routine/widespread 
violation if the violation was not routinely disciplined 
or was condoned by supervisors 
Exceptional a factor when an individual, crew or team intentionally 
violates procedures or policies without cause or need. 
These violations are unusual or isolated to specific 
individuals rather than larger groups. There is no 
evidence of these violations being condoned by 
leadership 
 
 
 
 
 
Violations
Routine Exceptional
 Violation based on risk 
assessment
 Inadequate briefing for job
 Operated when 
unauthorised
 Violated training rules
 Failed to comply with 
manuals
 Violated standing orders 
and regs
 Failed to inspect after 
alarm
 Exceeded limits of system
 Accepted unnecessary 
hazards
 Not qualified
 Unauthorised to operate 
beyond design criteria
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Taxonomy for phase-1: Risk of Accident 
 
Phase I under navigational incidents 
 
Table 0-20: Taxonomy for threat indication under navigational incidents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Risk Of Accident
Navigational 
Incidents
Onboard 
Incidents
'Entire-Vessel' 
Incidents
Personnel 
Incidents
Threat Indication Threat Detection Threat Analysis Preventive Action
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
T
h
re
at
 I
n
d
ic
at
io
n
 Onboard 
Equipment 
Radar 
Echo Sounder 
AIS 
ECDIS 
Sea Charts 
GPS 
Other 
Human 
Lookout 
OOW 
Other Crew Member 
Passenger 
Other 
Ashore 
Equipment 
Foghorn 
Lighthouse 
Bouy/Navigational Aid 
Other 
Human 
VTS 
Coastguard 
Other 
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Table 0-21: Taxonomy for threat detection under navigational incidents 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
T
h
re
at
 D
et
ec
ti
o
n
 
Onboard 
Equipment Decision Support System 
Other 
Human 
Master 
OOW 
Other 
Ashore Human 
VTS 
Other 
 
Table 0-22: Taxonomy for threat analysis under navigational incidents 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
T
h
re
at
 A
n
al
y
si
s 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Decision Support System 
Other 
Human 
Master 
OOW 
Other 
Ashore Human 
VTS 
Other 
 
Table 0-23: Taxonomy for threat prevention action under navigational incidents 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
T
h
re
at
 P
re
v
en
ti
o
n
 
A
ct
io
n
 Onboard Action 
Steering & Maneuvering 
Altering Speed 
Dropping Anchor 
Reverse Thrust 
Other 
Offboard Action 
Other Vessel Alters Course 
Other Vessel Alters Speed 
Other 
 
Taxonomy for On-board incidents 
Table 0-24: Taxonomy for threat indication under Onboard incidents 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
T
h
re
at
 I
n
d
ic
at
io
n
 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Fire Alarm System 
Heat Detector 
Smoke Detector 
CCTV & Cameras 
Other 
Human 
Lookout 
OOW/EOW 
Other Crew Member 
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L2B L2C L2D L2E 
Passenger 
Other 
Ashore 
Equipment 
Fleet Monitoring System 
Other 
Human 
Fleet Monitoring Centre 
Other 
 
Table 0-25: Taxonomy for threat detection under Onboard incidents 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
T
h
re
at
 D
et
ec
ti
o
n
 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Decision Support System 
Other 
Human 
Master 
OOW/EOW 
Other 
Ashore Human 
Fleet Monitoring Centre 
Other 
 
Table 0-26: Taxonomy for threat analysis under Onboard incidents 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
T
h
re
at
 A
n
al
y
si
s 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Decision Support System 
Other 
Human 
Master 
OOW 
Other 
Ashore 
Equipment 
Fleet Monitoring System 
Other 
Human 
Fleet Monitoring Centre 
Other 
 
 
Table 0-27: Taxonomy for threat prevention action under Onboard incidents 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
T
h
re
at
 P
re
v
en
ti
o
n
 
Onboard Action 
Cut off oxygen supply to flammable area 
Close fire doors 
Move flammable goods to safe place 
Reduce heat 
Shut down engine 
Shut down affected systems 
Other 
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Type of risk under 'Entire-Vessel' Incidents 
Table 0-28: Taxonomy for threat indication under 'Entire-Vessel' Incidents 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
T
h
re
at
 I
n
d
ic
at
io
n
 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Alarms & Warning 
Stability Indicators 
Water Level Indicators 
CCTV & Cameras 
Other 
Human 
Lookout 
OOW 
Other Crew Member 
Passenger 
Other 
Ashore 
Equipment 
Fleet Monitoring System 
Other 
Human 
Fleet Monitoring Centre 
Other 
 
Table 0-29: Taxonomy for threat detection under 'Entire-Vessel' Incidents 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
T
h
re
at
 D
et
ec
ti
o
n
 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Decision Support System 
Other 
Human 
Master 
OOW 
Other 
Ashore 
Equipment 
Fleet Monitoring System 
Other 
Human 
Fleet Monitoring Centre 
Other 
 
Table 0-30: Taxonomy for threat analysis under 'Entire-Vessel' Incidents 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
T
h
re
at
 A
n
al
y
si
s 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Decision Support System 
Other 
Human 
Master 
OOW 
Other 
Ashore 
Equipment 
Fleet Monitoring System 
Other 
Human 
Fleet Monitoring Centre 
Other 
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Table 0-31: Taxonomy for threat prevention action under 'Entire-Vessel' Incidents 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
T
h
re
at
  
P
re
v
en
ti
o
n
 
ac
ti
o
n
 
Onboard Action 
Altering Speed 
Stabilize & Secure Cargo 
Seal Hull Compartments 
Other 
 
 
Taxonomy for phase-2: The Accident 
 
 
Phase-2 Taxonomy for Navigational Incidents 
 
Table 0-32: Taxonomy for system health indication under Navigational Incidents 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
S
y
st
em
 H
ea
lt
h
 I
n
d
ic
at
io
n
 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Hull Damage Sensors 
List Indicators 
Water Level Indicators 
Stability Indicators 
Other 
Human 
OOW 
Other Crew Member 
Passenger 
Other 
Ashore 
Equipment 
Fleet Monitoring System 
Other 
Human 
Fleet Monitoring Centre 
Other 
 
Table 0-33: Taxonomy for system health detection under Navigational Incidents 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
S
y
st
em
 
H
ea
lt
h
 
D
et
ec
ti
o
n
 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Decision Support System 
Other 
Human Master 
Accident
Navigational 
Incidents
Onboard 
Incidents
'Entire-Vessel' 
Incidents
Personnel 
Incidents
System Health 
Indication
System Health 
Detection
System Health 
Analysis
Emergency
Action
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L2B L2C L2D L2E 
OOW 
Other 
Ashore 
Equipment 
Fleet Monitoring System 
Other 
Human 
Fleet Monitoring Centre 
Other 
 
Table 0-34: Taxonomy for system health analysis under Navigational Incidents 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
S
y
st
em
 H
ea
lt
h
 A
n
al
y
si
s 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Decision Support System 
Other 
Human 
Master 
OOW 
Other 
Ashore 
Equipment 
Fleet Monitoring System 
Other 
Human 
Fleet Monitoring Centre 
Other 
 
Table 0-35: Taxonomy for emergency response under Navigational Incidents 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
E
m
er
g
en
cy
 
R
es
p
o
n
se
 
Onboard Action 
Contain Hull Damage 
Contain Equipment Damage 
Drop Anchor 
Reverse Thrust 
Other 
Offboard Action 
Tug Vessel 
Other 
 
Phase-2 Taxonomy for On-board Incidents 
Table 0-36: Taxonomy for system health indication under Onboard Incidents 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
S
y
st
em
 H
ea
lt
h
 I
n
d
ic
at
io
n
 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Fire Alarm System 
Heat Detector 
Smoke Detector 
CCTV & Cameras 
Other 
Human 
Lookout 
OOW/EOW 
Other Crew Member 
Passenger 
Other 
Ashore Equipment Fleet Monitoring System 
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Other 
Human 
Fleet Monitoring Centre 
Other 
 
Table 0-37: Taxonomy for system health detection under Onboard Incidents 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
S
y
st
em
 H
ea
lt
h
 
D
et
ec
ti
o
n
 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Decision Support System 
Other 
Human 
Master 
OOW 
Other 
Ashore Human 
Fleet Monitoring Centre 
Other 
 
Table 0-38: Taxonomy for system health analysis under Onboard Incidents 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
S
y
st
em
 H
ea
lt
h
 A
n
al
y
si
s 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Decision Support System 
Other 
Human 
Master 
OOW 
Other 
Ashore 
Equipment 
Fleet Monitoring System 
Other 
Human 
Fleet Monitoring Centre 
Other 
 
Table 0-39: Taxonomy for emergency response under Onboard Incidents 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
E
m
er
g
en
cy
 R
es
p
o
n
se
 
Onboard Action 
Fire-fighting 
Sprinkler System 
Muster Crew 
Move flammable goods to safe place 
Cut off oxygen supply to flammable area 
Close fire doors 
Shut down engine 
Shut down affected systems 
Other 
Offboard Action 
Fire-fighting vessel 
Other 
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Phase-2 Taxonomy for 'Entire-Vessel' Incidents 
Table 0-40: Taxonomy for system health indication under 'Entire-Vessel' Incidents 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
S
y
st
em
 H
ea
lt
h
 I
n
d
ic
at
io
n
 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Alarms & Warning 
Stability Indicators 
Water Level Indicators 
CCTV & Cameras 
Other 
Human 
Lookout 
OOW 
Other Crew Member 
Passenger 
Other 
Ashore 
Equipment 
Fleet Monitoring System 
Other 
Human 
Fleet Monitoring Centre 
Other 
 
Table 0-41: Taxonomy for system health detection under 'Entire-Vessel' Incidents 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
S
y
st
em
 H
ea
lt
h
 D
et
ec
ti
o
n
 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Decision Support System 
Other 
Human 
Master 
OOW 
Other 
Ashore 
Equipment 
Fleet Monitoring System 
Other 
Human 
Fleet Monitoring Centre 
Other 
 
Table 0-42: Taxonomy for system health analysis under 'Entire-Vessel' Incidents 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
S
y
st
em
 H
ea
lt
h
 A
n
al
y
si
s 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Decision Support System 
Other 
Human 
Master 
OOW 
Other 
Ashore 
Equipment 
Fleet Monitoring System 
Other 
Human 
Fleet Monitoring Centre 
Other 
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Table 0-43: Taxonomy for emergency response under 'Entire-Vessel' Incidents 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
E
m
er
g
en
cy
 R
es
p
o
n
se
 
Onboard Action 
Altering Speed 
Stabilize & Secure Cargo 
Seal Hull Compartments 
Seal Watertight Compartments 
Ballast Water Stabilisation 
Other 
Ashore Action 
Tug Vessel 
Other 
 
Taxonomy for phase-3: Phase III- Evacuation 
 
Phase-3 for Navigational Incident 
Table 0-44: Taxonomy of Emergency response and evacuation for phase-3 under navigational incident 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
E
m
er
g
en
cy
 R
es
p
o
n
se
 &
 
E
v
ac
u
at
io
n
 
Onboard Action 
Contain Hull Damage 
Contain Equipment Damage 
Drop Anchor 
Reverse Thrust 
Lower Lifeboats 
Lower MES/Liferafts 
Muster Personnel 
Other Emergency Response Measure 
Other Evacuation Measure 
Offboard Action 
Call Tug Vessel 
Call SAR Services 
Other 
 
Table 0-45: Taxonomy of system health indication for phase-3 under navigational incident 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
S
y
st
em
 H
ea
lt
h
 I
n
d
ic
at
io
n
 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Hull Damage Sensors 
List Indicators 
Water Level Indicators 
Stability Indicators 
Other 
Human 
OOW 
Other Crew Member 
Passenger 
Other 
Ashore Equipment 
Fleet Monitoring System 
Other 
System health 
Indication
System health detection System health Analysis
Emergency response 
and evacuation action
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Human 
Fleet Monitoring Centre 
Other 
 
Table 0-46: Taxonomy of system health detection for phase-3 under navigational incident 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
S
y
st
em
 H
ea
lt
h
 D
et
ec
ti
o
n
 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Decision Support System 
Other 
Human 
Master 
OOW 
Other 
Ashore 
Equipment 
Fleet Monitoring System 
Other 
Human 
Fleet Monitoring Centre 
Other 
 
Table 0-47: Taxonomy of system health detection for phase-3 under navigational incident 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
S
y
st
em
 H
ea
lt
h
 A
n
al
y
si
s 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Decision Support System 
Other 
Human 
Master 
OOW 
Other 
Ashore 
Equipment 
Fleet Monitoring System 
Other 
Human 
Fleet Monitoring Centre 
Other 
 
Onboard Incident 
Table 0-48: Taxonomy of Emergency response and evacuation for phase-3 under onboard incident 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
E
m
er
g
en
cy
 R
es
p
o
n
se
 &
 E
v
ac
u
at
io
n
 
Onboard Action 
Fire-fighting 
Sprinkler System 
Muster Crew 
Move flammable goods to safe place 
Cut off oxygen supply to flammable area 
Close fire doors 
Shut down engine 
Shut down affected systems 
Lower Lifeboats 
Lower MES/Liferafts 
Muster Personnel 
Other Emergency Response Measure 
Other Evacuation Measure 
Offboard Action Call Fire-fighting vessel 
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L2B L2C L2D L2E 
Call SAR Services 
Other 
 
Table 0-49: Taxonomy of system health detection for phase-3 under Onboard incident 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
S
y
st
em
 H
ea
lt
h
 I
n
d
ic
at
io
n
 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Fire Alarm System 
Heat Detector 
Smoke Detector 
CCTV & Cameras 
Other 
Human 
Lookout 
OOW/EOW 
Other Crew Member 
Passenger 
Other 
Ashore 
Equipment 
Fleet Monitoring System 
Other 
Human 
Fleet Monitoring Centre 
Other 
 
Table 0-50: Taxonomy of system health detection for phase-3 under onboard incident 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
S
y
st
em
 H
ea
lt
h
 
D
et
ec
ti
o
n
 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Decision Support System 
Other 
Human 
Master 
OOW 
Other 
Ashore Human 
Fleet Monitoring Centre 
Other 
 
Table 0-51: Taxonomy of system health analysis for phase-3 under onboard incident 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
S
y
st
em
 H
ea
lt
h
 A
n
al
y
si
s 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Decision Support System 
Other 
Human 
Master 
OOW 
Other 
Ashore 
Equipment 
Fleet Monitoring System 
Other 
Human 
Fleet Monitoring Centre 
Other 
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Phase taxonomy for 'Entire-Vessel' Incidents 
Table 0-52: Taxonomy of Emergency response and evacuation for phase-3 under 'Entire-Vessel' Incidents 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
E
m
er
g
en
cy
 R
es
p
o
n
se
 &
 E
v
ac
u
at
io
n
 
Onboard Action 
Altering Speed 
Stabilize & Secure Cargo 
Seal Hull Compartments 
Seal Watertight Compartments 
Ballast Water Stabilisation 
Lower Lifeboats 
Lower MES/Liferafts 
Muster Personnel 
Other Emergency Response Measure 
Other Evacuation Measure 
Ashore Action 
Call Tug Vessel 
Call SAR Services 
Other 
 
Table 0-53: Taxonomy of System health indication for phase-3 under 'Entire-Vessel' Incidents 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
S
y
st
em
 H
ea
lt
h
 I
n
d
ic
at
io
n
 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Alarms & Warning 
Stability Indicators 
Water Level Indicators 
CCTV & Cameras 
Other 
Human 
Lookout 
OOW 
Other Crew Member 
Passenger 
Other 
Ashore 
Equipment 
Fleet Monitoring System 
Other 
Human 
Fleet Monitoring Centre 
Other 
 
Table 0-54: Taxonomy of system health detection for phase-3 under 'Entire-Vessel' Incidents 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
S
y
st
em
 H
ea
lt
h
 D
et
ec
ti
o
n
 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Decision Support System 
Other 
Human 
Master 
OOW 
Other 
Ashore 
Equipment 
Fleet Monitoring System 
Other 
Human 
Fleet Monitoring Centre 
Other 
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Table 0-55: Taxonomy of system health analysis for phase-3 under 'Entire-Vessel' Incidents 
L2B L2C L2D L2E 
S
y
st
em
 H
ea
lt
h
 A
n
al
y
si
s 
Onboard 
Equipment 
Decision Support System 
Other 
Human 
Master 
OOW 
Other 
Ashore 
Equipment 
Fleet Monitoring System 
Other 
Human 
Fleet Monitoring Centre 
Other 
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Error Mode for each Phase 
Specify whether the step was Applicable and Successful – Level 3A & 3B 
This stage firstly breaks down each step into smaller ‗sub-steps‘, as follows: 
Step Sub-Steps 
Indication Information Recording 
 Information Transmission 
Detection Information Receiving 
 Information Evaluation 
 Information Transmission 
Analysis Information Receiving 
 Planning 
 Decision Making 
Action Communication 
 Timing & Sequence 
 Selection & Quality 
Once again, these steps and sub-steps are self-explanatory. 
At this stage, the user must determine whether each sub-step was applicable or not. If 
it was not applicable (for instance, if the threat indicator and detector are the same 
person and there is therefore no transmission or receiving or information; or if there 
was no threat detection) the user does not need to answer any more questions, and 
can move to the next sub-step or step. Alternatively, if a sub-step was applicable, and 
successful, in that case too, the user can move to the next sub-step without going into 
further stages of the sub-step.  
If, however, a sub-step is applicable, and unsuccessful, the user must answer further 
questions, and moves to stage 5.  
Note here that successful means success in the context of the sub-step – and not in 
the context of the entire accident or incident; a successful action might still be a 
wrong action in terms of the accident, but it was ‗successful‘ because in itself, it was 
done correctly, but may, for example, have been based on wrong information from 
the previous step.  
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Specify whether Human or Equipment Failure – Level 4A 
If a sub-step was unsuccessful, the user can select in this stage if it was due to human 
or equipment failure.  
Specify what the Human or Equipment Failure Was – Level 4B 
In this level, the user gets to specify what the exact human or equipment failure was. 
It depends on the sub-step, and the phase that the user is in. Tables on the following 
pages show the possible failures for each possible sub-step as defined in earlier on 
this page.  This taxonomy is adapted from the TRACEr taxonomy of Kirwan and 
Shorrock (2002). 
Table 0-56: Possible Failures for Information Recording 
No Information Recorded 
Unclear Information Recorded 
Partial Information Recorded 
Wrong Information Recorded 
Delay in Information Recorded 
Unnecessary Information Recorded 
 
Table 0-57: Possible Failures for Information 
Transmission 
No Information Transmitted 
Unclear Information Transmitted 
Partial Information Transmitted 
Wrong Information Transmitted 
Delay in Information Transmitted 
Unnecessary Information Transmitted 
 
Table 0-58: Possible Failures for Information 
Transmission 
No Information Received 
Unclear Information Received 
Partial Information Received 
Wrong Information Received 
Delay in Information Received 
Unnecessary Information Received 
 
Table 0-59: Possible Failures for Information 
Evaluation 
No Evaluation 
Unclear Evaluation 
Partial Evaluation 
Incorrect Evaluation 
Delayed Evaluation 
 
Table 0-60: Possible Failures for Planning 
No Planning 
Unclear Planning 
Partial Planning 
Wrong Planning 
Delay in Planning 
Unnecessary Planning 
 
Table 0-61; Possible Failures for Decision 
Making 
No Decision 
Unclear Decision 
Partial Decision 
Wrong Decision 
Delay in Decision 
 
Table 0-62: Possible Failures for 
Communication 
No Action Information 
Provided/Recorded 
Unclear Action Information 
Provided/Recorded 
Partial Action Information 
Provided/Recorded 
Wrong Action  Information 
Provided/Recorded 
Delay in Action Information 
176 
 
Provided/Recorded 
Unnecessary Action Information 
Provided/Recorded 
 
Table 0-63: Possible Failures for Timing & 
Sequence 
Action too long 
Action too short 
Action too early 
Action too late 
Action repeated 
Action in wrong sequence 
 
Table 0-64: Possible Failures for Selection & 
Quality 
Omission 
Action too much 
Action too little 
Action in wrong direction 
Wrong action on right object 
Right action on wrong object 
Wrong action on wrong object 
Extraneous act 
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In this level, the user gets to specify why the human or equipment made an error or 
failed. It depends solely on whether a human or technical subject committed a 
failure, regardless of the phase or the step. The taxonomy for this stage too (at least 
for the human subjects) is adapted from TRACEr (Kirwan, Shorrock 2002).  
The following tables show possible internal error modes for human subjects.  
Table 0-65: possible internal error modes for human subjects 
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Table 0-66: Possible Failures for decision making, action & violation 
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The following tables show the possible respective psychological error modes, also 
for human subjects.  
Table 0-67: Psychological error modes for human subjects for perception and memory 
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Table 0-68: Psychological error modes for human subjects for decision making, action and Intended 
violation 
 
With regards to equipment failures, there is no ‗taxonomy‘ per se. However, it is 
broadly been identified that an equipment may cause a failure if it is not installed, if 
it is turned off, is on the wrong settings, suffers from an electric failure, has a poor 
maintenance record, is out-dated technology, has loose connections or unreliable 
software. Some of these errors too can be traced back to human mistakes, but 
primarily may be considered ‗equipment‘ failure causes.  
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Stage of Indication 
Table 0-69: error mode and cognitive process during stage of indication 
 
 
 
 
No Threat Information Recorded
Unclear Threat Information Recorded
Partial Threat Information Recorded
Wrong Threat Information Recorded
Delay in Threat Information Recorded
Unnecessary Threat Information Recorded
Correct Threat Information Recorded
No Threat Information Recorded
Unclear Threat Information Recorded
Partial Threat Information Recorded
Wrong Threat Information Recorded
Delay in Threat Information Recorded
Unnecessary Threat Information Recorded
No Threat Information Transmitted
Unclear Threat Information Transmitted
Partial Threat Information Transmitted
Wrong Threat Information Transmitted
Delay in Threat Information Transmitted
Unnecessary Threat Information Transmitted
Correct Threat Information Transmitted
No Threat Information Transmitted
Unclear Threat Information Transmitted
Partial Threat Information Transmitted
Wrong Threat Information Transmitted
Delay in Threat Information Transmitted
Unnecessary Threat Information Transmitted
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
 R
ec
o
rd
in
g 
A
p
p
lic
ab
le
?
Equipment Failure - Specify
Choose a problem based on chosen hardware - e.g. not installed, turned off, wrong settings, 
electric failure, poor maintenance record, out-of-date technology, loose connections, unreliable 
software
Human Failure - Specify
Mis-hear, mis-see, mis-read threat; ignore threat; late detection of threat; forget to monitor for 
threat; forget to share information of threat; omitted action
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
 T
ra
n
sm
is
si
o
n
 A
p
p
lic
ab
le
?
Equipment Failure - Specify
Choose a problem based on chosen Auto. System - e.g. not installed, turned off, wrong settings, 
electric failure, poor maintenance record, out-of-date technology, loose connections, unreliable 
software
Human Failure - Specify
Mis-hear, mis-see, mis-read threat; ignore threat; late detection of threat; forget to monitor for 
threat; forget to share information of threat; omitted action
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
 R
ec
o
rd
in
g 
Su
cc
es
sf
u
l?
 If
 
n
o
t:
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
 T
ra
n
sm
is
si
o
n
 S
u
cc
es
sf
u
l?
 If
 
n
o
t:
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Stage of Detection 
Table 0-70: error mode and cognitive process during stage of detection 
 
 
No Threat Information Received
Unclear Threat Information Received
Partial Threat Information Received
Wrong Threat Information Received
Delay in Threat Information Received
Unnecessary Threat Information Received
Correct Threat Information Received
No Threat Information Received
Unclear Threat Information Received
Partial Threat Information Received
Wrong Threat Information Received
Delay in Threat Information Received
Unnecessary Threat Information Received
No Evaluation
Incorrect Evaluation
Delayed Evaluation
Partial Evaluation
Unclear Evaluation
Correct Evaluation
No Evaluation
Unclear Evaluation
Partial Evaluation
Incorrect Evaluation
Delayed Evaluation
No Threat Evaluation Transmitted
Unclear Threat Evaluation Transmitted
Partial Threat Evaluation Transmitted
Wrong Threat Evaluation Transmitted
Delay in Threat Evaluation Transmitted
Unnecessary Threat Evaluation Transmitted
Correct Threat Evaluation Transmitted
No Threat Evaluation Transmitted
Unclear Threat Evaluation Transmitted
Partial Threat Evaluation Transmitted
Wrong Threat Evaluation Transmitted
Delay in Threat EvaluationTransmitted
Unnecessary Threat EvaluationTransmitted
Equipment Failure - Specify
Choose a problem based on chosen Auto. System - e.g. not installed, turned off, wrong settings, 
electric failure, poor maintenance record, out-of-date technology, loose connections, unreliable 
software
Human Failure - Specify
Mis-hear, mis-see, mis-read threat; ignore threat; late detection of threat; forget to monitor for 
threat; forget to share information of threat; omitted action
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
 R
ec
ei
vi
n
g 
Su
cc
es
sf
u
l?
 If
 n
o
t:
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
 E
va
lu
at
io
n
 
Su
cc
es
sf
u
l?
 If
 n
o
t:
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
 T
ra
n
sm
is
si
o
n
 S
u
cc
es
sf
u
l?
 If
 
n
o
t:
Equipment Failure - Specify
No or incorrect threat indication; Choose a problem based on chosen Auto. System - e.g. not 
installed, turned off, wrong settings, electric failure, poor maintenance record, out-of-date 
technology, loose connections, unreliable software
Human Failure - Specify
No or incorrect threat indication; Mis-hear, mis-see, or mis-read threat indicator; ignore threat 
indicator; late detection of threat indicator; forget to monitor threat indicator; forget to ask 
information of threat indicator; omitted action
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
 E
va
lu
at
io
n
 
A
p
p
lic
ab
le
?
Equipment Failure - Specify
No or incorrect threat indication; Choose a problem based on chosen hardware - e.g. not 
installed, turned off, wrong settings, electric failure, poor maintenance record, out-of-date 
technology, loose connections, unreliable software
Human Failure - Specify
No or incorrect threat indication; Perception Problems (Expectation bias, confusion, discrimation 
failure, tunnel vision, overload of information, lack of vigilance, distractions, time pressure, desire 
for harmony, group think); Memory Problems (Mis-recall information about threat; prospective 
memory failure; forget temporary information; forget long term training & procedures)
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
 R
ec
ei
vi
n
g 
A
p
p
lic
ab
le
?
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
 T
ra
n
sm
is
si
o
n
 A
p
p
lic
ab
le
?
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Stage of Analysis 
Table 0-71: error mode and cognitive process during stage of analysis 
  
No Threat EvaluationReceived
Unclear Threat Evaluation Received
Partial Threat Evaluation Received
Wrong Threat Evaluation Received
Delay in Threat Evaluation Received
Unnecessary Threat EvaluationReceived
Correct Threat EvaluationReceived
No Threat Evaluation Received
Unclear Threat EvaluationReceived
Partial Threat Evaluation Received
Wrong Threat Evaluation Received
Delay in Threat Evaluation Received
Unnecessary Threat Evaluation Received
No Preventive Planning
Unclear Preventive Planning
Partial Preventive Planning
Wrong Preventive Planning
Delay in Preventive Planning
Unnecessary Preventive Planning
Correct Preventive Planning
No Preventive Planning
Unclear Preventive Planning
Partial Preventive Planning
Wrong Preventive Planning
Delay in Preventive Planning
Unnecessary Preventive Planning
No Decision
Unclear Decision
Partial Decision
Wrong Decision
Delay in Decision
CorrectDecision
No Decision
Unclear Decision
Partial Decision
Wrong Decision
Delay in Decision
Equipment Failure - Specify
No or incorrect threat indication; Choose a problem based on chosen Auto. System - e.g. not 
installed, turned off, wrong settings, electric failure, poor maintenance record, out-of-date 
technology, loose connections, unreliable software
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
 R
ec
ei
vi
n
g 
A
p
p
lic
ab
le
?
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
 R
ec
ei
vi
n
g 
Su
cc
es
sf
u
l?
 If
 
n
o
t:
Human Failure - Specify
No or incorrect threat indication; Mis-hear, mis-see, or mis-read threat indicator; ignore threat 
indicator; late detection of threat indicator; forget to monitor threat indicator; forget to ask 
information of threat indicator; omitted action
P
la
n
n
in
g 
A
p
p
lic
ab
le
?
P
la
n
n
in
g 
Su
cc
es
sf
u
l?
 If
 n
o
t:
Equipment Failure - Specify
No or incorrect threat detection; Choose a problem based on chosen hardware - e.g. not 
installed, turned off, wrong settings, electric failure, poor maintenance record, out-of-date 
technology, loose connections, unreliable software
Human Failure - Specify
No or incorrect threat detection; Perception Problems (Expectation bias, confusion, discrimation 
failure, tunnel vision, overload of information, lack of vigilance, distractions, time pressure, desire 
for harmony, group think); Memory Problems (Mis-recall information about threat; prospective 
memory failure; forget temporary information; forget long term training & procedures)
D
ec
is
io
n
 M
ak
in
g 
A
p
p
lic
ab
le
?
D
ec
is
io
n
 S
u
cc
es
sf
u
l?
 If
 n
o
t:
Equipment Failure - Specify
No or incorrect planning; Choose a problem based on chosen hardware - e.g. not installed, 
turned off, wrong settings, electric failure, poor maintenance record, out-of-date technology, 
loose connections, unreliable software
Human Failure - Specify
No or incorrect planning; Perception Problems (Expectation bias, confusion, discrimation failure, 
tunnel vision, overload of information, lack of vigilance, distractions, time pressure, desire for 
harmony, group think); Memory Problems (Mis-recall information about threat; prospective 
memory failure; forget temporary information; forget long term training & procedures)
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Selection of action 
Table 0-72: taxonomy for source of failure, error mode and cognitive process during selection of action 
 
No Action Information Provided/Recorded
Unclear Action Information Provided/Recorded
Partial Action Information Provided/Recorded
Wrong Action  Information Provided/Recorded
Delay in Action Information Provided/Recorded
Unnecessary Action Information Provided/Recorded
Correct action communication
No Action Information Provided/Recorded
Unclear Action Information Provided/Recorded
Partial Action Information Provided/Recorded
Wrong Action  Information Provided/Recorded
Delay in Action Information Provided/Recorded
Unnecessary Action Information Provided/Recorded
Action too long
Action too short
Action too early
Action too late
Action repeated
Action in wrong sequence
Correct action timing & sequence
Action too long
Action too short
Action too early
Action too late
Action repeated
Action in wrong sequence
Omission
Action too much
Action too little
Action in wrong direction
Wrong action on right object
Right action on wrong object
Wrong action on wrong object
Extraneous act
Correct action selction & quality
Omission
Action too much
Action too little
Action in wrong direction
Wrong action on right object
Right action on wrong object
Wrong action on wrong object
Extraneous act
C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
at
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n
 A
p
p
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ab
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?
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o
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m
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 If
 n
o
t:
Se
le
ct
io
n
 &
 Q
u
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y 
A
p
p
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ab
le
?
Se
le
ct
io
n
 &
 Q
u
al
it
y 
Su
cc
es
sf
u
l?
 If
 n
o
t:
Equipment Failure - Specify
No Threat analysis; Choose a problem based on chosen hardware - e.g. not installed, turned off, 
wrong settings, electric failure, poor maintenance record, out-of-date technology, loose 
connections, unreliable software
Human Failure - Specify
E.g., Mis-hear, mis-see, mis-read instructions; ignore instructions ; forget to share instructions; 
omitted action, Perception Problems (Expectation bias, confusion, discrimation failure, tunnel 
vision, overload of information, lack of vigilance, distractions, time pressure, desire for harmony, 
group think); Memory Problems (Mis-recall instructions; prospective memory failure; forget 
temporary information; forget long term training & procedures)
Equipment Failure - Specify
No Threat analysis; Choose a problem based on chosen hardware - e.g. not installed, turned off, 
wrong settings, electric failure, poor maintenance record, out-of-date technology, loose 
connections, unreliable software
Human Failure - Specify
No Threat Analysis; Mis-hear, mis-see, mis-read instructions; ignore instructions ; forget to share 
instructions; omitted action, Perception Problems (Expectation bias, confusion, discrimation 
failure, tunnel vision, overload of information, lack of vigilance, distractions, time pressure, desire 
for harmony, group think); Memory Problems (Mis-recall instructions; prospective memory 
failure; forget temporary information; forget long term training & procedures)
Ti
m
in
g 
&
 S
eq
u
en
ce
 A
p
p
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ab
le
?
Ti
m
in
g 
&
 S
eq
u
en
ce
 S
u
cc
es
sf
u
l?
 If
 n
o
t:
Equipment Failure - Specify
No Threat analysis; Choose a problem based on chosen hardware - e.g. not installed, turned off, 
wrong settings, electric failure, poor maintenance record, out-of-date technology, loose 
connections, unreliable software
Human Failure - Specify
E.g., Mis-hear, mis-see, mis-read instructions; ignore instructions ; forget to share instructions; 
omitted action, Perception Problems (Expectation bias, confusion, discrimation failure, tunnel 
vision, overload of information, lack of vigilance, distractions, time pressure, desire for harmony, 
group think); Memory Problems (Mis-recall instructions; prospective memory failure; forget 
temporary information; forget long term training & procedures)
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Appendix – 4: List of selected investigation report into domestic RoPax ferry accidents and incidents 
Table 0-73: list of selected Indonesian domestic ferry cases 
No Involved ship/s Location and 
time 
Nature of 
Accident 
Consequences Probable 
Cause)* Ship/Structure Passenger Other Cargo 
1 Indonesian registered ro-ro 
passenger ferry MV. Wimala 
Dharma 
Lombok Strait, 
Nusa Tenggara 
Barat, on 7 
September 2003 
Sunk Total Loss  - Loss of 
Vehicle 
Technical 
2 Taiwan register container ship 
MV. Uni Chart with Indonesian 
register ro-ro passenger ferry 
MV. Mandiri Nusantara  
West Surabaya 
traffic lane, 
Madura Strait, on 
27 September 
2003 
Collision Minor damage to the 
Bulk Carrier. Partial 
damage to the ferry 
Loss of life  - Human Factor 
3 Indonesian registered ro-ro 
passenger ferry MV. Digul 
Off Merauke 
coast, Papua, 14 
July 2005 
Capsize/Sunk Total Loss Loss of life Loss of 
Vehicle 
Technical 
4 Indonesian registered ro-ro 
passenger ferry MV. Lampung 
2006 
Sunda strait, 23 
November 2006 
Engine room 
fire 
Extensive damage  - Loss of 
Vehicle 
Technical 
5 Indonesian registered ro-ro 
passenger ferry MV. Senopati 
Nusantara 2006 
Java Sea, 29 
Desember 2006 
Capsize/Sunk Total Loss Loss of life  - Technical 
6 Indonesian registered Ro-ro 
Passenger ferry MV. Nusa 
Bhakti 
Off Buk-buk 
Beach, Bali on 13 
January 2007 
Engine 
Room Fire 
Partial Damage  -  - Technical 
7 Indonesian registered Ro-ro 
Passenger ferry MV. Levina I 
40 Nm northern 
Tanjung Priok 
Port, Seribu 
Island, DKI 
Fire Extensive damage to 
ship structure 
Loss of life Loss of 
Vehicle 
Technical 
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No Involved ship/s Location and 
time 
Nature of 
Accident 
Consequences Probable 
Cause)* Ship/Structure Passenger Other Cargo 
Jakarta on 22 
February 2007 
8 Indonesian registered Ro-ro 
Passenger ferry MV. Dharma 
Kencana I 
Mentaya Hilir 
Selatan river, 
West Kalimantan 
on 18 May 2008 
Fire Partial Damage Loss of life  - Technical 
9 Indonesian registered Ro-ro 
Passenger ferry MV. Teratai 
Prima  
25 Nm off Pare-
pare, Makassar 
Strait, 11 January 
2009 
Capsize/Sunk Total Loss Loss of life Loss of 
Vehicle 
Human Factor 
10 Indonesian registered Ro-ro 
Passenger ferry MV. Mandiri 
Nusantara 
Java Sea, on 30 
May 2009 
Fire extensive damage Loss of life Loss of 
Vehicle 
Technical 
11 Investigation into fire on board 
Indonesian registered Ro-ro 
Passenger ferry MV. Laut Teduh 
2 
Sunda Strait, on 
28 January 2011 
Fire extensive damage  -  - Technical 
12 Indonesian registered Ro-ro 
Passenger ferry MV. Salvia 
Seribu Island, on 
08 February 2011 
Engine room 
fire 
Medium damage in 
the engine room 
 -  - Technical 
13 Indonesian registered Ro-ro 
Passenger ferry MV. Musthika 
Kencana II 
Java Sea, on 04 
July 2011 
Fire Extensive damage to 
ship structure, 
subsequently total 
loss 
 - Loss of 
Vehicle 
Technical 
14 Indonesian registered Ro-ro 
Passenger ferry MV. Windu 
Karsa 
Bone Bay, South 
east Celebes on 
27 August 2011 
Capsize/Sunk Total Loss - Loss of 
Vehicle 
Technical 
15 Indonesian registered Ro-ro 
Passenger ferry MV. Marina 
Nusantara with Indonesian 
Barito River, on 
26 September 
2011 
Collision Minor damage to the 
Barge, Extensive 
damage to the ferry 
Loss of life Loss of 
Vehicle 
Human Factor 
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No Involved ship/s Location and 
time 
Nature of 
Accident 
Consequences Probable 
Cause)* Ship/Structure Passenger Other Cargo 
registered tugged barge Bg. 
Pulau Tiga 330-22 
due to fire resulted 
from collision 
16 Indonesian registered Ro-ro 
Passenger ferry MV. Bahuga 
Jaya with Singapore registered 
chemical tanker MV. Norgas 
Cathinka 
Sunda Strait, on 
26 September 
2012 
Collision Minor damage to the 
Tanker ship, Total 
the ferry 
Loss of life Loss of 
Vehicle 
Human Factor 
 *: NTSC summary reports. Data obtained courtesy of NTSC, 2014 
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Appendix – 5: SEMOMAP model results compilation data 
Table 0-74: the compilation of SEMOMAP result for each phase and each stage to the selected cases 
 
Applicable & 
Successful
Applicable Not 
Succesfull
Not 
Applicable
Human 
Failure
Equipment 
Failure
Fire Phase-1 Threat Indication 7 52 27 8 17 6 2
Threat Detection 4 78 47 12 19 12 0
Threat Analysis 5 78 46 8 24 8 0
Threat Prevention 
Action
5 78 31 21 26 17 4
Phase-2
System Health 
Indication
5 56 38 0 18 0 0
System Health 
Detection
3 84 70 4 10 4 0
System Health Analysis 3 84 68 8 8 8 0
Emergency Response 
Action
7 84 43 34 7 26 8
Phase-3
Emergency Response 
& Evacuation Action
8 66 42 23 1 17 6
System Health 
Indication
4 44 30 0 14 0 0
System Health 
Detection
4 66 51 0 15 0 0
System Health Analysis 4 66 51 2 13 2 0
836 544 120 172 100 20
Capsize Phase-1 Threat Indication 6 60 34 1 25 1 0
Threat Detection 5 90 66 7 17 6 1
Threat Analysis 4 90 51 23 16 23 0
Threat Prevention 
Action
4 90 47 23 20 20 3
Phase-2
System Health 
Indication
2 8 4 0 4 0 0
System Health 
Detection
2 12 10 0 2 0 0
System Health Analysis 1 12 4 6 2 6 0
Emergency Response 
Action
1 12 4 8 0 7 1
Phase-3
Emergency Response 
& Evacuation Action
4 33 20 13 0 12 1
System Health 
Indication
5 22 15 0 7 0 0
System Health 
Detection
1 33 22 3 8 3 0
System Health Analysis 1 33 14 6 13 6 0
495 291 90 114 84 6
Collision Phase-1 Threat Indication 5 34 25 0 9 0 0
Threat Detection 4 51 31 5 15 5 0
Threat Analysis 4 51 12 23 16 23 0
Threat Prevention 
Action
6 51 35 14 2 10 4
Phase-2
System Health 
Indication
5 18 13 0 5 0 0
System Health 
Detection
4 27 21 1 5 1 0
System Health Analysis 3 27 20 4 3 4 0
Emergency Response 
Action
6 27 23 4 0 4 0
Phase-3
Emergency Response 
& Evacuation Action
6 18 10 8 0 8 0
System Health 
Indication
4 12 10 0 2 0 0
System Health 
Detection
4 18 14 0 4 0 0
System Health Analysis 2 18 12 2 4 2 0
352 226 61 65 57 4
Total
Total
Number of 
event
Nature of 
Accident
Observable process of fail/safe status Source of Failure
Number of 
Subject
StagesPhase
